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Abstract 
This thesis examines how the Kurdish media communicate political issues in relation 
to corruption, reform, government performance, and citizens' trust. In particular it 
investigates how young people understand and respond to political issues across the 
media and how their social and political backgrounds affect their evaluation of the 
government’s performance and the role of elections in the political process. This 
investigation is combined with how media professionals view editorial policy of news 
coverage of political issues and freedom to access the public sector. 
This thesis employs a combination of methods: content and framing analysis to 
examine five media platforms; focus groups, interviews and semi-structured 
interviews to elicit the views of young people and media editors; a thematic analysis is 
employed to assess the data gathered from both young people and media editors. 
Overall, the findings indicated that both the ruling party’s media and the opposition 
media, particularly the television channels, focus on using magnifying frames and 
localising frames in their coverage of the political issues with varying degrees. Each of 
them reflects the same reality differently which in turn leads to the viewers and 
readers become divided into two categories. This diversity of framing news coverage 
is due to the media discourse of the ruling party and opposition media and the 
political background of the young people as well. This research has revealed the need, 
especially from young people, for the establishment of a national media that strike a 
balance between the opposition and ruling parties and offer coverage of political 
issues without the direct influence of political parties. 
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Chapter one 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Political Contexts 
This study concerns political communication and investigates the relationship 
between young people and political news across the media in Iraqi Kurdistan. Young 
people in this thesis are those aged between 18 and 28, as they have received very 
little attention from the main political parties although they constitute one of the 
largest sections of the overall population (Saber, 2015). A large proportion of this 
category suffers from unemployment while the other group who are university 
students, are not optimistic about the future particularly in terms of finding jobs 
(Abdullah, 2013). Since the two political parties in power, namely the Patriotic Union 
of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Democratic Party of Kurdistan (KDP) have monopolised 
the public sector, the Peshmerga and Security forces, as well as the economy, they 
have succeeded in controlling the larger part of society through clientelism (Qani and 
Fatah 2012). In other words, the two political parties have used public funds, jobs and 
posts to buy people's votes and loyalty. The clientelism system exists when a kind of 
deal is struck between those in power and clients in society who agree to exchange 
benefits. In this regard, Bardhan and Mookherjee (2011) note that clientelism is 
associated with the political parties in power and they argue that ‘Clientelism refers to 
strategic transfers made by political parties and governments to poor and 
disadvantaged groups as a means of securing their votes, in an effort to consolidate 
political power’ (2011, p 2). 
After the fall of the Saddam regime in 2003, the international economic sanctions 
were lifted which led to the Iraqi budget increasing rapidly as well as that of Kurdistan 
which receives 17% of the Iraqi budget (Salih, 2015). The two political parties started 
to appoint people and distribute jobs and posts on the basis of clientelism, which in 
turn fuelled unemployment amongst the new young generation who had just 
graduated. This category felt that although they had qualifications they had little 
chance of securing jobs, since a large number of people had been been appointed 
during 2003 - 2009 despite having no qualifications.  
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Alongside this, the opposition parties became stronger particularly following the 
emergence of the Gorran Movement which means “change” in English and which 
appeared formally in the elections in July 2009. The Gorran Movement was led by 
Nawshirwan Mustafa, the deputy leader of the PUK party, which he left arguing that 
he could not fight corruption and introduce reforms because the party would not 
allow him, therefore he established firstly a media company and then the Gorran 
party. According to many political observers and researchers, the real opposition 
party emerged from this election as they believed it was an important period of 
transition in the political and civic life of Kurdistan (Haji, 2015). This party, before 
announcing itself, established a media company in 2007 called Wsha (meaning “word” 
in English) which mainly focused on corruption and reform by arguing for change in 
the power structure. The Gorran Movement mostly relies on its media, particularly 
KNN TV and the Sbeiy website, to deliver its political discourse to people and remains 
focused on young people as they have received little attention compared to other 
demographic categories. The traditional political parties, such as the political parties 
in power, relied on recruiting large numbers to their membership on the basis of 
clientelism. In turn, this meant the two main parties did not focus on the media in 
elections before 2009 because they already controlled the people. By contrast  Gorran 
relied on the media because it had no budget to buy votes and was not in a position to 
use jobs and posts to buy support. From this standpoint the media began to play a 
large role in political communication as Gorran pushed the two political parties to 
give importance to the media in the political communication process. Therefore, this 
study is important because it seeks to investigate this phenomenon by examining the 
role of the media in political communication particularly regarding young people who 
are targeted by the media of the opposition and ruling parties who both recognise the 
importance of gaining favour with this demographic sector. 
In Kurdistan, there is no national broadcasting service as the media is controlled by 
the main political parties. The media platforms in this thesis were selected according 
to their ownership, since the political television channels are monopolised by the 
political parties. In this sense the two channels, namely GK TV, the main political TV, is 
owned by the PUK which is one of the main political parties in power, while KNN TV, 
the opposition political TV, is owned by the Gorran Movement which is also the main 
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opposition party. Alongside the two television channels, this  thesis  selected three 
websites, the online versions of former or existing printed publications, namely 
Xendan, owned by the PUK and the Sbeiy website which is owned by the Gorran 
Movement. Both these websites formerly had a print version but now they only retain 
an online presence. The final website is Awena which is independent and still has a 
print version, but this research focuses on its online output in order to maintain 
coherence with the other two websites and because online media have become more 
popular than print media. In this thesis, the print media were excluded because they 
are faltering, for example both Xendan and Sbeiy had a print version but they were 
closed down due to their loss of popularity. Furthermore, this thesis excludes social 
media because the Internet service in Kurdistan is unstable and not available 
everywhere as well being expensive compared to people's incomes. This thesis 
investigates the political discourse across the Kurdish media and how young people 
understand and respond to this discourse, in particular relating to the four issues: 
corruption, reforms, government performance and citizens’ trust. These four political 
issues are the most important in people's minds and interests, therefore they are 
becoming daily subjects across the media (Warty, 2008; Hussain, 2015).  
This thesis seeks to investigate the impact of the media in shaping Kurdish young 
people’s attitudes, principally in relation to corruption, reform, citizens’ trust and 
government performance. Currently all media platforms in Kurdistan are attempting 
to focus their political communication on young people’s concerns and aspirations. 
Consequently, the thesis seeks to evaluate the media news coverage of the four 
political issues by adopting a framing analysis as a qualitative approach for analysing 
the textual news and by using content analysis to provide indicators for identifying 
the agenda of the five media platforms studied. Beside this, in-depth interviews were 
conducted with media professionals representing the five media platforms to 
investigate how they cover the political issues and to what extent they can access the 
public sector to obtain information about these issues. This thesis investigates how 
young people understand and respond to this media content through conducting focus 
groups with representative participants. Furthermore it uses in-depth interviews and 
semi-structured interviews to examine how young people view the government's 
performance and the role of elections in the political process. 
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1.2 The Rationale of the Research Project 
Decision-making in Kurdistan is conducted within the two main political parties 
rather than in the government departments (Qani and Fattah, 2012). Besides, the 
opposition parties have been unable to exert pressure on the the ruling parties who 
can buy the affiliation of people through use of public finance. The economy of Iraq 
when began to grow and it led to an increase in people's income, for example the 
monthly salary of the average employee increased from 200 to 600 US Dollars by 
2008 (Muhamed, 2008). Employees’ salaries increased rapidly, particularly in the 
public sector although the price of basic needs rose as well (Nury, 2012). However, at 
the same time, unemployment increased especially amongst young people because 
the two governing political parties deprived many people of government jobs, whilst 
giving these jobs to their own followers in order to buy their votes (Hussain, 2015). In 
an interview in the Hawlati Newspaper with Ayoub Barzani, a Kurdish political 
analyst of the reform process, the government did not have any plans in place to 
tackle corruption and introduce reforms as the government itself was corrupt 
(Hawlati 2012a). Subsequently the opposition parties became much stronger, 
particularly the Gorran which was established some months before the election in 
2009. Gorran is based on the promise to change the system in Kurdistan and its 
workers are mostly volunteers, whereas the members of the other parties receive a 
salary, particularly those in the ruling parties. At the same time the opposition parties 
became stronger because many people, particularly young people, attempted to find a 
job in different sectors instead of relying on financial support from the ruling parties. 
Young people started to support the opposition parties in order to enable the 
opposition parties to take power, introduce reforms and fight corruption. During the 
last election campaign the Gorran Movement Party relied on the media, particularly 
KNN TV and the Sbeiy website, to focus primarily on its agenda for political change, 
while the ruling parties depended on buying votes by using public funds. The 
opposition parties focused on fighting corruption and introducing reforms if they 
were to win the election, whereas the ruling parties argued that the Kurdish people 
should support them because they had struggled against Saddam’s regime in the past 
and only they were able to keep Kurdistan safe. Alongside this, the ruling parties 
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argued that the Kurds needed to solve their problems with Baghdad before 
introducing reforms in the KRG (Hussain, 2015). 
The Gorran Movement has introduced a new model of doing politics in Kurdistan 
which relies on the media and this is important as it has fewer active members 
compared to the other parties, particularly the ruling parties (Hussain, 2015).) The 
Gorran party's media remains largely focused on portraying corruption and the 
government’s performance in a negative light and this appeals to young people who 
are the main demographic category affected negatively by the government. 
Consequently the opposition and independent media give importance to young people 
as their main target audience. From this stand point, the media has become much 
more effective in handling political communication and analysing the political process, 
particularly the opposition and independent media.  
The hypothesis of this study is that economic growth in Kurdistan has led to a lack of 
social justice due to government corruption and that young people are the 
demographic group most affected by this phenomenon. This perceived lack of social 
justice has led to the formation of an effective political movement supported by young 
Kurds, and this is correlated with the emergence of a stronger opposition and 
independent media.  
1.3 Objectives of the Research 
This study investigates how Kurdish media address the four political issues in relation 
to corruption, reform, government performance, and citizens' trust. This thesis has 
selected these four political issues as they receive intensive coverage by the media, 
particularly by the opposition and independent media due to continuing government 
corruption and its poor performance. Hussain (2015) argues that corruption in 
Kurdistan is due to clientelism which is mainly practised by the two political parties in 
power. Therefore this thesis adopts the theoretical assumption that the clientelism 
model is a major causality factor which fuels corruption. It also aims to interview 
media professionals in order to evaluate how they view the coverage of political 
issues and to what extent they can access the public sector to obtain information 
about these issues. This thesis investigates how young people understand and 
respond to the political issues and explore the role of the media in shaping their 
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political attitudes towards the aforementioned political issues. Part of this will include 
an analysis of the demographic characteristics and political backgrounds of young 
people that affect their understanding and their responses to political news with 
particular reference to the four political issues identified.  
The thesis focus on political communication in Kurdistan by adopting framing analysis 
as a qualitative approach to analysing textual news along with content analysis. Sound 
effects and visuals will be excluded because the majority of the news reports on 
television in Kurdistan do not involve these techniques and effects due to lack of 
professional expertise in the Kurdish media (Abdul Rahman, 2012; Muhedeen, 2012). 
To examine young people's attitudes towards the media coverage, government 
performance and the political process, this thesis will apply the active audience theory 
the particularly coding/decoding model which allows the audience to evaluate the 
media content by arguing that the audience receive the media message actively, 
thereby forming their own meaning from the experience or through the social context 
(Brant, 2012). Morley applied this model in his second study (1980/1999) of the 
demographics of the BBC's audience for the TV program ‘Nationwide’ to understand 
the breakdown of social class, gender and ethnicity through  conducting  focus group 
(cited in Roskos-Ewoldsen, David and Monahan, 2009).  This model gives importance 
to the role of the audience background, particularly demographic characteristics such 
as gender, place of residence and education, in affecting their understanding of the 
media content, which has a similar aim of this thesis. The variable of age will be 
excluded because this thesis focuses specifically on young people between the ages of 
18 and 28 based on the assumption that they share  the same issues in this study. In 
this particular study, the respondents' political background will be taken into account 
because the two political parties already control a large part of society, and in turn, it 
can be assumed that many young people are influenced by their families and become 
close to the political parties in power, while the remainder can be divided between the 
opposition and independent. This different background might affect their 
understanding and attitudes.   
Furthermore, from the active audience theory, uses and gratification will be taken into 
account, as this model gives importance to the role of the audience. Zhao notes that 
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the 'audience are able to provide researchers with an accurate description of their 
mass media use because they are aware enough of their own media use, interests, and 
motives that have a role in understanding the media content’ (Zhao, 2008, p 22).  Uses 
and gratification theory can be used to evaluate the government, for instance Reddick 
argues that 'although the use and gratification theory was applied originally to radio 
and television, the basic features of this theory can be applied to a certain degree to 
citizens' efforts to contact and communicate with the government as well' (2010, p 
16). My research adopts this method to evaluate the attitude of young people towards 
the political issues across the media, government performance and the political 
process gathered through conducting focus group and interviews. Thus 
methodologically, the focus groups, in-depth and semi-structured interviews will be 
applied to collect the data from the young people which will subsequently be analysed 
qualitatively by applying thematic analysis.  
1.4 The Research Questions 
The research raises a series of questions to investigate the aims, which can be clarified 
as follows: 
Q1: To what extent and how do the Kurdish media cover political issues in particular 
those relating to corruption, reform, government performance and citizens' trust? 
This research question is designed to produce a textual analysis of the news coverage 
by applying content analysis to identify indicators underlying the agenda of each 
media platform and  applying qualitative analysis to identify how each media platform 
uses frames in their news coverage. The media platforms analysed include the 
opposition TV channel (KNN TV) and the ruling party’s TV channel (GK TV), as well as 
three websites, namely: Sbeiy (opposition party), Xendan (ruling party) and Awena 
(independent).  
Q2: Why does each platform of the Kurdish media have a different style of covering 
the identified political issues according to its ownership and what is the level of 
freedom of access to information in terms of these political issues? This research 
question is designed to explore the opinions of the media professionals in each media 
platform through conducting an in-depth interview with the news managers of the 
organisations selected in this research, to provide additional insights into the findings 
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revealed by both the first research questions. Furthermore, it will allow evaluation of 
the level of freedom of access to information in the media according to the three types 
of ownership: ruling parties, opposition parties and the independent media. 
Q3: How do young people understand and respond to the political news in particular 
relating to corruption, reform, and government performance and citizens’ trust across 
the different Kurdish media and how do young people evaluate the government’s 
performance and the role of elections in the future democratic process? And to what 
extent do the demographic characteristics and political background of young people 
have an impact on their understanding and response? This research question seeks to 
evaluate if and how young people are influenced by the media in terms of the 
coverage of political issues in order to identify the role of the media in shaping their 
political attitudes. This research question seeks to understand the attitudes of young 
people towards the government’s performance and the political process more 
generally. Through conducting focus groups the attitudes of young people towards the 
media will be evaluated, while the in-depth and semi-structured interviews will assess 
the young people’s views towards the government’s performance and the political 
process. 
1.5 Research Motivation and Significance 
Political communication research is especially important for Iraqi Kurdistan where 
the role of the media has increased rapidly since the election of 2009 (Roznama, 
2009); there are several reasons for this. The first is that the outcome of the elections 
showed that people were influenced by the mediated election campaigns, for example 
the Gorran Movement Party managed to achieve 23% of the votes with only its media 
platform to publicise itself (Al-Zaidi and Sadiq, 2012). Prior to the election of 2009 
there was no competition between the political parties because the two main parties 
monopolised power, entering under one list in the election. At the same time the 
opposition parties were weak, with the consequence that their election campaign was 
also ineffective (Al- Zaidi and Sadiq, 2012). These two authors argue that the Kurdish 
people were focused on the establishment of the government and administrative 
institutions after the uprising of 1991 and they did not have a positive experience of 
that process, while the Iraqi regime continued to pose a danger to the security of 
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Kurdistan until 2003. Furthermore, the experience of democratisation in Kurdistan 
has not reached a level which has enabled the opposition parties to become strong 
since the political parties have continued to rely on interpersonal communication 
through their members in their organisation offices instead of using the media. 
The results of the 2009 election demonstrated that the media had become more 
effective than in previous years. Al-Zaidi and Sadiq (2012) argued that the two ruling 
parties used public finances to buy votes, and saw no need to use the power of 
political advertising prior to the emergence of the Gorran Party. Therefore the results 
of the election in 2009 took them by surprise. They went on to argue that social 
mobility in Kurdish society, alongside the role of the independent and opposition 
media in covering corruption, has made people more aware of the political process, 
particularly young people. 
The other point which makes this thesis important is that it focuses on three 
interrelated aspects, namely content analysis of the political news, the perception of 
young people regarding political issues across the media and the attitude of media 
workers regarding access to information. This research will seek to form a 
comprehensive interpretation of the political communication process, as well as 
exploring the role of both traditional media (TV) and new media (websites). Thus the 
main significance of this research project can be determined in the following points: 
- The outcome of this research shows how the Kurdish media cover the political issues 
and to what extent they contribute to the shaping of the political attitudes of young 
people. Young people comprise one of the largest sections of Kurdish society, while at 
the same time they have not received a great deal of attention from the government. 
Hardy (2012b) argues that young people in Kurdistan are a very dynamic stratum in  
society however they face huge problems of unemployment and housing and they are 
worried about their pensions in the future. He also argues that it is this category in 
society which is demanding that the government introduces reforms, and it is also one 
of the reasons why it has become a major item of interest for the media, in particular 
the opposition and independent media. Young people are considered more likely to be 
influenced by the opposition parties, and this indicates that they are likely to become 
powerful and affect a change in the political system in the future (Hussain, 2015). The 
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findings of this research can offer some analysis as to how political communication 
and the political system in Kurdistan may develop, as well as delineating some 
expectations and assumptions about the future of political communication and the 
democratic system in Kurdistan.  
As far as I observed this is the first research of its kind conducted in Kurdistan. Most 
research conducted in both Media Studies and Political Science is based on 
quantitative data, and there is no existing qualitative data into political 
communication in Kurdistan. As a consequence the project is important for academics 
and the political world alike. Conclusions may also prove useful to other researchers 
dealing with political communication in the country. 
1.6 Chapter Outline 
This thesis is presented in seven chapters. Following the introductory chapter, the 
second chapter examines the literature that is composed of several sections according 
to the theoretical and conceptual framework adopted within the thesis. Particularly, it 
discusses the framing analysis as a criteria and approach to analysing the political 
news as well as applying active audience theory particularly the coding/decoding 
model and uses and gratifications to evaluate how young people understand and 
respond to political news and government performance. Alongside these theories, in 
this chapter the clientelism model will be examined as a theoretical assumption of the 
causality of the corruption and the lack of effective government performance in 
Kurdistan.  
Chapter three discusses the methodology and the rationale behind the methods 
adopted for data collection and data analysis. To address the research questions and 
the rationale of selecting the methods, this thesis used a mixed methods approach, 
such as content analysis (statistical analysis) and framing analysis (qualitatively) of 
the news content in particular relation to the four political issues across the five 
media platforms. In-depth interviews were used to examine the views of the media 
professionals towards the editorial policy of the news coverage and the freedom of 
obtaining information about the political issues in the public sector. Alongside 
analysing the news content and media professionals' opinions, this chapter adopts 
three methods, namely focus groups, in-depth and semi-structured interviews, to 
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collect data from three different sample groups of young people. The focus group was 
used for young people to evaluate how the media cover the political issues, in-depth 
interviews were used to evaluate how young people evaluate the government’s 
performance, and semi- structured interviews were used to evaluate how young 
people view the role of elections in the political process. The data collected from both 
young people and media professionals were analysed through thematic analysis. 
Furthermore, this chapter discusses the ethics of both the data collection and 
sampling process. 
Chapter four discusses the life condition of young people as a main category in 
Kurdish society, although they have received little attention from the KRG. This 
chapter focuses on young people in terms of their concerns, especially education, 
unemployment, housing, state pension and political participation. Alongside 
examining young people’s issues, this chapter briefly examines the history of the 
Kurdish media and describes the five media platforms selected for study in this thesis. 
This examination of the life condition of young people and the history of the Kurdish 
media helps to understand relevant elements for this thesis and provides background 
information to understand the structure of the political issues and the media context 
in Kurdistan which forms the central part of this thesis. 
Chapter five begins the analysis of the empirical data by examining the content of the 
political news in three sections. The first section relies on the content analysis of the 
textual news, while the second examines the news selected through the framing 
analysis qualitatively. The third remaining section focuses on the editorial policy and 
the freedom of access allowed to the public sector to collect information about the 
political issues of the media  through conducting in-depth interviews with media 
professionals, particularly the chief news editor or managing news editor of the five 
media platforms examined in this thesis. 
Chapter six discusses the findings related to young people's understanding of and 
their response to the political issues in the news coverage across the Kurdish media, 
specifically the attitude of young people towards the government’s performance and 
the role of elections in the political process. This chapter consists of three sections; the 
first section discusses how young people understand and respond to the news relating 
20 
to the four political issues across each television channel and website through 
conducting 7 focus groups. This section analyses the role of the demographic 
characteristics and political background of young people in relation to their political 
understanding and response. The second section discusses the attitudes of young 
people towards the government’s performance by conducting in-depth interviews 
with 15 young people. Similarly to the first section, the second section examines the 
role of the demographic characteristics and political background of young people in 
terms of their evaluation of   the government’s performance. The third section 
remains focused on the role of political participation in the democratising process and 
future government performance through analysing the views of 7 young people 
elicited from semi-structured interviews. 
Chapter seven concludes the research project and consists of four sections. The first 
section consists of a review of the findings, while the second provides a reflection on 
the findings of the three theoretical approaches adopted in the research, namely 
framing analysis, active audience theory (particularly the coding/ decoding and uses 
and gratifications models), and the clientelism model. The third section provides 
reflections on the practical implications of the findings and the fourth section presents 
suggestions for further research, particularly in relation to the topic of this research 
project. 
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Chapter Two 
2. The theoretical and conceptual framework in the literature review 
2.1 Introduction 
The present chapter will look at the theoretical and conceptual framework through 
presenting theoretical and empirical evidence within the relevant literature. The 
literature relevant to this thesis will be reviewed in four sections which will help to 
introduce the topic of the research and its main conceptual framework. 
The first section reviews the framing theory which was adopted in this thesis as a 
method of analysis of the news content related to selected political issues: corruption, 
reform, government performance and citizens' trust and this helps to examine how 
the media use frames in their coverage. The second section looks at the active 
audience theory, particularly the coding/decoding model which argues that the 
audience might construct meaning of the media content through their own experience 
or from the social context, based on the assumption that the audience does not 
understand the media content similarly due to the differences in their backgrounds. 
This argument supports the research question which investigates how young people 
understand and respond to the political issues across the media, government 
performance and the role of elections in the political process, and the role of 
demographic political background in their evaluation. Furthermore, the second 
section reviews the uses and gratifications model which enabled the audience to 
provide the researcher with information to examine the media and the government’s 
performance as well. The third section examines the relationship between young 
people and political news through reviewing the relevant theoretical and empirical 
research and this informs the central part of this thesis. The final section looks at the 
clientelism model based on the assumption that it causes a political system to be 
corrupt. This helps to examine the political structure of Kurdistan as well as 
understanding the causality of corruption and the lack of effective government 
performance that represent the main concepts of the political issues in this thesis. 
2.2 Framing Analysis 
This methodology is adopted to investigate political communication by examining 
how young people understand and respond to the political issues across the media 
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and how they view government performance and the role of elections in the political 
process. Accordingly, this thesis examines the media content, particularly political 
news dealing with corruption, reform, government performance and citizens' trust, 
including the attitude of media professionals towards the coverage of political issues 
and freedom to access the government departments. To this end, a part of the present 
study analyses the media content particularly political news items which cover the 
four political issues. Research into political communication is important because, as 
Willnat and Aw (2009) argued, it can help people to make sense of how media operate 
in the political process. Bryant and Zillmann stated that, ‘political communication 
research is important not only for individual citizens but also for key political actors, 
such as political leaders, information strategists, and journalists’ (2002, p216). 
Similarly, Bucy and Holbert refer to the concept that this type of research might ‘affect 
leadership, policies and democratic processes involving the lives of hundreds of 
millions of people’ (2011, p 544). 
The present study applies framing analysis as the theoretical framework and 
approach to analyse textual news due to its suitability for such analysis, as framing is 
widely used in different fields due to its flexibility. Framing started with Goffman in 
1981 when he argued that the social situation is determined by different points of the 
frame and this concept was further developed at the beginning of the 1990s by other 
researchers (Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007). Entman was perhaps the most 
influential in laying the foundation and systematic methodology for conducting 
framing research by devising four main categories, namely: problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation and treatment recommendation (Entman, 1993).  
Bucy and Holbert (2011) show that framing makes a significant contribution in the 
research that focuses on the qualitative textual analysis and in particular it started to 
be used in political communication research to determine the potential effects of 
media coverage on the media receivers. Bryant and Oliver (2008) also show that 
framing has become a dominant methodology in communication research. In the same 
way, Kaid (2004) noted that framing analysis is widely used in political 
communication research because it allows an examination of the contextual content. 
The analysis of news texts in their historical and social context can reveal deeper level 
of meaning compared to the quantitative analysis of words and textual elements. As 
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Neuendorf (2002) notes, inferences cannot be made into the producers' and 
audiences' accounts by using content analysis only, and both content analysis and 
audience studies need to be integrated to give a full account of the opinions revealed. 
On the other hand, the role of content analysis is not limited to understanding what 
the media content and its characteristics are, as Berelson (1971) argues, through 
content analysis we can understand the potential influences of media on audiences. 
Furthermore, Macnamara suggests that content analysis provides the media 
researcher with the tools to evaluate the effectiveness of an organisation at 
communication and to measure the ‘strategic insights and intelligence through issues 
tracking (environmental scanning), competitor analysis and trend identification’ 
(2005, p 21). However, there are many critics of the content analysis approach as 
many believe that it has predominantly focused on quantitative content analysis 
(Macnamara, 2005). For this reason, Newbold, Boyd-Barrett and Van den Bulck argue 
that, ‘the problem is the extent to which the quantitative indicators are interpreted as 
intensity of meaning, social impact and the like’ (2002, p 80). There is no simple 
relationship between media texts and their impact, and it would be far too simplistic 
to base decisions in this regard on mere figures obtained from a statistical content 
analysis. 
Prior to the emergence of framing theory, more researchers adopted agenda setting to 
evaluate the impact of the news programs on the audience.  As Tankard (2001) notes,  
framing has become a second stage of agenda setting. The agenda setting theory 
argues that the priority of the media in covering subjects has a general influence on 
the audience, while framing theory argues that the framing of each news item has 
some specific influence on the audience (McCombs, 2002). This means that framing 
theory is more accurate because it deals with the individual news article, whereas 
agenda setting argues that the news programmes all together can have an impact on 
the audience.  
This is further cited in McCombs and Shaw (1993) who claim that framing focuses on 
the text content and not only on the general coverage of the issues. Consequently, 
framing fills the gap that was implicit in an analysis based exclusively on agenda 
setting. Riaz (2008) further argues that media producers use mass communication 
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methods to provide their audience with a specific agenda, to create interest in certain 
issues and use framing to show the importance of these issues. Therefore the 
implications of agenda theory on audience perception is limited compared to framing. 
In this respect, Berger argues that 'agenda setting theory argues that the institutions 
of mass communication don't determine what we think, but determine what we think 
about' (2004, p 67).  
However, framing analysis was criticised due to its being an incomplete method of 
evaluating the content as it focuses on text and excludes the manipulation of sound 
effects and visuals and the size or colour of the texts in print media. Van Dijk (2006) 
refers to the role of the manipulation of sounds and the size of text and argues that 
these features should be considered in textual analysis. Some researchers have tried 
to develop framing analysis in their research, for instance Choi and Lee (2006) 
suggested relying on the scene as the basic unit of analysis of TV news. Another 
problematic of framing analysis is the coding and interpretation processes which can 
be open to the bias of the researcher, for example Tankard argues that, ‘coming up 
with the names for frames itself involves a kind of framing’(2001, p 97). 
The other important aspect to mention about framing analysis is that the audience has 
its own framing for interpretation, so this argument reduces the influence of framing. 
Scheufele (1999) and Choi and Lee (2006) distinguished between media framing and 
audience framing and then suggested that four key processes should be taken into 
consideration, namely ‘frame building, frame setting, individual-level processes of 
framing, and a feedback loop from audiences to journalists' (Scheufele,1999, p103). 
On the other hand, Price et al. (1997) supported the influence of the framing model 
through two studies, which showed that the framing model had direct influence on 
audience decision-making and public policy and contributed to the shaping of public 
opinion. 
In order to develop a framing model, other researchers have tried to apply framing in 
a mixed methodological approach to evaluate different levels of the framing effect. 
Van Group (2007) used framing within an agenda setting model to develop a strategy 
to reconstruct frame packages, which means that the framing model is suitable to the 
aims of the research and it can be best adapted to the model. Alongside this, Choi and 
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Lee (2006) suggested that in reception studies in the media, framing should include 
narrative techniques, especially where the character and psychological explanation of 
media influence are taken into consideration. 
In the light of the varied literature surrounding framing analysis and despite the 
model having weaknesses, it is currently becoming one of the main models used in 
research that focuses on media effect and audience perception. The weaknesses 
identified by the aforementioned authors can be summarised into three main points: 
framing does not include sound or the size of text (Van Dijk, 2006), the names applied 
to frames are problematic (Tankard, 2001) and the distinction between media 
framing and audience framing is often hard to define (Scheufele ,1999; Choi and Lee, 
2006). To overcome these weakness, this thesis will only focus on textual news rather 
than audio-visual because a part of the sample will be selected from Kurdish websites 
which have no audio-visual content while the remaining news sample will be selected 
from the two Kurdish TV channels which attach little importance to audio-visual 
effects due to the lack of expertise in the Kurdish media compared to Western TV 
channels (Abdul Rahman, 2012). Specifically regarding the name of frames this 
research will design a form of encoding the framing of the news according to four 
clear concepts which will form the criteria for framing the news. Alongside this, the 
encoding process will attempt to determine the emergent frames as well.  
The methodology chapter will provide more detail about the process of applying 
framing as an approach for textual news analysis.  Specifically regarding the 
distinction between audience framing and journalists’ framing, it will be argued  that 
both sides can have their own framing for news items, while this criticism does not 
imply that framing does not have an impact on the audience. In this thesis, besides 
framing analysis, active audience theory is applied which argues that the audience do 
not receive the media message passively (Hartig, 2015). The application of this theory 
helps to strike a balance between media effect theory such as framing and active 
audience theory that supports the ability of the audience to receive the media 
message actively. 
Recent political communication research studies that have used framing analysis have 
demonstrated that ‘framing within competitive elite environments tend to see 
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journalists as having a rather passive, stenographic role in transmitting source 
positions’ (D’Angelo, 2012, p360).  This model is useful for the present research for 
many reasons, but mainly because it investigates coverage of political issues across 
different media, where each has a specific moral evaluation for the coverage of news 
based on whether it is by the opposition party, the ruling party or the independent 
media. This model allows the present research to distinguish amongst them due to the 
researcher’s assumption that they each use a different frame in their coverage. This 
model allows the present research to distinguish amongst them due to the 
researcher’s assumption that they each use a different frame in their coverage. The 
research focuses on specific political issues particularly corruption, reform, 
government performance and these concepts are covered differently across the media 
studied in this research which are divided into three different types of ownership, 
each of which has its own dimension and vision, particularly the media belonging to 
the political parties in power and the opposition. In turn, this affects the framing of the 
political issues in their media coverage. 
2.3 Active Audience Theory  
The previous section discussed the concept that framing analysis is an approach to 
analysing political news, but intrinsic to it is the argument that media content has an 
influence on the audience. Thus the framing model constructs the audience as passive 
and variously influenced by the content of the media it watches or reads. By contrast 
the active audience theories criticised this argument, particularly those scholars who 
developed the active audience theory which purports that media texts do not have the 
same effect on the members of a given audience due to the fact that any audience 
consists of different social groups. This thesis seeks to examine how young people 
understand and respond to the political issues and how they evaluate the 
government’s performance and the role of elections in the political process and 
democratisation. Alongside this, the thesis investigates the role of demographic 
characteristics and political background in the evaluation of young people towards the 
media, government performance and political process. Therefore, active audience 
theory, particularly  the coding/decoding model which focuses on the role of audience 
background in understanding the media content and the uses and gratifications model 
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enable the audience to provide information to researchers when examining the media 
and  government performance. 
2.3.1 Coding/decoding model 
Hall, one of the main scholars who defined active audience theory and presented the 
coding/decoding model, argues that it is ‘something to do with the asymmetry 
between the codes of  “source” and “receiver” at the moment of transformation into 
and out of the discursive form’ (2004, p110). This theory allows for the importance of 
individual interpretation and understanding of a given piece of news based on the 
background of the audience, their social context and knowledge. According to 
Nightingale (1996) 'the coding /decoding model was first proposed by Stuart Hall in 
1973’ and Valdivia notes that his model focuses on social structure through three 
levels: 'the framework of knowledge, the relation of production, and the technical 
infrastructure that proposed this'. (2008, p 362). The coding and decoding affect both 
the media production and consumers of this production, while the media producer 
always attempts to ensure that its output is understood and decoded according to its 
expectations. The coding/decoding model was applied by Brunsdon and Morley to 
examine the audience of ‘Nationwide’, a British news programme between 1978 and 
1999, which involved a close textual analysis of a single episode of the programme 
aired on May 19, 1976 (cited in Roskos-Ewoldsen, David and Monahan, 2009, p 223). 
The model was applied  to understand the differing social classes, gender and 
ethnicity of the audience watching an episode of 'Nationwide' through conduction 
focus.    
Active audience theory in general supposes that audiences are not passive in 
interpreting media messages, and that they are not influenced according to the level of 
the intended messages by producers, but rather their active reading and use of 
different media makes them capable of creating their own meaning out of media 
content. The audience might be using the media content for different functions. For 
instance, Radway (1984) found that people may use romantic novels to resist the 
dominant culture and Ang (1985) noted that women watch soap operas for 
entertainment purposes. This indicates that the audience can use media for their own 
purposes, particularly based on social factors and most notably gender. An example of 
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how empirical research applied the uses and gratification model to evaluate audience 
response was the study of Arab TVs Satellite channel which  found that young females 
mostly prefer TV dramas, movies and music while young males prefer news 
programmes (Al- Hadidi et al, 2006). They argue that young males in the Arab world 
are mostly responsible for covering life expenses, which in turn makes them give 
importance to political content as there is still no political and economic stability in 
these countries.  
Prior to Radway  and Ang's works, other researchers argued that media content does 
not affect the audience in similar ways due to factors relevant to individual differences 
and the demographic characteristics of a given audience. Morley (1992) argued that 
audience studies should take social characteristics into account, namely social class, 
gender, age, ethnicity, place of residence and education. In the same way, the 
conceptual frame of active audience theory and its arguments were established by 
some researchers who focused on television audiences. Fiske (1987) notes that 
viewers of television are not a homogeneous mass, rather they are composed of a 
wide range of different groups. Fiske's argument seems even more relevant and 
powerful today with the emergence of specialist media and multi-media platforms 
which allow the audience to select different channels or programmes, highlighting the 
ability of viewers to be more selective. Alongside the consideration of the audience’s 
background, another research study which investigated active audience theory 
identified other points to be factored in. For instance, Clarke (2000) reported that 
specific audience members differ in the production of meaning in accordance with the 
different social setting in which media messages are received. This relates to the prior 
knowledge and attitudes of receivers of the media content. Palmer notes that the 
‘audiences are functionally differentiated by their relationship to the moment of 
production of media output’ (2004, p 72). Young people are not a homogenous mass 
and they can be read differently on the basis of their demographic characteristics and 
political background. This diversity can affect the media’s influence on their attitudes 
and interest, a phenomenon which has attracted the attention of researchers for many 
years, as seen earlier in both Morley (1992) and Fiske (1987).  
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Alongside the demographic categories of social class, gender, age, ethnicity, place of 
residence and education, the present research hypothesises that there are other 
variables which can affect the political communication of young people in Kurdistan, 
mainly political interest, political awareness, and political affiliation or political 
orientation, but this does not mean that these assumptions can be generalised to all 
political environments and societies. Empirical research has also shown that the 
Internet has a positive effect on the political participation of young people compared 
to the influence of TV (Bakker and De Vreese, 2011), although in Kurdistan TV still 
retains more influence ((Technology, the Ministry of Culture, Youth, and Sport, 2009). 
Östman found in his research in Sweden that 'Internet use and news consumption, 
both of which were related to political knowledge, were moderately related to 
political participation’ (2012, p 105). In addition, young people as a whole can express 
as a specific group what characteristics they hold in common, as noted by Quintelier, 
Dietlind and Allison (2012). This research examined a cohort of young Belgian people 
and detected that social networking has a potential influence on young people and 
demonstrated that the political context enhances the effects of the network to which 
the young people belong. 
According to earlier literature the attention paid to political news by young people is 
associated with political participation. Holt et al. (2013) found in their research that 
use of political news increased the political engagement of young people and Moeller 
and De Vreese (2013) found that exposure to political news among young people is 
linked to political engagement, whereas exposure to entertainment has the opposite 
impact. The level of exposure to political content across the media and the motivation 
to access such information can be related to the lack of understanding of politics, 
considering that the media play such a crucial dimension in the role of political 
education (Buckingham, 1999). In terms of demographic characteristics the control 
variable most significant within the media’s role in exposing corruption has been 
identified by empirical research in terms of the level of education of the audience, 
which enables them to understand their role in relation to their rights and 
responsibilities towards the government (Dutta and Roy, 2013). In the same way in a 
recent PhD thesis in Kurdistan, Ali (2011) notes that the level of higher education is 
the only variable that has any correlation to the audience’s understanding of political 
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news. In another words, Ali found that the people who have a higher level 
qualifications are more interested in political news and tend to construct their own 
meaning from the messages received, compared to people who have a lower level of 
qualifications. The outcome of Ali's research helps the current thesis to take the 
education factor into account when determining what can affect this factor of young 
people's understanding of the political issues across the Kurdish media. 
Political discussion among people who have different political backgrounds and 
experiences may not influence their attitudes. Talat (2006) argues that people who 
have longstanding political orientations are not necessarily affected by media 
exposure and interpersonal communication. He expresses the view that people might 
participate in political debate merely to evaluate the information received from the 
media; on the other hand people who are less politically informed tend to understand 
politics from the media and interpersonal communication.  It is known that the impact 
of demographic characteristics and other variables of young people's backgrounds are 
not stable and the influence varies according to the different communication 
environments or societies. With specific reference to the literature in Kurdistan, little 
previous academic research has been undertaken to study political communication 
and young people, and to date only two PhD research projects have been conducted 
into political communication in Kurdistan. The first investigated the role of political 
programmes on Kurdish satellite TV in shaping the political awareness of the 
audience (Ali, 2011). The second was research into the role of the media in activating 
political participation in Iraqi Kurdistan (Mageed, 2011). Equally, there are no 
academic journals dedicated to the media in Kurdistan and media research is usually 
published in general university academic journals due to the fact that Media and 
Communication Studies only started in 2001 in Iraqi Kurdistan. 
In terms of the criticism of  active audience theory, some arguments have been raised 
by researchers, such as Fiske (1987) who argues that the paradigm has overrated the 
viewers' ability to create their own meaning. Furthermore, (Alasuutari, 1999 and 
Clarke, 2000) argue that the active audience might not all be resistant to the media 
messages, which means the whole audience are not necessarily active to the same 
extent. This criticism of active audience theory means that the audience have different 
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views because of their background and this emphasises the main argument of the 
coding/decoding model. Therefore, this thesis takes this argument as a theoretical 
assumption to highlight the demographic characteristics and political background of 
young people in Kurdistan when evaluating the political issues across the media and 
government performance and the role of elections in the political process. 
2.3.2 Uses and gratifications model 
The uses and gratifications model is located in active audience theory and consists of 
several concepts (Zhao, 2008), while this thesis focuses on the concept that the 
audience can provide information to the researcher to evaluate the media content as 
well as the government’s performance as they are active and can construct meaning 
according to their experience and social context (Danesi, 2013). Therefore, the uses 
and gratifications model emphasises individual differences, which is parallel with the 
coding/ decoding model and means that both models are significant in examining the 
demographic and political background of young people. Al-Biada (2008) in her 
research in Lebanon detected that females tend to favour entertainment programmes, 
such as movies, music and competition programmes. Another study which applied the 
uses and gratification model to examine the use of Iraqi young people of media 
broadcasting found a significant correlation between gender and use of media 
broadcasting (Mustafa, 2010). He found that females mostly prefer movies and music, 
particularly those who are not in higher education. He suggested that young females 
in universities tend to favour political programmes more than those who have not 
completed university or who are not educated. In Mustafa's  research it can be seen 
that education has a role to play in determining the  motivation of young people, 
particularly young females. 
The different motivations for using media have been outlined by the uses and 
gratification model which characterises the audience as active (Danesi, 2013). This 
theory was further developed by Katz, Blumler and Gurevitch who proposed the 
following five basic assumptions (Zhao, 2008). Firstly, audience members actively 
select which media best meets their needs; secondly audience members are key in 
choosing  which media best meet their perceived needs; thirdly audience members 
have a wide range of gratification providers they can choose from, not just the media; 
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fourthly audience members can describe their own preferences and choices in 
selecting different forms of media for different purposes; fifthly researchers should 
investigate audience preferences before reaching any general conclusions about the 
significance of the mass media in influencing public opinion ( Zhao, 2008, p 22). The 
current research takes the fourth assumption which argues that the audience are able 
to provide the researchers with information to evaluate the media because they are 
aware enough of their own media use. Moreover, this theory can applied to 
communication study in general, in this respect Reddick argues that 'although the use 
and gratification theory was applied originally to radio and television, the 
basic  features of this theory can be applied to a certain degree to citizens' efforts to 
contact and communicate with the government as well' (2010, p 16) Based on this, my 
research takes this argument to evaluate the attitude of young people towards the 
political issues across the media, government performance and the political process 
through conducting focus groups and interviews.   
More recently, new technology has changed previous orientations around media 
theories, particularly the Internet which has expanded users’ opportunities. Rannikko 
(2010) notes that new media must take the active audience theory into account as the 
audience have become more able to select materials across the Internet. Alongside 
this, new media enable users to select information in relation to media themes 
because it gives them the opportunity to interact with media producers and their 
partners (Lievrouw and Livingstone, 2006). Although new technology allows 
increased interaction between media producers and users, Beckett (2008) notes that 
any such interaction is limited. Apart from the current level of interaction between 
media producers and users, the new media has facilitated audience participation in 
the media production process, so this argument justifies the active audience paradigm 
as the audience becomes more selective in choosing the media outputs and interaction 
with others. Accordingly, the application of an active audience paradigm is reasonable 
in the present research, as the audience includes young people who consume their 
political news across a range of platforms such as  TV channels and websites. 
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2.4 Young people and political news 
This section looks at the relationship between young people and the political news 
across a range of media in Western countries, developing countries and Kurdistan 
through reviewing the empirical research. This helps to identify popular media types 
for political communication purposes which are used by young Kurdish people. At the 
same time, this provides an image of how the media are used for political 
communication in Kurdistan against the background of the global media landscape of 
political communication. 
Several researchers have investigated the relationship between young people and the 
media and they have based their research in both developed and developing 
countries. Buckingham (1999), Hamid (2000) and Allawaty (2011) claim that 
evidence exists in both democratic societies and new democracies which suggest an 
association between news media use and political knowledge in young people. 
Conversely, Mesch and Coleman (2007) and Henn and Foard (2012) discovered that 
there are differences in the role of the news media in a range of established western 
democracies where a decline in political participation and therefore of voting 
numbers among younger citizens has been identified. According to such research, it 
was argued that the decline of political participation among young people may be 
closely linked to their use of new media, particularly social media. This is in contrast 
to the lack of decline in the political activities of those of adult age due to their 
continued dependence on traditional media (Lenhart et al. 2010). In developing 
countries people use social media as a political platform to express their views and 
exchange opinions, this leads to an increase in political participation albeit indirectly 
(Stieglitzand  Dang-Xuan, 2013; Hickey, 2014). For instance, young people ranked 
highest amongst the categories of people who participated in demonstrations during 
the Arab Spring and they largely depended on social media websites to organise their 
activities (Howard and Hussain, 2013; Macafee and De Simone, 2012). Researchers 
have outlined and categorised the different orientations in terms of political 
participation in the World Values Survey (Jeong, 2013). For example, Jeong (2013) 
found that civic engagement through music, art and charitable organisation has a 
positive impact on political participation, and he detected that there is a positive 
correlation between civic participation and political demonstration. Furthermore, he 
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found that a political organisation can adopt a negative role in terms of political 
participation particularly those organisations or unions controlled by the government 
in non-democratic regimes. These researchers (Strömbäck and Shehata, 2010; All- 
Laban, 2007) found that there is a causal relation between  exposure to the political 
news by young people and their political interest. Beside this, Holt et al. (2013) argue 
that the increasing number of news channels across the world has given more 
opportunity to people to watch news, which in turn has raised their  political interest. 
According to Holt et al, the traditional definition of political participation includes 
voting, polling, and participation in activist movements only, and they suggested that 
any definition of political participation should include other activities like interaction, 
discussion with people across social media and uploading videos on YouTube as a 
means of political expression. Their research further suggested that ‘social media 
could serve as a leveller of political interest and offline political participation between 
younger and older citizens’ (Holt et al. 2013, p 31). According to some of the 
literature, the use of political content across the different forms of media can be 
associated with political participation and political interest. 
There are many studies which substantiate that television has a considerable role in 
shaping viewers' political behaviour whether in an established democracy or in new 
and developing democracies. Tewksbury, Jensen and Coe (2011) argue that TV news 
stories affect audience attitudes because of the impact of television in general rather 
than the credibility of the news. Bucy and Grabe (2007) showed that TV had a 
considerable role in conveying information to viewers within the election process in 
1992 in the USA. These views about whether television or new media exert a greater 
influence on young people’s attitudes depend on cultural factors, audience habits and 
individuals’ patterns of media use. Moreover, Voltmer and Brants (2011) assume that 
political actors, such as governments, political parties and other elites of established 
political institutions are losing control over the way in which politics is communicated 
and interpreted in the public sphere due to the power of new media.  
The research that investigated the use of You Tube during the 2008 U.S. presidential 
primaries found that often the audience gained political information from TV news on 
YouTube (Hanson, Haridakis and Sharma, 2011). Previous research confirmed that 
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both TV and new media have complemented each other until now. However media 
usage has been constantly evolving and the current thesis will examine the 
importance of both TV and websites. Nonetheless, TV remains more popular than the 
Internet especially in countries where Internet services are still limited due to lack of 
infrastructure or financial backing and the fact that some people in those countries 
are still computer-illiterate (Ciborra, 2005; Agboola, Isaac  and Arthur, 2000) . 
Specifically in Iraqi Kurdistan there is a lack of research that has investigated how 
young Kurdish people use the media. The most recent research, conducted in 2009 
was by the Technology and the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports of Kurdistan. 
This survey found that, 'more than 98 per cent of young people watch TV and only 40 
percent use the Internet, while most young people prefer political news, particularly 
males' (2009, 10). Furthermore, Internet service in Kurdistan remains limited to only 
certain cities and is expensive in relation to young people's income, whereas there is 
no tax on TV users, which means TV remains more popular (Warty, 2008, Abdul 
Rahman, 2012). In Kurdistan there is no research available to date into young people 
and the Internet and their usage of new media, particularly social media. Generally, 
social media are not used as much by Kurdish young people compared with other 
countries due to the high costs of Internet services and lack of mobile connections, 
which in countries where these exist, can lead to increased use of social media  at the 
expense of other media platforms.  The National Youth Survey of 2009 also went on to 
note that more than 90 per cent of young people had participated in previous 
elections and 70 per cent wanted the political system to be changed. This shows a high 
level of political interest and engagement by young people in Kurdistan. 
The media has contributed to the emergence of democratisation, in the same way as 
the emergence of the printed press in Western democracies during the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries (Habermas, 1991). In this respect, Pridham (1990) 
argues that the emergence of democracy is related to the role of the media. In the 
same way, Chadwick (2012) argues that ‘the Internet is evolving into one of the most 
significant enablers of political innovation since the emergence of mass democracy’ 
(2012, p 2). However in some aspects, TV plays a more active role, as both authors 
Chadwick  and Pridham argue that television has more impact on young people 
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because of their relatively lower political awareness (Pridham, 1990; Chadwick, 
2012) . In a similar vein, Kaid et al. (2007) found that political advertising across new 
media (YouTube in particular) has quite a strong influence on young American voters. 
In relation to new media, Russell et al. (2002) argue that young people in the UK are 
least likely to change their political views and they do not rely on new media to 
understand politics. Conversely, an earlier study identified that new media enable 
young people to be more interactive, and hence have a positive effect on their various 
forms of political communication (Bakker and De Vreese, 2011; Kruikemeier et al.  
2013). 
Traditional media still play a key role in political communication, nevertheless, the 
majority of arguments show that young people increasingly depend on new media for 
political communication whether in established or emerging democracies because 
new media are becoming more popular. However, in new democracies the lack of 
media freedom as well as issues related to the funding of traditional media may force 
opposition parties to rely on new media to communicate with young people, as new 
media are cheaper and more readily available. For instance, the former Mubarak 
regime in Egypt did not allow the Muslim Brotherhood to establish a traditional media 
outlet but through the Internet they communicated with the Egyptian youth. Attia et 
al. (2011) argue that the Egyptian youth, through communicating via social 
networking, managed to sustain the impact of the revolution. Funding is another 
major factor as media producers can establish platforms online more cheaply than 
using either print media or broadcasting. Even in a democratic society social media 
have an active role in terms of political participation, as Enjolras, Steen-Johnsen and 
Wollebaek, (2013) show in their study in Norway where social media enjoy a 
considerable and independent role in mobilising and organising demonstrations. In 
their study they conclude that social media should be an alternative means of political 
and civil organisation alongside traditional media. The Internet has evolved into an 
active instrument in developing the independent media, particularly in new 
democratic societies like Kurdistan, where the independent media started with 
website, one of the media discussed in the following chapter. The development of the 
Internet is supposed to help young people to become more active in political 
communication particularly as young people tend to communicate with their friends 
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across social media if the Internet is more readily available. It is worth mentioning, 
however, that young people in Kurdistan still do not use the Internet on their mobile 
phones as a result of high Internet prices and unreliable services. 
In light of the above research, it can see that people use the political news to 
understand politics and from this context young people rely on the media to 
understand and participate in the political process. TV channels and new media, such 
as the websites Youtube and other forms of social media are the main platforms in 
political communication, however, in Kurdistan the TV still takes the main role as 
discussed above. Regarding the new media in Kurdistan, websites have become the 
most popular (Muhedeen, 2012). Therefore, this thesis examines TV as the most 
popular media platform and websites which follow TV in terms of audience numbers, 
particularly for obtaining political news. 
2.5 Clientelism Model 
This section reviews the political issues identified in this thesis as the four concepts of 
corruption, reform, government performance and citizens' trust. These concepts are 
largely highlighted in the Kurdish media particularly across the opposition and 
independent media due to the lack of government performance and the political 
system which is based on the client system (Hussain, 2015). Zaidi and Sadiq (2012) 
argue that the political system in Kurdistan is characterised by nepotism and the 
citizens are not treated on an equal basis. Therefore this section reviews the concept 
of political clientelism as a causality of the political issues in Kurdistan. 
Since clientelism features in the political system this situation is supposed to create 
political issues, particularly corruption and the lack of government performance. This 
discussion reviews the clientelism model as a theoretical assumption that has 
repercussions on the political system of Kurdistan and it provides a suitable 
theoretical and conceptual framework for the thesis. 
Roniger adopts the term clientelism from Richard Graham who characterised 
clientelism as an action-set built upon the principle of 'take there, give here', enabling 
clients and patrons to benefit from mutual support as they play parallel to each other 
at different levels of political, social, and administrative articulation' (2004, p 355). 
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Roniger (2004) further explains that clientelism in the political arena, particularly in 
the government context, leads ‘to the distribution of state resources (jobs, contracts, 
and services) in exchange for political support and is associated with various forms of 
patronage and organisational brokerage. This implies that in the political clientelism 
system there is a form of deal between those in power and their clients to exchange 
benefits. In this regard, Bardhan and Mookherjee (2011) note that  clientelisim is 
associated with the political parties in power and they argue that ‘clientelism refers to 
strategic transfers made by political parties and governments to poor and 
disadvantaged groups as a means of securing their votes, in an effort to consolidate 
political power’ (2011, p 2). In this respect, Stokes et al (2013) argue that in 
clientelism system, the political parties distributes jobs, cash, credit, myriad and other 
resources to citizens in order to vote in favour of them front of them either for the 
election campaign or at any other time . This secures and keeps the politicians in 
power. 
The above definition of clientelism can apply to the political arena of Kurdistan where 
both political parties in power, the PUK and KDP, since the creation of the first 
government in 1992, started to construct their popularity based on the client system. 
On 19th May 1992, the election of the Kurdistan National Assembly (KNA) was 
conducted with the participation of eight Kurdish political parties and 4 Assyrian 
parties (Christian ethnic groups) who were competing for 100 parliamentary seats 
with 5 seats reserved for ethnic groups by quota, although subsequently 5 seats were 
retained for the Assyrians because the Turkmen withdrew from the elections. The 
Turkmen comprise the third minority group in Iraq and the majority of them live in 
Kurdistan, particularly in Kirkuk and Erbil, and most of them came from Turkey 
during the Ottoman Empire period. According to the election rules each list was 
supposed to obtain 7% in order to enter the KNA. Ultimately, the KDP obtained 51% 
and the PUK gained 49% of the votes (Dabrowska and Hann, 2008). Despite 
fraudulent incidents in this election, Stansfield (2003) stated that this election was 
one of the most democratic in the Middle East. The PUK did not agree to form the 
opposition because it believed that the KDP would start to buy the loyalty of the 
citizens through the distribution of public funds, as there was an old long-standing 
competition between the two parties about keeping and expanding their influence, 
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which had sometimes led to armed conflict between them.  As a result, the KDP and 
PUK formed a 50-50 coalition government and subsequently divided the government 
departments by making small concessions to the minor parties in order to ensure 
their support. According to Mustafa who was the PUK deputy leader, he suggested his 
party should form the opposition, nevertheless other members of the PUK preferred 
to enter the government because, as mentioned above, they did not have confidence in 
the KDP's undertakings (Mustafa, 2008). As the two political parties in power, the PUK 
and KDP, monopolised the public sector, Peshmerga and other security forces, as well 
as the economy, they could control the larger part of society on the clientelism basis 
through using public funds and jobs to buy votes (Qani and Fatah 2012).   
The client system leads to lack of social justice because the whole population have no 
real opportunity to find jobs (Bellamy, 2013). Another feature of the clientelism 
system is that the government faces over-employment because the political parties in 
power need to distribute new jobs to people continuously (Warner, 1997). The two 
arguments of Bellamy (2013) and Warner (1997) show that the new generation, 
particularly young people, face the negative consequences of the client system. After 
2003 the budget of Kurdistan started to increase due to the economic sanctions being 
lifted and the two political parties, PUK and KDP, started to monopolise the economic 
sector through establishing big companies which dominated contract allocation 
without transparency (Salih, 2015). Salih (2015) notes that the client system in 
Kurdistan led to a lack of social justice, for instance a small sector of society became 
wealthy dramatically while large parts of society became poor as a result of inflation. 
In the same way, the public services were not developed and the opposition parties 
were weak (Al Zaidi and Sadiq, 2012). As a result, the civil organisations and 
independent media emerged to criticise the government. In this regard, Al Zaidi and 
Sadiq (2012) argue that the debate of corruption and demand for reform by the 
people, civil society organisations, opposition parties and opposition and independent 
media mainly started from 2004 when the budget of the KRG started to increase.  
 The most prominent intellectual group which criticised government policy was the 
Rahand, which translates as ‘dimension’ in English, and which appeared from 1994 to 
2006. Most members of this group were living in the EU and through their journal of 
40 
the same name they published articles focusing on questions of freedom and 
democratisation in the KRG. Rasul (2010) mentioned that the Rahand group 
developed a critical discourse which had an active impact on readers, particularly on 
young people, which contributed to change and helped the emergence of real 
opposition parties. As well as this group, other forms of opposition emerged, for 
instance the development of independent media, such as the Hawlati newspaper 
which started in Sulaymaniyah as a weekly newspaper in 2000 and then became a 
daily. 
It is undoubtedly the case that, prior to 2009, some pressure groups and the 
independent media were more active in voicing opposition to the ruling parties than 
the smaller political opposition parties themselves. This was largely due to the fact 
that the two main parties stifled any open debate from the opposition parties and 
endeavoured to control any public criticism against them. This forced many Kurdish 
people to demonstrate openly, for example about the national budget which although 
it increased, still did not deliver improved public services.  In this context, Ali (2009) 
claimed that the Kurdish ruling parties argued that they were the only legitimate 
organisations worthy of government because they had opposed the Saddam regime, 
and that therefore the Kurds should show them loyalty for patriotic reasons. 
Moreover, when the opposition parties criticised the government, the two main 
parties accused them of being new in the political arena and therefore not having 
played a part in the struggle against the former regime. This in turn implied that only 
the two parties in power were legitimate; the opposition parties were ignored even 
though they were willing to help find a solution to the issues of corruption and reform. 
Therefore, members of the opposition parties joined in the anti-government protests 
alongside ordinary citizens. 
When ruling governments in a country do not allow opposition parties or individuals 
to propose different ideas this can lead to alternative forms of opposition, such as 
popular demonstrations and reports across the independent media. For instance, in 
Western democracies people and opposition parties usually have more rights to 
express their critical opinions against the performance of their governments 
compared with the people and opposition parties in a new democracy. All the 
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revolutions during the Arab Spring were initiated by the people and encouraged by 
the opposition parties. Salah (2009) argues that group pressure and the independent 
media encouraged the public to ask their government to make reforms in public 
services through demonstrations at the end of 2005 and the beginning of 2006 in the 
KRG. 
By the end of 2005, some of the PUK leaders formed a campaign to introduce reforms 
inside the KRG; these became known as the reform group in the PUK. This group made 
demands, such as reducing the power of the PUK leader, introducing reforms in the 
PUK, activating the Political Bureau of the PUK, conducting an election amongst the 
PUK members and ensuring the services provided to the public were improved 
(Mustafa, 2009). The PUK followed this up by taking steps to implement the demands 
of the Reform Group.  In spite of this, the Reform Group refused the offer to join in the 
internal elections of the PUK, arguing that the PUK had no real intention of conducting 
reforms. In addition, the Reform Group was uncomfortable with the power-sharing 
agreement between its party (the PUK) and the KDP. Under these circumstances, 
Nawsherwan Mustafa, leader of the Reform Group, along with the rest of its members, 
resigned from the PUK. Subsequently, in March 2007 they established a Media 
Company called Wsha which means ‘awareness’, to inform the people about 
corruption and reform (Mustafa, 2008). 
The company of Wsha had a considerable impact on the political situation of the KRG 
particularly in the PUK-influenced area because the Reform Group effectively became 
the opposition within the KRG, as they had a large membership base. Accordingly, 
freedom of expression expanded for each of the other opposition parties as well as the 
media (Al Zaidi and Sadiq, 2012). The opposition parties started to develop a coherent 
programme  against the ruling parties, with the four opposition parties, the Kurdistan 
Islamic Union (KIU), the Islamic Group (IG), the Toilers Party of Kurdistan (TPK) and 
the Socialist Party of Kurdistan (SPK) entering the  last election in July 2009 under a 
single list named ‘Service and Reform’. The Media Company, Wsha, formed its own list 
in the election and called it the Gorran list meaning ‘change’. This group focused on 
reforms and corruption and a call to change during the election campaign. As a result 
of all these oppositional activities and the competition amongst the two traditional 
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parties, the other political entities became stronger in the last election campaign. 
Ultimately, the traditional list (KDP and PUK) gained 59 seats out of 111 seats while 
the Gorran list took 25 seats with only 13 seats for the Service and Reform list. The 
results were declared by the independent High Electoral Commission of Iraq. This was 
a significant transition in political life in Iraqi Kurdistan because the two main parties 
had controlled the elections since 1992. Asos (2015) argues that the real opposition 
party started from the election in 2009, as people started to find an alternative party, 
particularly young people because the new generations demanded a better level of 
public services and accountability. However, the older generations still appreciated 
the struggle of the two main parties which they had conducted against the Saddam 
regime. Also most of the older generations kept a strong affiliation to these parties 
because they stood to gain financially through pensions or bribery (Qani, 2012a).  
Criticism of civil society and the opposition party increased when oil production 
restarted and people found that although the national budget increased, the level of 
ordinary people’s income did not change (Hussain, 2015; Salih, 2015). The arguments 
of both researchers imply that the KRG did not have an effective economic strategy or 
strong economic policy. In this regard, Qani (2015) argues that the two families in 
Kurdistan who dominated the PUK and KDP parties sought to transform the political 
system to a rentier economy system, such as those in the Arab Gulf countries, which is 
administered by families and ignores democratisation which is opposite to this system 
because in a democracy people play a big role in policy-making and decisions. 
Chaudhry (2011) explains that much of the Saudi state is based on the rentier 
economy system, where, for example, construction has relied on patron-client 
relationships through corruption of individuals by providing them with jobs in both 
the private and public sectors. Qani (2015) justifies his argument through four points, 
the first is that the two families monopolise the economic system through adopting 
the rentier system which relies on protecting the oil without transparency and using 
the income of this in their companies’ favour. Secondly, the religious dimension gives 
credence to the Salafist ideology which states that ruling families should be obeyed in 
any way, therefore the people do not have any right to demonstrate or seek to shape 
political parties or change the power base, even if the rulers become an authoritarian 
regime. As a result, the whole political process gradually comes under the families’ 
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control and the people will be forced to support the system even if they do not receive 
good quality services or are forced to suffer because of unemployment. The third 
point is that the families seek to form an intellectual group which does not criticise the 
political system through providing its members with higher salaries and privileges.  
In the light of the above discussion, it can be concluded in this section that the political 
economy of Kurdistan has been monopolised by the two political parties based on the 
system of clientelism (Hussain, 2015), and through adopting the rentier economy 
model (Qani, 2015; Salih, 2015). Such a system leads to corruption, bureaucracy, over- 
employment and general lack of social justice. The sector of society most likely to be 
affected by the client system are the young people because this system is based on the 
rentier economy which is unjust and creates over-employment, which particularly 
affects young people. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has considered the theoretical and empirical research into political 
communication in both new democracies and established democracies through 
several academic studies. The literature review discussion of related research helps 
establish how the arguments and assumptions of the present research can be 
delineated into a coherent framework, particularly framing analysis which in turn can 
be used as the criteria for analysing the political news. This chapter also reviewed the 
literature related to active audience theory particularly the coding/decoding model 
and uses and gratifications model which will be applied in order to evaluate how 
young people in Kurdistan understand and respond to the media content in particular 
across the Kurdish media as well as to examine how young people evaluate the 
government’s performance and the role of elections in the political process. The 
chapter has reviewed the clientelism model as a key theoretical assumption to review 
the Kurdish political system since the first government was formed in 1992. It is clear 
that the current political issues in Kurdistan have historical roots as a result of the 
accumulation of problems that have not been resolved by the client system adopted 
by the two political parties in power. The political system in Kurdistan may be 
considered as unique, as is the lack of academic research in Kurdistan in general, due 
to the historical background of the region. As Kirmanj (2013) notes, Kurdistan is not 
an independent nation-state although it does have many elements of a country's 
profile.  
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Chapter Three  
3. Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
 The aim of the project is to investigate political communication among young Kurdish 
people, thereby using Kurdistan as a case study by focusing on specific political issues 
across the Kurdish media and examining how young people understand and respond 
to the news coverage and how they evaluate both the government’s performance and 
the role of elections in the political process.  
Based on the research questions and its aims the present thesis uses a mixed methods 
to obtain data: applying content analysis and framing analysis to the textual news; 
conducting in-depth interviews with media professionals and with each focus group; 
conducting in-depth interviews and semi-structured interviews with young people. 
Hollway (2009) used a mixed methods approach involving both content analysis and 
interviews with the audience to increase the level of credibility of findings in her PhD 
thesis. Such mixed methods allow the researcher to compare findings received from 
both the audience and political news content. Smith argues that ‘content analysis can 
be used by researchers to compare the results of their content analysis with the 
information they are able to obtain from surveys or focus groups’ (2009, p 333). 
This chapter consists of four sections and the first section looks at the rationale of 
using a case study and explains the selection of political issues which were identified 
according to four concepts: corruption, reform, government performance and citizens' 
trust. The second section looks at content analysis and framing analysis which were 
applied as an approach to enable analysis of the textual news across the five media 
platforms. It also explains the strategy of sampling, the method of data analysis and 
ethics, as this addresses the first research question. The third section looks at the 
selection of the focus group that set out to analyse how young people understand and 
respond to the political issues across the five media platforms. This section also 
explains the selection of questions in each of the in-depth interviews and semi-
structured interviews which explored the attitudes of young people towards the 
government’s performance and the political process. Through conducting focus group 
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involving both in-depth and semi-structured interviews with young people the third 
research question will be answered and the findings of this research question will be 
presented in Chapter Six. As in the second section, the third section includes the 
sampling strategy adopted,as well as the method of data analysis and ethical 
considerations. 
The fourth section looks at the in-depth interviews which were devoted to examining 
the views of media professionals concerning the editorial policy underlying the news 
coverage of political issues and their perceived freedom to obtain information about 
political issues, all of which address the second research question. 
3.2 Case study   
The present research takes the case study approach to examine political 
communication amongst young people in Kurdistan as a means of understanding and 
interpreting political issues through the Kurdish media platforms. These are divided 
into different types according to their affiliation, namely the media controlled by the 
ruling political parties, by the opposition parties and the independent media. Each 
Television channel and website uses its own frames for covering the identified four 
political issues and there are more likely to be significant differences between the 
coverage of the media owned by the ruling political parties and that of the opposition 
and independent media. 
This thesis investigates how young people  understand and respond to political issues 
and it seeks to investigate how and why the media institutions selected use different 
frames to cover the main political issues identified, namely corruption, reform, 
government performance and citizens' trust.  These four concepts are widely covered 
by the media, particularly the opposition and independent media due to the perceived 
prevalence of corruption and poor government performance (Hussain, 2015). The 
increasing coverage of corruption issues by the opposition media forced the ruling 
media to cover this topic to a limited extent and it shows the government’s 
performance in a positive light in order to defend the ruling parties’ record. In this 
regard, Zaidi and Sadiq (2012) argue that the debate about corruption and the 
demand for reform from the people, civil society organisations, opposition parties and 
opposition and independent media mainly started in 2004 when the budget of the 
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KRG started to increase. Hussain (2015) also argues that the KRG adopted the client 
system due to the two families who dominated the KDP and PUK particularly after the 
increase in the budget after 2004. As Salih (2015) notes, the client system in Kurdistan 
led to a lack of social justice, for instance a small number of people became wealthy 
while a large sector of society became poor as a result of inflation. Furthermore, 
Hussain (2015) notes that the price of houses increased tenfold between 2003 and 
2010, while the city councils still do not have sufficient houses and flats to provide to 
young people as well as other social categories.  
As a result of this ongoing issue of corruption, young people started to demonstrate in 
May 2005 and they asked the government to solve this and introduce reforms (Zaidi 
and Sadiq, 2012). In this regard, Mustafa (2009) notes how the Gorran Party 
established the media company Wsha, which included KNN TV and the Sbeiy website 
in 2007 to exert influence on the government to introduce reforms. The two cases of 
corruption and reform became the slogan of all the political parties in the election 
campaigns of 2009 and 2013, apart from the ideological background of these political 
parties. The slogan of the government in 2009 and 2013 promised to introduce 
reforms and fight corruption, which means that corruption and reform became a 
challenge to all political parties and became a daily issue across the media. During the 
Arab Spring the young people started to demonstrate in January and February 2011. 
They asked the government to fight corruption and introduce reforms and as a result, 
9 young people died and dozens were injured in these demonstrations. As Hardy 
(2012b) argues, young people form the main sector of society, but they gain little 
attention from the government whilst they compose the main category of people who 
pay the price of corruption. At the same time young people were becoming more 
educated, which enabled them to gain more political knowledge, to understand 
government policy and to demand their rights in areas such as housing and 
employment. Kurdistan adopted a policy of democratisation and the media has played 
an active role in this process, as each political party seeks to have an effect on people 
through its media channels. Young people are the main social category and they 
believe that they do not receive sufficient attention from the government as 
aforementioned, while in turn it is the young people who are seeking political change 
in the country. 
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The investigation of young people and the media framing of political issues through 
the case study approach enabled the researcher to interpret the political 
communication process in Kurdistan. As Davies and Mosdell (2006) argue, the case 
study enables researchers to understand the phenomenon by examining a few 
examples which can be used to interpret the phenomenon itself.  This issue is the 
main political phenomenon in Kurdistan which the present research seeks to 
investigate by analysing political communication and applying the case study method; 
this empirical method has frequently been used successfully by political 
communication scholars (Stuckey, 1996; Stanyer, 2007). The other reason for 
applying the case study is its flexible approach which allows the researcher to adopt a 
mixed method approach, as clarified by Marschan-Piekkari and Welch, who argue that 
‘the most efficient approach is to use the case study which involves the collection and 
/or analysis of quantitative and/ or qualitative data in a single study’(2011, p 214).  
Opinions vary as to which approach, quantitative or qualitative, provides the most 
appropriate means of obtaining data which may be used to address particular 
research issues (Della Porta and Michael, 2008). Previous studies which investigated 
media issues have adopted a mixed method approach involving both quantitative and 
qualitative methods, all of which demonstrates that a hybrid of the two approaches 
includes many different forms of research methodology. 
The thesis is based more on the qualitative approach with a small amount of 
quantitative analysis, which is the content analysis of the news in order to investigate 
the importance of each media platform, where this gives an indicator of the agenda of 
these media. Besides the content analysis of the news content, the framing analysis 
will identify which frames are used by the five media outlets in their coverage of 
political news, thus enabling the thesis to be comprehensive and integrated. The four 
concepts together reflect the main political issues in Kurdistan, while the young 
people form the main sector of society affected by and interested in these issues. The 
media in Kurdistan have a different agenda when covering these issues and therefore 
it can be assumed that they use different frames in their coverage as the ownership of 
the Kurdish media is divided among the ruling parties, opposition and independent 
media. Which means the case study approach is adopted here to investigate these 
issues and provide a case study of political communication in Kurdistan. 
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 Marschan-Piekkari and Welch (2011) show that the mixed method is useful for 
deeper understanding and for supporting the findings, while Hesse-Biber notes that 
the mixed method enables the ‘qualitative researcher to creative quantitative 
measures from their qualitative data’ (2010: 1). Moreover Denscombe (2010) notes 
that the mixed method enables the researcher to develop the research instrument and 
design a variety of research questions, while  Greene argues that there is much for the 
researcher to ‘benefit from the creative thinking of the diverse application of social 
inquiry’ (2007, p 143).  
The case study approach is helpful in finding the causal interpretation of a 
phenomenon, and this gives further justification of its application in this research. 
Gray (2010) notes that the case study is useful for research which investigates media 
perceptions and for measuring the background of media audiences. It allows the 
researcher to investigate a phenomenon through focusing on a part of the issue which 
means that its function is not limited to a descriptive explanation but reveals a more 
in-depth explanation. Yin (2009) also argues that the case study can be used for 
explanation and generalisation as it enables the researcher to investigate a 
phenomenon or a group of events in the context of society. Furthermore, Yin (2009) 
notes that the case study can help to interpret the causality of a phenomenon. From 
this standpoint, the current thesis raises three questions to enable further 
understanding of political communication. These focus on different aspects of the 
issue: analysis of the media content of the political news; editorial policy and the 
freedom of media professionals to investigate political issues; evaluation of young 
people’s understanding of and response to the media content of the political issues 
and of their attitudes towards the government’s performance and the political issues. 
To examine these questions through this case study several different methods will be 
adopted, such as content analysis and framing analysis, in-depth interviews and semi-
structured interviews as will be explained in the following three sections in more 
detail. 
3.3 Content analysis of political news 
This section looks at the content analysis of the news coverage, including the sampling 
strategy of the selection of the media and news content, the method of data analysis 
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and the ethical case as well. The content analysis was employed to address the first 
research question which seeks to investigate to what extent the media covers the 
political issues in Kurdistan and how framing is used in their news coverage. 
Specifically with regard to the sampling of the media content analysis, there are 
several Television channels and websites that are not news providers in Kurdistan, 
therefore only 2 Television channels and 3 websites will be studied here. The 
rationale for selecting and rejecting components of the sample is related to the 
purpose and generalisation of the study in terms of the components and structure of 
the Kurdish media. In terms of the news channels in Kurdistan, they can be classified 
into those channels belonging to the ruling parties and those belonging to the 
opposition parties. Accordingly, one Television channel owned by the ruling parties 
has been selected, namely KG TV oriented by the PUK and this channel is specific in its 
political content. The KG TV channel's headquarters is in Sulaymaniyah City, which is 
located in the area where the opposition parties have most influence. In addition, 
most of the independent media platforms have emerged there because the area of 
PUK influence is more liberal than that of the KDP. KNN is the second Television 
channel selected and it is owned by the biggest opposition parties collectively known 
as the Gorran Movement and it also mainly focuses on political issues in Kurdistan. As 
for websites in Kurdistan, there are three types classified according to their 
ownership either by the ruling parties, opposition parties or independent ownership. 
The website representative of the main governing political party is the Xendan 
Website which is the most popular, whereas the most popular website among the 
opposition parties is Sbeiy owned by Gorran, the main opposition party. Although 
there are many independent websites, Awena has been selected because it is one of 
the main ones, and in order to give a balanced view of political news in this research 
project.  
From this standpoint, the thesis excluded print media, radio and social media for 
several reasons. With regard to the print media, currently the newspaper's popularity 
has fallen and several newspapers have been closed, which reflects a wider global 
phenomenon. For instance, the two websites analysed in this thesis, Xendan and Sbeiy, 
have both closed their print version. A further example concerning newspapers is the  
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‘Kurdistan News’, owned by the PUK and the oldest newspaper in Kurdistan, which 
prints 4,000 copies daily, while Kurdistan has a population of some 5 million. By 
comparison, the websites studied here attract up to 100,000 daily visitors (Muhedeen, 
2012). Moreover, radio listeners are increasingly limited to housewives and taxi 
drivers and most radio programmes tend to focus on music with a small amount of 
news and other programme content (Warty, 2008). In terms of social media, although 
its users are globally increasing rapidly, nevertheless in Kurdistan it is not more 
popular than television and websites for two reasons. Firstly the Internet is still 
expensive and unreliable and most users do not have mobile access because the 
Internet is only available by installing a home connection. Secondly, the Internet is not 
available everywhere, particularly in more rural areas, which means that television 
remains the main media platform and there is no tax on television which ensures its 
popularity. 
Regarding the sampling strategy, this involved selecting news programmes from the 
two selected television channels and news coverage on the three websites during a 
year. From the registration of my PhD programme in January 2012 until the selection 
of my sampling in April 2013 I observed the whole Kurdish media generally and the 
selected media  specifically. Furthermore, I started to discuss with professionals 
working in the media in Kurdistan and discovered that GK TV has the main news 
programme which is presented at 10 pm. This programme includes all the news 
stories presented during the day, it mainly consists of news but sometimes it invites 
political observers, journalists and experts to analyse some topics. This programme 
lasts nearly one hour and includes 15-35 news stories. Similarly, KNN TV  has a similar 
news programme which is presented at 9 pm. The two news programmes on GK TV 
and KNN TV largely present their daily news content in this peak-time broadcast (Ali, 
2011; Mageed, 2011). Therefore, during one week between 11th to 17th  April 2013 
news items from the television channels as well as from the 3 websites were selected. 
Thus the total amount of news content analysed from both channels was 14 hours 
across GK TV and KNN TV and the total number of news items was 280. From these, 
136 news items were identified as being relevant to the four political issues. For more 
details on this, see Table 5.1 in Chapter Five which is devoted to textual analysis. 
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With specific regard to the news from the websites, all the  news presented during the 
week was selected, which totalled 714 news items with 182 being relevant to the four 
political issues, again see Table 5.4 in Chapter Five. Thus the total number of news 
items across the five media platforms was 994, with 318 being relevant to the four 
political issues. Those 994 news items were analysed quantitatively in the form of a 
content analysis by applying several categories, while the  318 items were analysed 
qualitatively by applying a framing analysis. The sample of the news content analysis 
in this thesis is small as my research is based on the qualitative method, where usually 
the sample is small (Macnamara, 2005), (Denscombe, 2010) and Marschan- Piekkari 
and Welch, 2004). 
This thesis has applied a content analysis to the political news selected in order to 
focus on the second research question which investigates how specified political 
issues (namely corruption, reform, government performance and citizens' trust) are 
covered across the main Kurdish media platforms. The content analysis of the news 
content is divided into content analysis (statistical analysis) which is a quantitative 
approach and framing analysis which is qualitative approach. The thesis is mainly 
focused on qualitative content analysis rather than quantitative content analysis, as it 
seeks to investigate political communication qualitatively. However, quantitative 
analysis was used as an additional approach to provide indicators as to what extent 
the selected media give importance to the four political issues compared to other 
themes, thus enabling the  agenda of the studied media platforms to be determined. 
Furthermore, the second research question seeks to evaluate the priorities of the 
media channels, which makes the application of quantitative content analysis even 
more relevant. The quantitative method helps researchers to be more reliable and 
reduce bias as well (Newman and Carolyn, 1998; Markula and  Michael , 2011).  
Alongside these features of the quantitative method, the qualitative method is 
considered important and much more accurate in obtaining in-depth insights into 
issues. Newbold, Boyd-Barrett and Van den Bulck (2002) support the qualitative 
approach arguing that there is a relationship between media texts and their impact 
which cannot be evaluated quantitatively. Alongside the general importance of such 
qualitative content analysis, this thesis recognises the scarcity of research into 
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political communication in Kurdistan particularly the lack of any qualitative research 
in this field. Therefore, a qualitative content analysis will be conducted, as the current 
research is the first study to adopted the qualitative research approach foto examine 
political communication in Kurdistan. Hollway mentioned that, ‘the aim of qualitative 
document analysis is to discover new or emergent patterns, including overlooked 
categories ’ (2011, p 321). This is relevant to the current thesis which aims to acquire 
in-depth understanding of how political issues are covered across different media, 
from the media of the parties in power, opposition media and independent media 
sources. Keen and Todres (2006) claimed that the qualitative study seeks to achieve  
findings which accurately represent the research with the aim to describe, interpret, 
and evaluate message content. Regarding the importance of content analysis in media 
research, Wimmer and Dominick also added that it ‘is an efficient way to investigate 
the content of the media’ (2006: 156). The present research seeks to provide accurate 
knowledge and understanding of political news across the Kurdish media. Those 
scholars who support the quantitative approach, such as Newman and Carolyn (1998) 
and Markula and Michael (2011), argue that it reduces researcher bias and increases 
the reliability of the research. Therefore, in order to give as wide a picture as possible, 
the present research has applied both quantitative and qualitative descriptive analysis 
to cover the research questions and aims. As Markula argues, ‘A mixed methods 
approach helps answer different questions and thus enables a researcher to obtain a 
single well integrated picture of a situation’ (2011, p 201). 
Regarding the method of data analysis of the news content, this will be restricted to 
textual news and any sound effects and visuals will be excluded because the majority 
of news reports on television in Kurdistan do not involve these techniques or effects 
because of lack of expertise in the Kurdish media (Abdul Rahman, 2012; Muhedeen, 
2012). Similarly previous research which examined the news content of the Kurdish 
media excluded sound effects and visuals for the same reason (Ali, 2011; Mageed, 
2011). 
Two methods have been applied to analyse the textual news, the first being content 
analysis to analyse the news quantitatively according to several categories. Each news 
item from the sample was rendered into a transcript, closely read and then 
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categorised and coded. The news items were divided into three categories, with the 
First category classifying the news from across the television channels into three 
subcategories: (1) news relating to political issues (reform, corruption, government 
performance and citizens' trust); (2) news relating to disputed areas which refers to 
the external issues of Kurdistan; (3) other news (non-political and foreign news). The 
news items from the websites in this category were similar in content to the television 
but did not include the the subcategory of 'disputed areas’ because during the 
categorising process I found this was mostly highlighted on the television. The First 
category is devoted to evaluation of the priority given by the media platforms to the 
four political issues compared to other themes and the results of this are presented in 
Table 5.1 and 5.4 in Chapter Five.  
The Second category was devoted to classifying the news related to the four political 
issues into four subcategories: (1) corruption, (2) reform, (3) government 
performance, (4) citizens' trust. This would identify the agenda of the media towards 
each of these concepts and issues and thereby provide the priority of the five media 
platforms. The results are presented in Table 5.2 and 5.5 in Chapter Five.  
The Third category sought to categorise the news related to the four political issues 
into three subcategories: (1) using positive value, which means that the item showed 
the government in a positive light when discussing its performance, reforms and the 
level of citizens' trust in the government, while corruption was not discussed as an 
issue. (2) negative value, which means that the item reported negatively on the 
government's performance, reforms and citizens' trust, with corruption as a main 
news item and an important political issue obstructing development in Kurdistan as 
well as the overall democratic political process. (3) neutral value, which means that 
the media covered the four issues using a neutral approach. The third categorisation 
process was conducted by reading each news story and assigning one of the three 
values according to the phrases used and the approach of the coverage. The results of 
this category are presented in Table 5.3 and 5.6 in Chapter Five. 
Regarding the qualitative content analysis of the news content, framing analysis was 
applied to examine the news related to the four political issues covered in the selected 
media and the total news items were 318. This approach is widely used for analysing 
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news content as discussed in the literature review, and is viewed as particularly useful 
in research related to political communication. This research has applied the framing 
analysis according to the 4 components determined by Robert Entman (1993). These 
are : (1) problem definition, which helps determine how the media define the problem 
of the political issues and to what extent the media define the political issues; (2) 
causal interpretation, this component helps identify how the media refresh the 
causality of the political issues; (3) moral evaluation, identifies how the media 
evaluate the political issues; and (4) treatment recommendation, this component 
allows understanding of the extent to which the media attempt to provide solutions to 
political issues. There are several PhD researchers who have employed framing 
analysis as an approach and used its criteria to analyse textual news when 
researching political communication (Mchakulu, 2010).   
Alongside the four components, during the coding process each article was coded 
using general and open coding in order to explore the dominant framing components 
used in the coverage of the news stories and to identify how the phrases and points 
were used to construct each framing component. Subsequently, certain frames were 
identified that were used as a tool for constructing the 4 frame components. These 
were: (1) reframing, which means that the media devotes several news items or news 
stories to cover a case in one news programme; (2) magnified frame, refers to what 
emphasis the media gave to the case; (3) consequences frame, which refers to how a 
specific issue or a case has potential to have negative or positive impact; (4) simplify 
frame, refers to how the media simplifies the issue or underestimates its real size or 
significance; (5) localising frame, which means the issues are made to appear of local 
importance or smaller; (6) internal security frame, this refers to how the media claims 
that internal security is under threat from others, either from terrorism, or from 
Baghdad because of historical conflicts, or the threat from surrounding countries 
regarding Kurdish issues. These frames may be used by the media in order to distract 
people from asking the government to further reform internal issues. These are 
detailed in Appendix (5) which is devoted to the content analysis coding sheet. 
Regarding the ethics involved in the selection of the news content sample, I visited the 
five media outlets and informed them that I was conducting research into political 
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communication and the KNN TV and GK TV gave me seven news programmes on one 
DVD disk and mentioned that they were happy to provide material to any researcher 
free. Similarly, the managers of the three websites offered to provide me with their 
news during the week but I informed them that I would personally save and download 
the news as the three websites have open access and are free. Alongside this, the 
researcher can ask the Ministry of Culture to obtain the news and programmes across 
the media free. The Minister of Culture of the KRG provides this service to all 
researchers, as this ministry employs a system to record the whole media output and 
this helps researchers if the media are unwilling to co-operate. 
3.4 Conducting focus group, in-depth interviews and semi-structured interviews 
with young people. 
This section examines three methods (focus group, in-depth interviews and semi- 
structured interviews) employed to collect data from young people, including the 
sampling strategy, the approach of analysing the data and the ethics as well. These 
three methods were employed to answer research question three which investigates 
how young people understand and respond to the political issues across the media 
and how they evaluate the government’s performance and the role of elections in the 
political process. 
Focus groups, in-depth interviews and semi-structured interviews are among the 
main tools of data collection for qualitative research (Leavy, 2014; Elamé, 2013) and 
these methods can be combined with a quantitative approach in a single research 
(Elamé, 2013). Each of the three methods was applied to achieve specific aims: the 
focus group was used to evaluate how young people understand and respond to the 
political issues across the five media platforms studied in this thesis; the in-depth 
interviews were used to investigate how young people evaluate the government's 
performance; and the semi- structured interviews were used to discover how young 
people view the political process, particularly the role of elections, in the development 
of the democratic process.  
This thesis applied three tools and three different samples of participants to answer 
the first research question which consists of three parts: evaluating the media, 
evaluating government performance and evaluating the role of elections in the 
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political process. The focus group method was selected to collect data addressing the 
first part of the question (evaluating the media) comprised 42 participants across 7 
focus groups. The in-depth interview method was chosen to address the second part 
of the first research question (evaluating government performance) by selecting 
another 15 participants. The semi- structured interview method was applied to the 
final part of the research question (how young people see the elections in the political 
process) by selecting another 7 participants during the election campaign. Therefore, 
the total number of the sample is 62 participants, 42 for the focus group, 15 for in-
depth interviews and 7 for semi-structured interviews and all the participants were 
between 18 and 28 years old. All of these were conducted in the Kurdish language and 
subsequently translated into English, and all the transcripts relevant to the research 
questions are presented in Appendices 1-3. Each method will be explained more fully 
in terms of sampling, ethics and data collection process in the following section. 
3.4.1 Focus group 
The focus group was applied to the first research question to explore how these media 
platforms contribute to the formation of the attitudes of young people towards 
current political issues in Kurdistan. The other objective of conducting a focus group 
in this thesis is to enable comparison of the points of view expressed by the young 
people with the findings of the content analysis data. Babbie used focus groups ‘to 
examine how U.S. citizens frame their views of political issues’ (2012, p 157), and this 
method has been adopted in the current research. Lunt and Livingstone argue that a 
‘focus group is useful when researchers seek to discover participants' meanings and 
ways of understanding (1996: 3)’, which is clearly an objective of this research. 
Semetko and Scammell (2012) added that a focus group is a widely adopted method 
that can be used in political communication research. Perlmutter (1999) also shows 
that focus groups were used in marketing research before political communication 
and then became a method tool for evaluating voters’ feelings about any issue due to 
the inability of the survey method to examine audience attitudes effectively. As well as 
this method being useful to political communication research and appropriate to this 
thesis, it had not been used in any research in political communication, as far as I 
observed. The two research studies into political communication conducted in 
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Kurdistan by Ali (2011) and Mageed (2011) applied a quantitative method, namely 
content analysis of textual news and survey. The present thesis seeks to achieve 
deeper understanding of these issues through using qualitative approaches. 
There are recognised limitations to the use of a focus group, which Hennink (2013) 
defines as typically including six to eight participants or fewer. Scholars have different 
recommendations about the number of focus groups in individual research, for 
example Beall suggests that the researcher ‘can conduct one to two focus groups only’ 
(2010, p 35). Accordingly, in one of her research studies she conducted only three 
focus groups and devoted the focus of each group to the age of the participants. The 
limited focus group helps the research to be focused because as a qualitative tool it 
does not seek to generalise the data findings as in a survey. As the limited number of 
focus group participants allows the researcher to control the data, Hennink states that 
‘focus group homogeneity involves bringing people who have enough in common to 
allow the development of a productive controversial dynamic’ (2013, p 39). Similarly, 
Bloor (2001) argues that discussion through the focus group takes place in a dynamic 
and spontaneous fashion, although the process is conducted in an organised meeting. 
Moreover, the focus group allows the researcher to explore how each individual 
person affects the others, thus allowing a further opportunity to observe 
interpersonal communication. Martin (2011) found and suggested that in researching 
the effects of media in countries that have strong relationships amongst people, the 
evaluation of interpersonal communication should be included. 
The focus group process was carried out between 14th and 28th April 2013 and 
during this period one week’s news  from GK TV, KNN TV, Sbeiy Website, Xendan 
Website and Awena Website were selected  from 11th to 17th April 2013. The focus 
group process was conducted at the same time as the content analysis of the political 
news selection in order to evaluate the young people’s feedback on live events and 
news. The focus group consisted of 7 separate groups and each group was composed 
of 4-8 young people, making a total of 42 participants, with each group discussion 
lasting around 45 to 60 minutes. The seven focus groups were divided into two focus 
groups to discuss GK TV and two focus groups to discuss KNN TV. The other three 
remaining focus groups were centred around the websites: Xendan, Sbeiy and Awena, 
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with one focus group for every website; this means of obtaining news is less popular 
than television. Participants with differing political allegiances were divided among 
the different focus groups because Kurdish society is divided among the political 
parties, which is reflected in media users. Warty (2008) argues that partisan media 
and a lack of national broadcasting services leads to society being divided on the 
media. Therefore, the participants were  divided among the focus groups and it was 
impossible to find one young person who used all five media platforms studied. 
Nonetheless, as stated earler,  it is possible to devote one or two focus groups to 
evaluate the media or any cases (Beall, 2010).  
Specifically in Iraqi Kurdistan there is a lack of research that has investigated how 
young Kurdish people use the media; the most recent research, conducted in 2009 
was the National Youth Survey undertaken by the Ministry of Culture and Youth. In 
this survey, it was found that more than 98 per cent of young people watch television 
and only 40 percent use the Internet. Muhedeen (2012) states that the Internet in 
Kurdistan is expensive, unreliable and it is not available everywhere, which means 
that websites are not so popular compared to the television which is free of charge. 
From this stand point, the present thesis has excluded analysis of social media.  
The participants were selected according to demographic characteristics, namely 
gender, place of residence, and level of education. The participants were also selected 
according to some variables regarding the background of the young people, namely 
their political affiliation or political orientation and political knowledge or interest.  
The following table clarifies the composition of the focus groups.  
Table 3.1 
Focus Group 
Numbers 
Demographic characteristics of the participants in the focus 
groups 
 
Gender Place of 
Residence 
Higher Education and 
not in higher Education 
Total  
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Fe Ma City Town 
and 
villages 
In higher 
education 
Not in 
higher 
education 
 
First Tele-
vision 
2 3 4 1 5 - 5  
Second 1 3 4   4 4  
Third 3 4 4 3 7  7  
Fourth 3 4 5 2 7  7  
Fifth Website  7 3 4 7  7  
Sixth 4  4  4  4  
Seventh 2 6 6 2 8  8  
Total 15 27 30 12 38 4 42  
Focus Group 
numbers 
Political background of the participants in the focus groups  
Political affiliation or 
political orientation 
Political knowledge or 
political interests. 
Total  
Ruling 
partie
s 
Opposi
tion 
parties 
Independen
t 
 
First Televisio
n 
2 2 1 Media 5  
Second 1 2 1 Not in higher education 4  
Third 1 4 2 Media 7  
Fourth  1 6 Media 7  
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Fifth wesite 1 4 2 Political science 7  
Sixth  2 2 Political science 4  
Seventh 2 2 4 Political science 8  
Total 7 17 18  42  
Participants in the focus groups according to demographic characteristics and political 
background. 
During the selection of the sample every effort was made to keep a balance between 
the categories of young people according to their political and demographic 
characteristics as the thesis aimed to investigate the role of these factors as general 
and additional findings. However, it is not necessary to strike an exact balance 
because this thesis is located in qualitative research which, unlike quantitative 
research, does not attempt to generalise the data (Hadiwinata, 2003). According to 
Table 3.1, 38 young people were in higher education, and 4 young people were not. 
This can be explained by the fact that the majority of this age group in Kurdistan are 
either attending higher education programmes or have a university degree 
(Technology and Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports, 2009). Accordingly, the thesis 
only devoted one focus group to young people who are not in higher education and 
this group evaluated GK TV (see Appendix 1). This will not affect the data obtained for 
GK TV because there is another focus group devoted to GK TV. Hughes and DuMont 
(2002) preferred conducting focus groups in homogeneous groups in this way, while 
Beall (2010) suggested that is possible to devote even one focus group to evaluate any 
research topic. Furthermore, as stated above, this piece of qualitative research does 
not aim to generalise the data.  
Regarding the other two remaining factors, gender and place of residence, the 
participants were divided into 27 males and 17 females, which is not significant and 
will not affect the results. The participants were divided into separate and mixed 
groups of males and females, for instance there was one female focus group, one male 
focus group and the five remaining were mixed because the majority of them 
preferred this formation. It can be argued that gender division in Kurdistan, as in 
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other cultures, is often influenced by males, particularly in the formation of their 
political attitudes. Elsayed (2011) conducted focus groups with females separately for 
her PhD thesis and argued that Egyptian females often felt ashamed when speaking in 
meetings with males. In terms of the place of residence the young people were divided 
into 27 from cities and 15 from towns and villages, which reflects the fact that the 
majority of Kurdish people live in cities. In terms of age, the thesis did not take this 
into account for two reasons, firstly this is a cohort of young people aged 18 to 28 and 
this category share common political concerns, for example most of them are not 
employed in the public sector and they face housing problems, unemployment, and no 
clear prospects for the future. The second reason is that half the participants were 
selected from private university and aged over 24, which means the participants were 
exactly divided into the age groups (18- 28). 
To investigate the variables regarding the background of young people, namely 
political affiliation and political knowledge or political interest, some students were 
selected from the Department of Media and Political Science as they have a strong 
relation to these variables. At the same time the focus group whose participants were 
not in higher education was selected, on the assumption that they might have a 
weaker level of political knowledge. At the end of each focus group the participants 
were asked their political background and whether they were affiliated to a particular 
party or had any specific political orientation such as towards the ruling political 
parties, the opposition or independent media. Specific demographic characteristics 
were recorded to establish which participants were in higher education or not, along 
with their gender and place of residence (cities, villages and towns). It proved quite 
feasible to ask people about their political background in Kurdistan, as they were keen 
to show their affiliation to one of the political groups. This would allow for 
comparison between young people in higher education and those not in higher 
education and for these variables to be tested. The focus group and in-depth 
interviews were conducted during April and May, as this date was near the time of the 
election campaign leading to the August election and came at a time when the media 
coverage in relation to the research topic was greater.  
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The participants were selected from the University of Sulaymaniyah, University of 
Charmw and the University of Human Development and a small number I met in a 
youth club. Prior to the selection of university students I visited the Heads of 
Department and Faculty of these universities to explain my PhD project and they 
formally allowed me to meet their students. The lecturers were willing to help me 
arrange appointments with the students and provided a room in the university to 
conduct the focus groups. This is due to the fact that lecturers appreciate the work of 
researchers and tend to help them and provide them with all the facilities if required. I 
showed the students a sample of news on television and from websites but the 
respondents were not interested in watching them or reading them, as they claimed 
they had already seen them. This is probably due to the fact that most of the young 
people selected were interested in politics and were active users of the media 
platforms studied, a phenomenon common in qualitative research which mostly relies 
on purposive sampling (Merriam, 2014;Yin, 2010 ) in order to find deeper 
understanding rather than generalising the data as in quantitative research 
(Hadiwinata, 2003 ). 
The data collected from the focus groups, in-depth interviews and semi-structured 
interviews were all transcribed and analysed through thematic analysis as a method 
of data analysis. Thematic analysis is a typical approach to analyse qualitative data 
from interviews (Athanasiou and  Darzi, 2011), however this approach has some 
limitations. In this respect Willig claims that ‘thematic analysis does not itself provide 
the researcher with a clear theoretical basis which means that the researcher has to 
do a lot of conceptual work before embarking upon the research itself’ (2013, p 65). 
Another perceived weakness of this approach is that thematic analysis is also used to 
analyse quantitative data leading to a deductive approach, whereas in this thesis 
thematic analysis is used on qualitative data. However, this should not detract from 
the value of such analysis as any findings will aid comparison with the other data 
obtained elsewhere.  
Thematic analysis was also used to analyse the data collected by conducting in-depth 
interviews with the chief news editors. This thematic approach was adopted by 
Harper and Thompson (2011) who noted that the thematic analysis is useful in 
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dealing with data from verbal interviews, such as focus groups. Alongside this, 
thematic analysis has been described as a flexible method to analyse data and useful 
for qualitative research (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Willig (2013) also noted that 
thematic analysis can deal with a wide range of data including transcripts of 
interviews, focus group discussions and media texts. Finally, thematic analysis enables 
the researcher to systematically present the data which has been collected (Saldaña, 
2012). The approach also helps to explain the emergence of sub-questions after the 
data collection. Another important point of thematic analysis is that it helps 
researchers to find further meaning and identify the emergence of information 
relevant to the research question because it does not involve categorising the data by 
specific content type. Rather the data is interpreted according to the research 
questions which means that it can be used for several questions as coding and 
category criteria that develop during the data analysis, all of which aims to serve the 
research question (Athanasiou and Darzi, 2011). The transcripts were coded 
according to several sub-questions that relate to the main research questions of the 
project, as can be seen in Appendices 1-3 in order to ensure the main ideas of the 
participants were represented. Subsequently, notes were written on each idea and 
comment from the participants and any relationship between the comments was 
noted in order to identify common ideas and specific points mentioned by the 
participants. Furthermore, the analysis process was conducted on the data collected 
from the in-depth interviews, semi-structured interviews and the focus groups, as can 
be seen in the transcription copy of these in Appendices 1-3. 
Prior to conducting a focus group the key aims, research questions and concepts of the 
thesis were outlined to ensure the participants focused on the topic because during 
the focus groups they tended to discuss irrelevant points if left unchecked. My 
previous experience as a media presenter and correspondent from 2004 -2010 helped 
me to conduct the interviews confidently and effectively. Most of the participants 
were volunteers, because in Kurdish culture participants in such projects are not 
usually rewarded. Although some participants wanted their names to be shown, 
pseudonyms were adopted throughout to ensure anonymity along ethical grounds. 
During the focus groups each respondent presented one or two main points. Due to 
the nature of the focus groups that were composed of several members, each person 
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tried to discuss a few points and the others tended not to repeat the same comment, 
as they either approved of it or expressed a different viewpoint. All the participants’ 
comments were recorded and a pen was used to record notes as this is useful later for 
the researcher. Subsequently all the participants’ comments relevant to the research 
question were transcribed and presented in Appendix 1. 
3.4.2 Conducting in-depth interviews with young people. 
As aforementioned the focus group was presented as the first tool of the qualitative 
approach for data collection while the in-depth interviews can be identified as the 
second tool of data collection. Moskowitz (1998) notes that both approaches can be 
combined in the single research due to the flexibility of the qualitative approach. The 
present research has used in-depth interviews for collecting data from young people's 
perception of the government’s performance. Several authors refer to the advantages 
of in-depth interviews, for instance in widening interpretation and perception (Mayer, 
2011). This method is useful in ‘covering a wide area of interest’ such as that of the 
current research project (Hine and Carson, 2007, p 15). Wimmer and Dominick 
(2006) note that in-depth interviews are important for obtaining information on 
sensitive and serious issues and they argue that this allows the researcher to gain 
fresh information in detail. 
The in-depth interviews were applied as another tool for obtaining data about how 
young people evaluate the government’s performance in order to examine the 
understanding and attitudes of young people, therefore the participants were asked 
several questions during the in-depth interviews, as can be seen in Appendix 2. The 
interviewees were composed of 15 participants who participated between the 2nd 
and 25th May 2013. This period came a few months before the Kurdish election 
campaign and as a result political discussion amongst people became more heated. 
This in turn led to young people being more ready to discuss political issues and the 
government’s performance. The demographic characteristics and political background 
of the young people which were taken into account during their in-depth interviews 
are illustrated in the following table: 
Table 3.2 
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Demographic characteristics 
Political 
background 
Gender Educational background Place of residence 
2 Male 
Students in Media Studies 
University of Sulaymaniyah 
City Opposition 
2 Male 
Students in Political Science 
University of Sulaymaniyah 
Town and villages Independent 
1 Male Unemployed City Ruling parties 
2 Female 
Students in Media Studies 
University of Sulaymaniyah 
City Ruling parties 
1 Male Unemployed graduate from Erbil City Ruling parties 
1 Female 
Student in Education 
Department - Salahaddin 
University in Erbil 
Town and villages Ruling parties 
2 Female 
Students in Education 
Department - Garmian 
University 
Town and villages Opposition 
1 Female 
Student in Media Study 
University of Sulaymaniyah 
City Independent 
1 Male Unemployed City Independent 
1 Female 
Media Study University of 
Sulaymaniyah 
City Opposition 
1Male Unemployed graduate from Erbil City Opposition 
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Total 8 Males &7 Females to make a total of 15 young people. 
Demographic characteristics and political background of sample 
The interviewees were composed of 8 males and 7 females who were studying in 
different departments in the university. With specific regard to the educational 
background of the 15 participants, 10 of them were students from the Media Studies, 
Political Science, Education and Linguistics departments, while 2 of them had 
graduated, but were currently unemployed, and the remaining two were not in higher 
education. Thus the sample represented a cross-section of young people in Kurdistan, 
although the thesis is based on qualitative research which aimed to select young 
people who are interested in politics. It is a reasonable assumption that most young 
people in Kurdistan are interested in politics because they face issues such as finding a 
job, housing, and future security as there is no state pension in the private sector 
(Warty, 2008; Hussain, Talat, 2006 and Hussain, 2015). Regarding their place of 
residence, 10 of the participants were from cities and the remaining 5 from towns and 
villages, as the majority of Kurds live in cities. 
With specific regard to their political background they all had a different political 
orientation and 6 of them were affiliated to the opposition parties, 5 of them were 
affiliated to the political parties in power, and the remaining 4 were independent. As 
aforementioned in the focus group section, in Kurdish society most people tend to 
reveal their political background and it is quite possible to ask them about this. 
The actual length of each in-depth interview varied between 30 to 40 minutes and 
they were audio recorded and subsequently typed. Pen and paper was also used for 
recording some important notes and the interviews were conducted in different 
settings, such as in the university, in a public square, in a youth club and in a coffee 
shop. Enough time was allowed to conduct the interviews and the whole process was 
done face to face, which is more effective than by telephone or online because it 
allows the interviewer to interact with the respondents, who prefer this method as 
well. The conducting of the in-depth interviews and focus groups was not difficult as I 
had worked in the media as a news correspondent and radio presenter when I was a 
student in Kurdistan and Egypt during my Bachelors and Masters degree programme. 
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Similarly to the focus group, all 15 interviewees participated as volunteers because in 
Kurdish culture respondents do not expect to be rewarded for participating in 
research. The interviews as aforementioned were conducted in Kurdish and later 
translated into English by the researcher, no agency appears to be available to do this 
service. All transcripts relevant to the research question are presented in Appendix 2. 
3.4.3 Conducting semi–structured interviews with young people 
This thesis used the semi-structured interview to understand how young people see 
the role of their political participation in elections and their perception of the role of 
elections in a future democratic political system, as this is a part of the first research 
question. The participants in the semi-structured interview comprised 7 respondents 
who were asked some key questions in a public square during the last election 
campaign in September 2013 in order to obtain data to address the research question.  
Interviews conducted as part of research may take different forms and types, such as 
the semi-structured interview, structured interview and unstructured interview 
(Ritchie and Palmer, 2005; Schuh, 2009). The semi-structured interview is important 
for asking standard questions, and it allows for the investigation of additional 
questions (Jolley and Mitchell, 2007). However, the same authors also argue that 
structured interviews contribute to increasing the reliability and reducing the risk of 
bias from the interviewer.  Klenke (2008) notes that the semi-structured interview is 
usually prepared for limited key questions. This form of interview was important for 
the present research as it allowed young people to be interviewed in public squares 
and respond to questions more informally. The other reason for using this type of 
interview is that the young people in this kind of place and situation do not have 
sufficient time for a structured interview to be conducted as they came out to 
participate in the election campaign and to enjoy it. Therefore they tend to be 
unwilling to give more time to the researcher and it was easier to conduct the 
interviews in a short time, so the actual length of the semi-structured interviews was 
about 10-20 minutes only. During the semi-structured interviews there were seven 
young male participants who were interviewed between1st and 6th September 2013. 
Five of them were interviewed in Sulaymaniyah and the other two in Erbil. This was 
due to the fact that the election campaign was more popular at night particularly in 
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Salim Street in Sulaymaniyah and Eskan Street in Erbil. The majority of young people 
who participated were males with a few females who only attended with their parents 
or brothers. Therefore, I could not conduct semi-structured interviews with any 
female young people because they mostly tend to be willing to participate in 
interviews in educational and cultural institutions individually and not with their 
parents, as they feel a kind of shame when speaking with researchers, particularly 
during the election campaign which is characterised by hustle and chaos. The 
respondents were informed of the aims of the thesis and the interviewing process and 
were asked several questions to collect data about how young people interact with the 
political campaign, how they see the role of political elections in a democracy and how 
this may affect potential government performance after the election, all of which 
address a part of the first research question. These semi-structured interviews were 
important particularly as they were conducted at s suitable time during the election 
campaign as the atmosphere of this period motivates participants to deliver their 
messages more strongly to the researcher. Further clarification of the content of the 
semi-structured interviews can be found in Appendix 3.  
3.5 Conducting in-depth interviews with media professionals  
In-depth interviews were also used to collect data from media professionals 
particularly the Chief News Editor and Managing News Editors of the television 
channels and websites whose news content was selected for the present research. The 
aim of the interview with media professionals was to address the second research 
question relating to why each Kurdish media platform has a different style of covering 
political issues according to its ownership and to evaluate the freedom to obtain 
information about political issues. The interviews with this group were important for 
this research because it was expected to reveal an evaluation of their editorial policy 
in particular with relation to corruption and government performance. This also helps 
explain their attitudes towards the research issues and their editorial policy, and 
another advantage of the in-depth interviews is to provide a context in which to 
examine several issues related to media freedom and transparency in government 
departments. This is particularly important in Kurdistan where the government does 
not provide information to all the media equally, particularly the opposition and 
independent media. In this regard, Hussain (2015) notes that there is no real 
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transparency in the public sector towards the media and parliamentary members, 
particularly in the oil sector, which is the main sector in Kurdistan and Iraq as more 
than 90% of the budget comes from this sector (Salih, 2015). Moreover, Omer (2013) 
notes that the majority of government departments do not have a media spokesman 
or public relations officer, which in turn means that the media cannot obtain 
information or investigate the corruption and shortcomings of the government, 
particularly the opposition and independent media. Therefore, the interviews with 
media professionals facilitated investigation of this issue which contributes to the 
quality and performance of the media. Furthermore, there is a lack of research in this 
field, particularly in Kurdistan. 
Freedom of the media is quite relevant to the discussion of political communication, 
particularly in the Kurdish media context, as both authors Salih (2015) and Omer  
(2013) mentioned, the media in Kurdistan do not have an opportunity to investigate 
corruption and this thesis is largely focused on the issue of corruption. Therefore, 
conducting interviews with media professionals not only helps this thesis to 
investigate this topic, but also informs the textual analysis chapter, as thereby 
providing deeper understanding of political communication in Kurdistan. 
In light of the above arguments about the importance of conducting interviews with 
media professionals in this thesis, I visited the five media platforms which represent 
the Kurdish media to conduct the interviews. I found that the Kurdish media are 
administered by a small staff, particularly the websites, for instance Awena has only 
four media professionals and the Sbeiy team had only 9 members. Therefore, I decided 
to choose only one member from each. Whilst this may appear a very  limited sample, 
the professionals themselves argued that they preferred to conduct an interview with 
only one member, claiming that any one of them was able to provide the necessary 
details to address the research questions as the whole team were familiar with 
editorial policy and issues of freedom. They also argued that there is is good 
interaction between media professionals as their numbers are small. Furthermore, the 
researcher was not able to compel their participation as they were working and 
therefore free to decide to what extent they were willing to help the researcher in 
terms of time and the number of respondents. Alongside this, the limitations of the 
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number of media professionals will not affect this thesis because the 5 respondents 
selected provided the required information . In each of the five media platforms one 
professional was interviewed, as shown in the following table detailing the 
respondent’s position, the date, place and method of interview:  
Table 3.3 
Positions of media 
professionals 
Date of in-depth 
interview 
Place and the method of the and- depth interview 
News Chief  Editor of 
Xendan 
22/4/2013 Face to face interviewing in his office 
Managing News Editor 
of KNN TV 
22/4/2013 Face to face interviewing in his office 
The Head of Public 
Relations of GK TV 
14/4/2013 Face to face interviewing in his office 
News Chief Editor of 
Awena website 
19/2/2013 By Skype 
News Chief Editor of 
Sbeiy 
1/5/2013 Face to face interviewing in his office 
Positions, date, place of interview and the method of interview with media professionals 
According to the data in the above table the professionals were divided into three 
News Chief Editors, one Managing News Editor and the representative of GK TV was 
Head of the Public Relations unit of the channel because the channel preferred to 
select this respondent to be interviewed. All the interviews were conducted face to 
face and only the News Chief Editor at Awena was interviewed via Skype as this was 
the only possible method to conduct the interview. 
The respondents were informed of the research questions and aims before being 
asked several questions, see Appendix 6. All the interviews were recorded, and the 
actual lengths of these interviews lasted from 30 to 45 minutes. 
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3.6 Conclusion  
This chapter has shown that this thesis is located in the case study methodology by 
applying content analysis to determine the priority and agenda of the Kurdish media 
regarding identified political issues, namely corruption, reform, government 
performance and citizens' trust. Subsequently, framing analysis was employed as a 
qualitative criterion to evaluate the media and analyses how specific framing 
components and other frames are used in the news coverage. Furthermore, in-depth 
interviews were conducted with a group of media professionals to investigate their 
editorial policy and to evaluate the level of freedom journalists have to access 
information in government departments. Focus groups, in-depth interviews and semi-
structured interviews were employed as a qualitative approach to examine young 
people’s understanding and response to political issues across the media and analyse 
how they view the government’s performance and the role of elections in the future 
democratic process. The data collected from the young people and the media 
professionals were analysed qualitatively by applying thematic analysis.  
The table below clarifies this summary of the methods used. 
Table 3.4  
 
Research Question Main Instruments 
Main Method & 
The Data Analysis 
Approach 
Presentation 
of findings 
Q1 To what extent and how do the 
Kurdish media cover political 
issues in particular those relating to 
corruption, reform, government 
performance and citizens' trust? 
Selecting one 
week’s news 
output on 
GK TV 
KNN TV 
Sbeiy Website 
Xendan Website 
Awene Website 
Content Analysis 
(Quantitative) 
 
Chapter Five  Framing Analysis  
(Qualitative) 
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Q2 Why does each platform of the 
Kurdish media have a different 
style of covering the identified 
political issues according to its 
ownership and what is the level of 
freedom of access to information in 
terms of these political issues? 
In-depth 
Interviews with a 
range of Media 
professionals 
 Thematic Analysis 
(Qualitative) 
Q3 How do young people understand 
and respond to the political issues, 
and how do they see government 
performance and the role of 
elections in the future democratic 
process, and what is the role of 
demographic characteristics and 
political background in influencing 
their evaluation? 
Focus Group 
In-depth 
Interviews 
Semi-Structured 
Interviews 
with 
(young people) 
Thematic Analysis 
(Qualitative) 
 
Chapter Six 
Summary of methodology used 
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Chapter Four 
4. The living condition of young people and the media in Kurdistan 
4.1 Introduction 
 This chapter examines the living condition of young people and a brief history of the 
Kurdish media and how it contributed during the Kurdish national movement to the 
raising of political awareness among the Kurdish people. Both aspects comprise the 
essential part of this thesis which in turn will help understand the position of young 
people and their issues in the political context of Kurdistan. Examination of the recent 
history of the Kurdish media provides a clear vision of its structure and role in 
political issues. However there is a lack of research and data regarding this topic due 
to the precarious political set up of Kurdistan. This chapter consists of two sections, 
the first examines the living condition of young people in Kurdistan and analyse four 
elements, namely the position of young people in Kurdish society, education, their 
economic situation, which includes housing and pensions, and their political 
participation. The second section will give a brief history of the Kurdish media and 
discuss the five media outlets selected in this thesis, namely GK TV and Xendan 
website which is owned by the PUK, one of the two ruling political parties and KNN TV 
and Sbeiy website owned by the Gorran Movement which is the main opposition 
party, alongside the Awena website which represents the main independent website.   
4.2 The living condition of young people in Kurdistan 
This section examines the condition of young Kurdish people in four points, namely 
the position of young people in the Kurdish population, education, the economic 
situation of young people which includes housing and pensions and their political 
participation. 
4.2. 1 Young people in the Kurdish population 
Since 1997 no national statistics relating to the whole of the Iraqi population have 
been produced because of the prevailing unfavourable political and security issues. 
The only available relevant official information is a 2009 survey which was based on 
taking a sample and was conducted by the Central Agency for Statistics and 
Information Technology and the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports of Kurdistan. 
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According to this survey young people in the 10 to 30 age group comprised 42% of the 
population in Kurdistan and this percentage was approximately 10 per cent higher 
than the average rate of young people in other countries (Nugent, 2006). The age of 
young people selected for this research is between 18 and 28 years; three reasons 
have dictated this: firstly, this category comprises one of the largest sections of 
Kurdish society and it has received little attention from the government due to the 
poor economic strategy of the KRG and the corruption of the government (Hardy, 
2012a). The second reason is that much of this section of society, although already 
graduated from universities still face unemployment problems, while the remainder 
who are currently students do not believe they will be able to find jobs in the future, 
and as a result they tend to feel unsafe and dissatisfied with government policy (Abdul 
Ali, 2011). DeLong, Burger and Hamilton (2010) argue that, there are different views 
about the advantages and disadvantages of having a higher rate of young people in the 
strategy of development planning but most studies argue that a higher fertility rate is 
one of the factors that may hinder development. According to other researchers there 
is a correlation between a country’s population growth rate and its energy use 
(DeLong, Burger and Hamilton, 2010). This can be helpful for countries which 
fundamentally have a higher rate of population but which lack economic power; this 
age group is recognised as a valuable resource in all countries and many have 
strategies for developing and safeguarding the young. Iraqi Kurdistan has a huge 
amount of untapped natural resources, such as oil, gas, metals and fertile land for 
agriculture as well as a good supply of fresh water. These natural resources generate 
significant income for the national government, which means that funds are available 
to invest in areas of society of most importance to young people, such as education, 
training and jobs. Therefore, the high percentage of young people in Kurdistan 
mentioned above should not necessarily represent a burden on the process of national 
development, as adequate resources exist within the government. Despite this, the 
KRG has to date developed no real strategy to address young people's issues, youth 
unemployment has increased and public services are still poor, although during the 
last decade the  budget of Kurdistan increased dramatically, from less than $1 billion 
to $13 billion as a result of the increase in oil exports. Zebary (2010) stated that the 
Youth Empowerment Organisation of Kurdistan found that youth-related policies in 
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the government’s programme have been marginalised and it will take several years to 
solve the problems faced by young people. These problems will be further clarified in 
the following points. 
4.2.2 Young people and education in Kurdistan 
Education in Kurdistan is free at all stages from primary school to graduate education. 
However, the main opportunity realistically open to every student is to achieve a 
bachelor’s degree as places on Masters and PhD programmes are still not sufficient to 
meet demand from students. Since 2009 public universities have accepted around 
70% of students achieving a higher mark in secondary school while the remaining 
students have been forced to try and secure an offer from one of the country’s private 
universities. As a result, the number of private universities in Kurdistan has increased 
since 2008 and currently there are 15 private universities, a number equal to that of 
the public universities. However, offers at postgraduate level have remained limited to 
students who are members of the ruling political parties, even as recently as 2011. 
Given the process of corruption in place, which is also central to this thesis, the 
students who are members of the ruling political parties have more chance of 
progressing through the higher education system compared with those who support 
the independent and opposition parties. In an interview with Ali Said the Minister of 
Higher Education on 28 January 2013, he stated that the government should strive to 
give MA and PhD offers to students on a transparent and fair basis and not on the 
basis of party affiliation (Xendan, 2013a). Nevertheless, the Department of Military 
and Police Studies in universities currently persist in offering places only to those 
students who are members of the ruling political parties. This partisan intervention 
into the universities' affairs in Kurdish society has affected not only the educational 
rights of all young people but the quality of the education system as well. As a result of 
this corrupt system, even students who have relatively low grades on completion of 
their MA or PhD have become lecturers and scientific researchers, instead of these 
places going to more suitably qualified students. The student union itself has been 
monopolised by the ruling political parties; their main objective is to encourage 
students to become members of the ruling parties as well as to scrutinise non-party 
political activities in the university. Mustafa (2009) argues that the Kurdish 
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authorities have imitated the tactics adopted by Saddam's regime, which involved 
manipulating educational departments for political socialisation and promotion of the 
ruling political parties. The reputation of the student unions has faltered in recent 
years because of the influence of the ruling political parties, which in turn has led to 
independent groups of students engaging in protest activities such as holding 
demonstrations, conducting alternative meetings and seminars. Ali (2012) argues that 
the universities in Kurdistan have become a social meeting place and merely provide 
certificates instead of producing suitably trained professionals who could play a 
constructive role in the process of national development.  
In 2011 the KRG introduced a few reforms, in particular relating to the education 
system and higher education, which offered opportunities to students to study abroad, 
specifically on MA and PhD study programmes. Alongside this, a commitment was 
made to provide study opportunities in the public universities in a more transparent 
and fair manner, although in reality, students who have affiliations to the ruling 
political parties are still more likely to obtain such offers. To date, higher posts in 
universities are still occupied by lecturers who are affiliated to the political parties in 
power. Prior to 2006 most university graduates had the opportunity of finding jobs in 
the public sector because the government was new and the two ruling parties offered 
jobs in order to buy votes. However, more recent opportunities for finding jobs in the 
public sector have decreased accompanied by a similar decrease in the private sector. 
Abdullah (2013) mentioned that the desire of students to reach a level of higher 
education has fallen due to the fact that progression and jobs are based on favouritism 
and not on academic results. Jobs in the private sector are not considered as palatable 
as they do not usually include a state pension; consequently, people prefer to secure a 
job in the public sector even though the salary may be lower.  
The government does not have a real plan to tackle graduates’ issues and develop the 
level of university training needed; to date students are not qualifying in accordance 
with the requirements of vacant jobs on the ground. The previous Minister of Sport 
and Young People in an interview mentioned that young people should try to find a 
job and improve their skills because graduate qualifications alone are not sufficient 
(Roznama 11 May 2008, p 12).     
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Despite the fact that education at primary and secondary level is free, the quality of 
school provision is poor; there are several reasons for this: the curriculum, teaching 
methods and leisure facilities. The duration of study in state schools is between 8 am 
to 12 pm which is only 4 hours, whereas in private schools this is typically 7 hours. 
Classroom size can be as high as 45 while the average is 23 in private schools. The 
ratio of students and teachers in public schools is not consistent, for instance some 
schools have 10 teachers and only 20 students, whereas in others there are 500 
students and 10 teachers. Furthermore, the curriculum in the state schools is outdated 
and is not commensurate with the requirements of contemporary society. Specifically 
the teaching methods and the relationship between students and teachers are still 
based on past authoritarian models. The Ministry of Education made a pledge to 
change this state of affairs in 2010, but these issues have not yet been addressed. 
Currently, the environment in state schools does not encourage students to take any 
interest in education because of the poor level of educational facilities. In an interview 
with Dana Sofe, a member of the Education Committee of the Kurdistan Parliament, he 
stated that the budget of the Ministry of Education is too low (Hawlati 2012b).  On the 
other hand, the private schools have access to larger budgets and adhere to 
international standards of education in relation to the number of students in 
classrooms and the level of educational facilities. However, private schools are 
available only in the capital cities of the three provinces of Iraqi Kurdistan and not in 
the districts and villages. In general, the private schools qualify students without 
dependence on public funds. On the other hand, given that tuition fees at these schools 
are equal to the annual income of the average employee, few people are able to 
educate their children privately, all of which leads to an increase in class 
differentiation in society. Another element to consider in relation to private schools is 
that many families, especially those from the middle class, have sent their children to 
these schools due to peer pressure. Furthermore, the presence of private schools in 
any society may not necessarily be considered a wholly negative phenomenon if the 
public schools are operating at an acceptable average level. In 2013, the opposition 
members of parliament asked the government to increase the budget of the Education 
Department and earmark some buildings for education which are used by the offices 
of the political parties. 
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From the discussion above, it can be argued that the education system in Kurdistan 
requires comprehensive reform in order to play a part in creating a democratic 
society.  Demands by both opposition parties and independent groups are on-going 
for the ruling government to introduce reforms, including those relating to education. 
Generally it can be assumed that some of the objections and protests raised by young 
people since 2006 have been justified by the failure of the educational system.  
4.2.3 Economic situation of young people 
The Iraqi central government and the Kurdistan Regional Government do not provide 
any form of funding to parents who have children and only those employed in the 
public sector receive a nominal amount, normally about $10 a month per child. 
Therefore, most young people cannot plan their life without their family's support 
until they have completed their education and start to work, because the family is 
required to fund them. At present in Kurdistan there is no system of student loans as 
exists in the UK and other countries, whereby a young person can take out loans from 
the government in order to pay tuition fees. This means the burden of paying 
education fees rests entirely on families, which is often a significant barrier to 
entering higher education. Moreover, many young people, even after completing their 
studies, will face obstacles in finding work and planning for the future. This problem is 
more severe in Iraq, as indicated by comparative statistics for youth unemployment, 
which reveal that, for example in the UK, 20.3% of 15-24-year-olds were economically 
inactive during the period of 2010-14, while in Iraq this figure was 34.1% (The World 
Bank 2014).  
The economy of Kurdistan depends on the budget which is drawn up by the central 
government in Baghdad and this constitutes 17% of the national Iraqi budget; 95% of 
the total budget is derived from oil production. The KRG has the right to set its own 
economic policy, except for the salaries of employees in the government sector which 
are required to be the same as in the rest of Iraq. Therefore, the economy of Kurdistan 
is influenced by the economic situation in the wider country. The budget of Kurdistan 
increased from $1 billion in 2003 to $11.616 billion in 2011 after the fall of the 
Saddam regime due to the lifting of the international economic sanctions, which 
enabled Iraq to export oil. However, the people’s standard of living has not improved 
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because of corruption and poor economic policy. In 2013 the budget of Kurdistan rose 
to $13 billion although this did not stem the rise in unemployment. According to the 
report prepared by the Economic Chamber of the Gorran Movement, the main 
economic problem in Kurdistan is that the government has consistently ignored the 
private sector (Sbeiy, 2011a). Furthermore, those people who work in the private 
sector have no insurance or pension provision, therefore unsurprisingly people 
continue to seek employment in the public sector with the consequence that out of the 
five million strong population of Kurdistan, as many as 1.5 million work in the public 
sector. One example of this phenomenon are the Military and Security Departments 
which are controlled by the ruling parties and employees in these departments are 
offered posts as a means of securing their votes for the same parties. Therefore, the 
budget of these departments is five times higher than that of the Department of Health 
and Education, but employees in some government departments work only three days 
a week and sometimes less. Arguably, this can be considered as a form of 
underemployment relating to "overstaffing" or "hidden unemployment," namely the 
practice of businesses or entire economies employing workers who are not fully 
occupied because they are not working full normal weekly hours (Felices, 2003). 
Abdul Ali (2011) found that more than 41% of employees in the  public sector are 
surplus and do not contribute to the production process, while 70% of them are not 
graduates from universities or are not qualified. Therefore, opportunities for the new 
generation of graduates in the public sector have become limited. Most current 
employees do not have any relevant graduate qualifications necessary to work in the 
public sector as they were randomly appointed after 2003. As a result, the quality of 
services in the public sector has become poor and curtails potential new opportunities 
for future graduate students. Abdul Ali argues that the main causes of 
underemployment in Kurdistan are due to low wages in the private sector, the 
absence of life insurance and pension rights as well as appointments being made on 
the basis of mediation and nepotism.   
Moreover, most members of the military army, police and security forces are not 
university educated and the majority of them were previously young farm labourers 
working in rural areas. The government does not support the agricultural sector and 
people working in this sector, the result is that villages in rural areas do not have 
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enough services and leisure facilities and many young people from these areas have 
migrated to the cities to join the military, security forces and the police. Other 
consequences of this migration are that the price of basic goods has increased in the 
cities. Prior to this migration, Kurdistan relied on local food products, whereas now 
almost all food is imported including fruit and vegetables. Level of salaries and 
unemployment are the main problems faced by young people.  
4.2.3.1 Housing, state pension and social welfare 
Lack of housing is a common problem amongst people, particularly young people and 
there are several reasons for this. The main one is that the government does not have 
a housing strategy for young people but like other social provision it distributes 
housing to those parts of the population who have an affiliation to the ruling political 
parties instead of introducing a housing programme for the whole of the population. 
In an interview on the Sbeiy website (20 November 2010) Amen Jaf, an expert in local 
affairs, claimed that the government does not have any strategy for housing 
construction and all the projects that have been completed are of poor quality and 
they did not meet the required building standards. Jaf also referred to the fact that the 
political leaders in the ruling parties have monopolised the house building companies 
which focus on profit and do not receive any sanctions from the government for 
failing to complete on time or according to the specifications. The Minister of 
Reconstruction and Housing, Kamaran Ahmed, recognised this lack of quality in 
government-sponsored projects in an interview with Xendan (9 May 2013b). He went 
on to state that his department had funded some projects in 2012 that were not 
completed satisfactorily by certain companies and made the promise not to repeat 
this mistake in his department. Members of the government have publicly 
acknowledged that this form of corruption exists and that tighter controls are 
necessary but on the other hand, as Enayat (2012) argues, the government is not 
capable of finding a solution to the housing problem or assuring the quality of its 
housing projects by employing competent engineers to design them. This is a result of 
salaries for these positions being considerably lower than in the private sector, which 
has forced expert engineers to move from the public to the private sector. Enayat 
(2012) also mentioned that most private companies have been monopolised by 
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political leaders of the ruling parties. Alongside this, the issue of housing is not only 
related to poor quality, at stake there is also the pricing levels, as in the last decade the 
government constructed flats which it proceeded to sell at very high prices which has 
cut out many people in need of housing while at the same time others have bought 
simply to make a profit (Enayat, 2012). The Director of the Investment Department in 
Sulaymaniyah has acknowledged this to be the case and mentioned that the 
government will consider building flats for people who do not have a house and 
selling them at a reasonable price, in an interview with the Xendan Website 
(5/1/2013c). Even though the government has started to build flats the numbers 
planned are not likely to meet demand, particularly for young people, who essentially 
lack sufficient funds to pay the required 50% deposit up front. This point was made by 
the Minister of Reconstruction and Housing who said that the government will build 
5,000 flats for people who are not able to buy a house and argues that this will 
represent an important achievement of the government as there are 100,000 families 
who do not have their own home. In a report on the Radio Sawa website (3 Jun 2010) 
the Institute of Political Issues for Kurdistan shows in its opinion poll that 26% of 
young people claimed they were facing a housing problem. 
Targeted benefit from the government started in 2013 to grant loans to students who 
have completed their university studies. This is around $120 per month and is only for 
one year, but few students apply for it as the amount is not enough and it takes time to 
process the claim. At the same time the majority of students who have completed 
university are not able to find jobs, so they depend on their parents for financial 
assistance. Therefore, the majority of young people face a delay in marriage because of 
the situation, and they do not feel their life is secure because they have no health 
insurance or benefits. In Kurdish society marriage is the first step for couples to be 
able to live together.  
4.2.4 Young people and political participation 
Young people comprise the largest category of people who have consistently 
participated in politics since the creation of the Kurdish National Movement, right up 
to the current situation. However, currently young people are not at the centre of 
political decision-making because the political leaders have monopolised all aspects of 
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policy-making in both of the two main political parties and government. Hardy 
(2012a) argues that one of the main issues facing young people is the marginalisation 
of their role in policy-making and this led young people feeling dissatisfied, which 
results in them holding protests and demonstrations.  
Many young people worked in the organisational structures of the whole political 
parties with a low salary, particularly from 1991 to 2005 due to the lack of jobs in 
other areas of society. Alongside this, the participation of young people in the political 
parties at that stage was passive because they were not able to exert any influence on 
the decision-making process. After 2005, young people started to withdraw from 
working for the political parties due to the economic boom which opened new job 
opportunities for them. Also improvements in living standards allowed families to 
support their children financially, thus enabling them to visit clubs and other places 
where young people can gather, whereas before they had only been able to visit youth 
organisations created by the political parties as these were free to use. Talat (2006) 
found that the participation of young people in political parties had decreased; his 
survey revealed that 65% of young people did not participate in political parties. 
Rather, young people tended to engage in political participation outside the political 
parties, for example Talat showed that young people participated more in unofficial 
informal demonstrations rather than formal ones (Talat, 2006). However, formal 
demonstrations became difficult particularly after the events of 17th February 2011 
when demonstrators faced murder and violence by the police and security forces in 
Sulaymaniyah. Ali (2011) mentioned that local government officials in the cities and 
towns dealt with demonstrations according to their personal whims. Even if this 
argument is true, the main responsibility lies with the government as it gave its 
officials the go-ahead to use their own power instead of following regulations and 
failed to punish its officials when they dealt with demonstrations beyond the legal 
boundaries. Although young people often face violence from the security forces in 
demonstrations, they remain among the most active category of protesters in 
demanding their rights. Through sit-ins, gatherings and demonstrations they attempt 
to convey their views on political issues which often differ from those of the 
mainstream parties in government. Hardy (2012b) states that young people represent 
the most active force in Kurdish society in relation to political participation and that, 
84 
besides sit-ins and demonstrations, they also actively publish critical pieces in the 
independent print media or online. In the electoral body, young people make up the 
largest category of those who vote. According to Talat (2006), more than 80% of 
young people participated in the last elections and this rate is higher than among 
middle aged and older categories.   
4.3 A Brief history of the Kurdish media and the media selected 
This section briefly looks at the history of the Kurdish media and how it contributed 
during the Kurdish National Movement to the raising of political awareness among the 
Kurdish people. The section will also define the five media platform outlets selected in 
this thesis. The aim of this section is to help understanding of the media structure of 
Kurdistan according to the role of the Kurdish media in the coverage of political 
issues. 
4.3.1 Brief history of Kurdish media 
The first Kurdish newspaper was published in Egypt by Miqdad Mathat Badrkan with 
the title of Kurdistan, and it lasted four years from 1898 to 1902. In that period the 
Kurdish people lacked a political entity which would enable them to have their own 
press, as Kurdistan was under the rule of the Ottoman Empire (Mustafa, 2012). 
Although Egypt was also part of the Ottoman Empire there were fewer restrictions on 
freedom of publication, hence Badrkan chose Egypt as the location to publish the 
newspaper Kurdistan. Mustafa (2012) stated that the Kurdistan newspaper only 
numbered 31editions and it was not published regularly because of the political 
situation and general lack of funds. Editions 1 to 6 were published by Miqdad Badrkan 
in Egypt and later numbers were published by his brothers Amin Ali and Suraya in 
Geneva and Folkestone in the UK. Two reasons are given by Mustafa (2012) about the 
changes; the first was that Miqdad went to Istanbul because he was summoned by the 
rulers of the Ottoman Empire as the newspaper's political aims encouraged the 
Kurdish people to start a political movement fighting for their rights against the 
Ottomans. The second reason is that the other brothers of Miqdad were forced to 
choose another location for publication as the Ottoman rulers were putting pressure 
on Egypt to arrest them.    
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Political circumstances in the Ottoman Empire changed as a result of a coup in 1908 
led by the Taraqi group, which led to an increase in the level of freedom. This change 
helped the Kurdish people to print the Kurdistan in Istanbul in 1908. While this paper 
had the same title as that published in Egypt, its circulation lasted only one year due 
to the coup by Shawkat Pasha in 1909 who decided to cease publication of the paper 
(Mustafa, 2012). Other print media were established at the same time by Kurdish 
organisations and young Kurdish students in Istanbul such as the Kurd Tawn Taraqi 
Gazette in 1908, Rozi Kurd in 1913, and Hatawe Kurd in 1913 (Mustafa, 2012). Jamal 
Baban started to publish the Bangi Haq which means 'the right call' in Baghdad in 
1914, but this was also subsequently closed down due to the British occupation of 
Iraq. During all this period, at the turn of the 20th century, Kurdish people were 
starting to publish papers outside the Kurdish areas as these were not sufficiently 
developed and lacked both urban centres and facilities, including universities and 
printing presses. 
When Britain occupied Iraq newspapers begun to be published in different languages, 
namely English, Arabic and Kurdish. Following this, the Kurdish people seized the 
opportunity to start publishing a Kurdish newspaper with the title Tegayshtni Rasti 
which means ‘truth of understanding’ in English, that was published from 1917 to the 
end of the First World War on 27th January 1918. The paper ceased publication due to 
the withdrawal of support from Britain because the aim of supporting it was 
essentially for propaganda and publicity on behalf of Britain. (Mazhar, 1978). During 
the period of British colonialism in this region, Mazhar argued that Britain preferred 
to support Arab language newspapers in the rest of Iraq. 
In 1920 the Iraqi people began a revolution against the British army; Britain withdrew 
its army from Sulaymaniyah, which today is part of Iraqi Kurdistan, in order to control 
the other areas of Iraq, and the Kurdish people seized the opportunity to control their 
own area within Iraq.  King Mahmud established the Kingdom of Kurdistan and 
named Sulaymaniyah as its capital city, where a newspaper called Peshkawtn 
(meaning ‘develop’ in English) became the official print media. This paper was also 
published for less than two years, from 29 September 1920 to 27 July 1922, because 
the Kingdom of Kurdistan passed from British control to that of Iraq. The Iraqi state 
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was formed during that period of liberation from British colonial rule which also 
meant that Britain helped to form the Iraqi system; Mustafa argues that Britain 
favoured the Arabs' national claim and ignored that of the Kurds (Mustafa, 2012).  
Following the integration of Kurdistan into Iraq, some print media were established 
by Kurdish organisations and intellectual groups to raise the political awareness of 
the Kurdish people and ensure the protection of the Kurdish identity, the titles of 
these publications were Omed Istiqlal, Bangi Haq, Bangi Kurdistan and Rozi Kurdistan. 
The Iraq regime was a newly formed monarchy and did not become really powerful 
until the Second World War, its status remained that of a protectorate under British 
control, so Iraq was forced to allow the Kurdish people to publish their newspapers 
because from the British perspective this would help to make Iraq more stable. The 
Kurdish media focused on poetry and Kurdish literature to defend the Kurdish 
national cultural identity as its people had lost their local governing power and 
become part of Iraq. Qani (2012b) mentioned that the Kurdish people defended their 
identity through publishing poetry, but that the content of these poems was part of an 
ongoing political discourse.   
After the Second World War the Iraqi regime became stronger and exercised control 
of the Kurdish National Movement by allowing it to publish print media on condition 
that it did not focus on political issues and self-determination. Alongside this, the Iraqi 
regime prevented any Kurdish political activities and any Kurdish groups that 
supported the aims of the Kurdish National Movement. As a result of these censoring 
processes, two kinds of publications emerged, the Kurdish official publications and 
underground publications. The main official publication was the Galaawez magazine 
published during the period of 1939-1940. At the same time, the Kurdish people 
started to establish political organisations and underground publications, for instance 
Zenawai Kurdistan which in English means ‘re-life Kurdistan’ at the beginning of the 
1940s and the Netionam magazine which in English means ‘nation’. In the middle of 
the 1940s Kurdish political parties emerged, such as the KDP in 1943, opening their 
offices in Kurdish rural areas as the majority of Kurdish people were located in rural 
mountainous areas which were difficult for the Iraqi regime to control. The KDP 
started to publish underground publications, for instance the Risgary paper which in 
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English means ‘liberation’; this paper was secretly distributed in Kurdish towns and 
cities.   
The Iraqi regime was forced to allow the Kurdish people to publish their print media 
due to the efforts of the Kurdish National Movement which started at the beginning of 
the 1940s. The aims of the Iraqi regime in allowing the Kurdish print media were 
twofold; firstly to let the Kurdish people know that the regime was giving them 
cultural rights and secondly to use these media outlets to promote the Baghdad 
regime. The Iraqi regime allowed the Kurdish media to publish newspapers from the 
1940s until the fall of Saddam in 2003, as it used the Kurdish media itself to oppose 
the voice of the Kurdish National Movement. Despite the Kurdish print media being 
controlled by Iraq, it nonetheless indirectly influenced the ultimate goals of the 
Kurdish National Movement which was also that of protecting Kurdish identity. For 
the same reasons mentioned above the Iraqi regime established Kurdish radio in 1954 
and Kurdish TV in 1967 (Wasfi, 2005). Wasfi mentioned that freedom of information 
was not stable under the policies of the Iraq regime; nevertheless Kurdish media 
professionals working in the new TV and radio stations attempted to focus on political 
rights, especially when levels of freedom gradually increased during the period of 
negotiations between the Iraqi regime and the Peshmerga. Undoubtedly, the Kurdish 
media under the former Iraqi regime, whether in print, radio or TV, indirectly 
contributed to the development of the Kurdish National Movement, in spite of the lack 
of freedom and its primary stated focus on Kurdish language and literature. 
On 14 July 1958 the Iraqi system changed from a monarchy to a republican system 
following the revolution of the Free Officers led by Abdul Karim Qasim. Qasim started 
negotiations with Mustafa Barzani, the leader of the Kurds, about their political status 
but they did not arrive at any agreement, which prompted the Kurdish rebels to 
establish the National Movement Armed, centred in Kurdish rural areas under Iraqi 
control. Due to the geographical nature of these areas, this movement is known in 
Kurdish political literature as 'the struggle in the mountains' and the rebels depended 
on guerrilla warfare because they did not have a professional standing army to fight 
the Iraqi regime. The Kurdish rebels established print media outlets such as Xabat 
which was published by the KDP and Sharara published by the PUK. These papers 
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were distributed in the cities and towns by their members who were working in 
secret organisations. Alongside these papers, the Kurdish rebels established radio 
stations on the Iraq-Iran border, for example the KDP established the Radio Voice of 
Kurdistan in 1964 and the PUK established the Radio Voice of the People of Kurdistan 
in 1976. The aim of these papers and radio stations was to raise political awareness 
among the Kurdish people particularly those who were living in the towns and cities, 
as those living in the rural areas were already in close communication with the rebels. 
Arguably, the rebels used mass media communication to reach the Kurdish people in 
the towns and cities and establish far more interpersonal communication with those 
living in the rural areas. This struggle is called the Kurdish Resistance Media in the 
Kurdish political literature and it lasted from 1958 to 1991 when the Kurdish 
revolution won the day.   
Following the revolution in 1991, each political party started to establish its own 
media, and several reasons are given for this. The first concerns political publicity and 
the need for each party to become more popular within the new political regime and 
system. At that time people’s living standards were low, and there was no 
independent media until 1999, when the first independent newspaper Hawlati was 
published in the city of Sulaymaniyah, beginning as a weekly and becoming a daily 
from 2005. An independent radio station, Radio Nawa, was also established in 2005 in 
Sulaymaniyah and there is as yet no independent news TV channel, as this would 
require greater availability of funds and there is insufficient media freedom. On the 
other hand, today there are a number of commercial TV channels that focus on music 
and movies as news TV cannot depend merely on advertising in Kurdistan as yet. 
However, NRT TV claims that it is independent while at the same time others claim 
that NRT is not independent. In order to examine the structure and development of 
recent Kurdish media, the following section will explain in greater detail the role of 
the media involved in this research, namely GK TV, KNN TV, Xendan Website, Sbeiy 
Website and Awena Website.  
4.3.2 GK TV 
GK TV belongs to the PUK and it was the first Kurdish channel established by the 
Kurdish political parties after the revolution in 1991. The channel started 
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broadcasting by the end of 1991, but to begin with, it was only local, covering only the 
Sulaymaniyah area. On the 1st June 2008 the PUK established a version of GK TV by 
satellite, which represented the first Kurdish satellite television news channel. Before 
this channel other public satellite channels had emerged, such as Kurdistan TV 
launched by the KDP in 1999 and Kurdsat TV launched by the PUK in 2000. 
GK TV is a news channel but it focuses largely on international issues instead of the 
main current issues in Kurdistan. According to Mageed (2011) GK TV has a number of 
goals, such as the political promotion of the PUK's policies, democratisation and the 
right to express opinions and shedding light on the disputed areas currently 
administered by the Baghdad government but which the Kurdish people want to be 
incorporated into Iraqi Kurdistan. The channel has dedicated news bulletins to cover 
issues outside Kurdistan, particularly news related to the Kurdish part of Syria and 
Turkey to distract attention from internal issues such as corruption and the 
investigation into public sector services.  
4.3.3 KNN TV 
Kurdish News Network (KNN) was established by the company Wsha which in English 
means 'the word' and started its test broadcasting in the middle of 2008. Wsha is a 
media company which consists of a radio channel, TV channel and a website. This 
company was established by Nawsherwan Mustafa, the previous vice-president of the 
PUK until 2006, since then Mustafa has split from the party with his group and 
established this media company. Mustafa argued that the aim of the split was to 
promote reforms in the political system in Kurdistan through his media company; he 
also argued that he was not able to introduce reforms when he was in the PUK due to 
the position taken by the other leaders within the party who rejected his plans for 
reform (Gorran Movement, 2009).The specific aim of the channel as stated on its 
website is as follows: 
The channel does, though, conform to the wider agenda of the Wsha Corporation, 
which is to address the inequalities and barriers to reform which plague the Kurdistan 
area. KNN's aim is to promote political, social and economic reform by exposing 
corruption and highlighting the ways in which the interests of the Kurdish people are 
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not being addressed and could be better served. The channel attempts to address such 
problems as the lack of distinction between the public and the private spheres which, 
especially in regards to business, have ensured that vested interests within the 
government have the power to undermine moves towards a more democratic state 
and society. KNN's philosophy is based on the assertion that freedom of expression is 
a right, and not a privilege, and seeks therefore to be both an information provider, a 
medium for people to express their views and a public arena in which debate is 
encouraged rather than suppressed (KNN Website, 2013). 
KNN is mostly funded by the Gorran Movement, although Rahman (2012) stated that 
it also obtains some funds from gifts and donations from wealthy citizens as well as 
through advertising. 
4.3.4 Xendan website 
The Xendan Website is the online version of the Xendan Foundation for Media and 
Publication because the majority of online media outlets are simply an electronic 
version of the newspapers and magazines circulated in Kurdistan. Although the 
majority of the Kurdish print media began offering an electronic version during the 
last decade, they were not popular until 2011, largely because Internet facilities were 
unavailable to the majority of people and were only available to companies and 
foundations. Moreover, Internet contracts were expensive relative to people’s 
incomes. 
The Xendan Website is sponsored by the Xendan Foundation for Publishing and 
Broadcasting. According to Muhedeen (2012), the Xendan Foundation belongs to 
Barham Salah, the Vice-president of the PUK. Xendan has a number of aims: providing 
an objective media information service, focusing on democratisation and the 
development of a civil society, spreading the culture of moderation in order to create a 
climate where diverse views are accepted and tolerated. There are 40 media workers 
working for the Xendan website and its sister radio channel. Although, as mentioned 
above, Muhedeen (2012) argues that Xendan is also sponsored by the former prime 
minister Barham Salah, who is thereby able to influence Xendan policy. Xendan claims 
that it is independent by arguing that it does not receive funding from the PUK's 
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finance department. However, it is clear that Xendan is supported by the PUK because 
it was established formally by Barham Salah when he was Prime Minister of the KRG 
and he is currently Deputy Chairman of the PUK. Since Barham Salih and other leaders 
in the ruling parties have their own influence and interests they use part of their own 
funds for the media to protect them and their position. 
4.3.5 Sbeiy website 
The Sbeiy website was established by the Gorran Movement in 2007, and it has the 
same aim as KNN TV, as mentioned above. Sbeiy relies on obtaining news and 
information from other media workers in the Gorran Movement, such as those at KNN 
TV and the Voice of Gorran which is the sister radio channel. There are 8 media 
workers in Sbeiy and its budget is relatively small at only US$120,000 per month 
(Salih, 2010). 
4.3.6 Awena website 
The majority of staff at Awena previously worked at the Hawlati newspaper, the latter 
was the first independent newspaper in Kurdistan established in 2000. The Awena 
newspaper was established in 2006 and its electronic copy is administered by 
separate staff in the same building. This website largely focuses on political issues. 
According to Salih (2010) only the four editors are formally employed, due to lack of 
funding. Furthermore, he claimed that he is working as a volunteer at Awena, because 
each of the four news editors earns only US$ 400 per month. This salary is quite low 
compared to the average salary of media workers in Kurdistan, while some media 
employees can earn as much as US$ 8,000 a month. The monthly budget of Awena is 
around US$ 3,000 to 4,000, a very small sum which does not allow him to appoint 
enough news editors or correspondents, therefore most Awena correspondents work 
as volunteers (Muhedeen, 2012).  Warty (2008) stated that the issue of media funding 
is related to the economic structure of Kurdistan, where the main companies are 
monopolised by the two ruling parties. In turn, these companies do not provide funds 
through placing advertisements across the independent media which frequently 
criticise both the companies and the two ruling parties. There are also no subsidies 
available to the independent media from the government. 
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4.4 Conclusion 
Regarding the living conditions of the young, this chapter found that young people in 
Kurdistan comprise the largest section in society and most observers believe they do 
not receive enough attention from the government. Several factors have been ascribed 
to this, principally tied to corruption and lack of any coherent government youth 
policy. Although the government offers free education from primary school until 
graduate level, not all young people receive adequate education and qualifications. 
Several factors are at work here: the first is related to the government’s educational 
strategy which does not focus on the quality of education or ensuring that students 
qualify to meet the requirements of current socio-economic needs. For example, there 
are now many graduates unable to find jobs because almost all the positions have 
been taken by others who were already appointed by the government in the period of 
2004-2009. A second factor is related to the government’s economic strategy which 
does not support the development of the private sector which could employ graduates 
and reduce unemployment. Inclusive of this is the fact that most people prefer jobs in 
the public sector which guarantees a state pension, minimum wage and employee 
rights, unlike the private sector. This in turn leads to people thinking that their lives 
will not be secure unless they obtain a job in the private sector. Jobs in the public 
sector have become more difficult to obtain because the two ruling parties appointed 
a huge number of people during the last two elections in order to buy their votes. This 
policy has produced a negative impact on young people and the new generation find it 
difficult to obtain jobs in both the public as well as the private sector. Consequently 
young people have become more active in politics, particularly taking part in 
demonstrations and engaging with the opposition parties to fight for their rights. 
Young people in Iraqi Kurdistan form a remarkable demographic section of the 
population and are more willing to demand reforms and fight corruption compared to 
other categories in society. 
Regarding the Kurdish media, the first form of Kurdish media was the newspaper 
Kurdistan, published in Egypt in 1898 which was rather late compared to the other 
surrounding nations such as the Arabs, Turks and Persians because the Kurds lacked 
any political entity enabling them to exercise their cultural and political rights. As 
noted above, the Kurds continually used the media to raise political awareness and 
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protect Kurdish identity until 1991, when the Kurdistan Regional Government was 
established. Prior to 1991, several political parties struggled against various Iraqi 
regimes and each political party used its own media platform to communicate with 
the Kurdish people living in cities and towns. However, much communication with 
Kurds living in rural areas was more interpersonal, as these areas were remote and 
largely outside the control of the Iraqi regime. After 1991 the Kurdish media was 
largely under the control of the main ruling political parties until 1999 when the 
independent print media began to emerge. The opposition media outlets also started 
to become more powerful following the emergence of the Wsha Company, which is 
owned by the Gorran movement, the largest of the opposition parties.  
The main issue facing the independent and opposition media is funding and the lack of 
freedom of information. These two issues reflect on the state of the political system, 
for example the problem of media funding is related to corruption, since the major 
companies are monopolised by the two ruling parties and no advertising is placed 
with the opposition and independent media, given its critical stance towards the 
government in power. The relationship between the media and government in the 
KRG territory is complex and ever-changing. Modern technology and online access 
may bring about a further change in this relationship as the Kurdish people will be 
able to obtain news and information from a wider range of independent sources. 
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Chapter Five 
5. Political Issues across the Kurdish Media and Editorial Policies 
5.1 Introduction 
The first two sections of this chapter will discuss the findings of the news content 
analysis across the Kurdish media, with particular focus on each of the following: GK 
TV, KNN TV, Xendan website, Sbeiy website and Awena website. The third section looks 
at  the freedom to access the public sector  to investigate political issues and the 
editorial news-making policy of each of the above media outlets by conducting in-
depth interviews with their Chief News Editor or News Managing Editor. The first 
section is based on a content analysis of 994 items of news. From these 994 news 
items, the focus will be on 318 articles relating to internal political issues, in particular 
those relating to the main themes identified by this research as being most significant 
in Kurdistan, namely corruption, reform, government performance and citizens' trust. 
These will be analysed according to three values, namely whether the content is 
positive, negative or neutral. The second section will analyse the 318 news articles 
qualitatively through framing analysis thus presenting a more in-depth analysis to 
complete the overall analysis of the first section which gives some significant 
indicators to the qualitative analysis to be carried out, such as the coverage level of 
political issues and the use of values in the news coverage.  
The third section is based on in-depth interviews with the media professionals from 
each of the TV and websites, from which the Chief News Editor or the News Managing 
Editor were specifically interviewed. These interviews enabled the researcher to 
discuss the findings of the news content analysis and to understand why and how they 
address political issues through particular use of the values and frames in their 
coverage of the news as well as issues related to access to freedom of information for 
journalists in Kurdistan. 
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5.2 The News Coverage and Values Used Across the Kurdish Media  
 This section will analyse the news coverage broadcast or published by the Kurdish 
media selected as the focus of this research project, namely GK TV, KNN TV as well as 
the Sbeiy, Awena and Xendan websites. Alongside this, the section will investigate the 
values used in the news coverage whether positive, negative or neutral. The aim of the 
present section is to examine Research Question one which is related to the extent of 
the level of coverage of internal political issues by the Kurdish media. 
5.2.1 The news coverage in particular relating to the four political issues across 
GK TV and KNN TV 
This examines the level of the extent of news coverage in particular relating to 
political issues across the opposition party TV and that of the TV channel owned by 
one of the political parties in power in order to show which one of them displays more 
interest in political issues. For this research, the main news programme was analysed 
across a whole week.  The news programme content was coded according to three 
categories, the first was news relating to the four political issues: corruption, reform, 
government performance and citizens' trust, which in turn was interpreted in the light 
of three categories, positive, negative and neutral values. The second category relates 
to news from the disputed areas which are now administered by Baghdad although 
the Kurdish claim they are part of Iraqi Kurdistan. The third category identifies other 
news, such as that related to non-political issues and foreign news. Unlike the first 
main category of news coverage, the second and third categories were not subjected 
to qualitative analysis through in-depth interviews or focus groups but they were 
included to provide a fuller evaluation of each network’s coverage of the identified 
political issues (corruption, reform, government performance and citizens' trust) 
For instance, the data in Table 5.1 shows that KNN TV covers internal political issues 
twice as frequently as GK TV, whereas GK TV covers the disputed areas twice as much 
compared to KNN TV. The disputed areas consist of Kirkuk Province and some other 
towns currently administered by Baghdad but which the KRG believe to belong to 
Kurdistan. This difference confirms that KNN TV focuses on internal issues rather than 
on news from the disputed areas administered by Baghdad. This in turn raises the 
question as to why GK TV does not focus on internal political issues, whether this is 
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due to the lack of this issue in Kurdistan or because the channel is owned by the PUK 
which is one of the ruling political parties and therefore responsible for dictating the 
political agenda. The data in table (5.1) show the indicators of the main news 
categories which will be examined more in depth in the next section with the news 
coverage analysed qualitatively. 
Table 5.1  
Total GK TV KNN TV 
News Categories 
% F %  F % F 
48.6 136 29 35 63.5 101 
News relating to political issues (reform, 
corruption, government performance and 
citizens' trust) 
19.6 55 27.2 33 13.8 22 News relating to disputed areas 
31.8 89 43.8 53 22.7 36 
Other news (non-political news and 
foreign news) 
100 280 100 121 100 159 Total 
The news coverage in the main daily news programme during one week between 11-17 of April 
2013  across KNN TV and GK TV 
According to the data from the above table KNN TV covers political issues in 101 news 
items on political issues, representing 63.5% while 13.8% of its content covers the 
political issues of the disputed geographical areas. This shows that the opposition 
parties tend to focus more on internal issues of Kurdistan rather than on the disputed 
geographical areas because KNN TV is owned by the main opposition party and 
wishes to highlight the political failings of the government. However this table does 
not show which aspects of internal political issues KNN TV covers (corruption, reform, 
government performance and citizens' trust), nor which value is predominantly used 
through its coverage, whether positive, negative or neutral. These details will be 
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presented in a later table. Besides the news relating to internal political issues and the 
disputed areas, KNN TV devotes only 22% of its coverage to non-political or foreign 
news items. Conversely GK TV is a wider-ranging political news channel and it devotes 
43.8% of its coverage to non-political news and foreign news, for instance the 
coverage level of internal political issues by GK TV is only 29% and the remaining 
proportion is devoted to news from the disputed areas which has a very similar 
percentage to the coverage of internal political news (27.2%). 
As the data shows, KNN TV covered 159 news items in total during one week in its 
daily news programme, while GK TV presented 121 news items. There are several 
reasons for the difference in the number of news items covered, firstly in GK TV the 
actual length of news is longer and it relies on lengthy reports which can extend to 
more than 6 minutes; secondly, KNN TV is based on re-framing news which means 
presenting one news story or one event through several news items in the same news 
programme, this editorial style can have more impact implications on the audience 
because it allows cumulative coverage. Thirdly, the editorial style and policy of KNN 
TV focuses on shorter television news items and reports, as explained by both news 
makers of the two channels interviewed for this research and which will be clarified in 
the last section. 
5.2.1.1 The news coverage of political issues across KNN TV and GK TV 
The previous point showed that KNN TV presented 101 news items representing 
63.5% of all its coverage, by contrast the coverage rate of GK TV was only 29 news 
items representing 29%. This looks at which political aspects, whether reform, 
corruption, government performance or citizens' trust are covered more by both TV 
channels. Table (5.2) shows the extent of the level of coverage of political issues 
across KNN TV and GK TV. 
Table 5.2  
GK TV KNN TV 
Political news 
% F % F 
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20 7 29.7 30 Corruption 
25.7 9 4.9 5 Reform 
51.4 18 50.5 51 Government Performance 
2.9 1 14.9 15 Citizens' Trust 
100% 35 100% 101 Total 
The coverage level of the main political issues across KNN TV and GK TV 
The table shows that both KNN TV and GK TV devoted half of their coverage to 
government performance issues among the four issues identified, but this does not 
mean that the two channels addressed the news similarly in terms of attributing 
positive, negative and neutral values. Furthermore, there is not much difference in 
terms of the coverage of corruption issues, with KNN TV devoting 29.7% of its time 
and GK TV 20%. This table (5.2) only shows the level to which a given issue was 
covered, while the next table will show in what way the four issues are addressed, 
whether positively, negatively or neutrally.  
The above table shows that KNN TV devoted 14.9% of its coverage to the issue of 
citizens' trust, which is more than 5 times that of GK TV whose proportional average 
was only 2.9%. By contrast GK TV covered the reform process to the extent of 25.7% 
whereas KNN TV’s coverage was only 5% as KNN TV prefers to focus on government 
corruption and criticism of its actions and policies. The next section will analyse the 
editorial policy of each channel in terms of whether the news coverage was presented 
in a positive, negative or neutral manner. 
5.2.1.2 The dominant values in the news coverage across KNN TV and GK TV 
The previous point focused on the dominant issues covered by the two channels but it 
did not provide any specific stance on the political issues covered, particularly 
whether the two channels clearly display a different view or editorial policy. KNN TV 
is owned by the Gorran Movement Party which is the main opposition party and has 
never been in power to date, while GK TV is owned by the ruling political party and 
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seeks to show the advantages of the government and the positive aspects of the 
government’s performance. This factor is highly significant in Kurdistan as there is no 
public service broadcasting organisation in the KRG, so both channels have been 
established to support the views of their respective ownership. Therefore, this 
identifies the different values clearly expressed in the coverage of the four issues by 
both channels, which means it builds on the previous section, while the later 
qualitative section in the present chapter will examine the variations in each channel 
in depth. This does not mean that the present section has no clear role and purpose, 
but rather it will provide some indicators which can be used in the argument to 
interpret and support the qualitative analysis.   
Table 5.3  
GK TV KNN TV 
Political News Total Neutral Negative Positive Total Neutral Negative Positive 
% F % F % F % F % F % F % F % F 
100 7 28.6 2  - 71.4 5 100 30  - 100 30  - Corruption 
100 9 22.2 2 11.1 1 66.7 6 100 5 60 3 40 2  - Reform 
100 18 11.1 2 5.7 1 83.3 15 100 51 7.9 4 88.2 45 2.9 2 
Government 
Performance 
100 1  -  - 100 1 100 15  - 100 15  - Citizens' Trust 
100 35 17.2 6 5.7 2 77.1 27 100 101 6.9 7 91 92 1.9 2 Total 
The dominant values (Positive, Negative and Neutral) used in news coverage by KNN TV and GK 
TV 
The data shows that the dominant value evident in the coverage of the four political 
issues on KNN TV is negative, to a level of 91% which means that KNN TV covers the 
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identified political issues negatively, whereas the proportion of negative values 
evident on GK TV is only 5.7%. This would indicate that GK TV does not criticise the 
four political issues compared to the news coverage on KNN. Furthermore, the 
divergence in the use of positive values in terms of political coverage is much greater 
than negative values because KNN TV uses positive values in their news about 
government undertakings to the extent of only 1.9% while GK TV reaches 77.1%, thus 
the average rate becomes more than 37 times greater. With specific reference to the 
use of neutral values, GK TV uses more than twice as many neutral values compared to 
KNN TV, however the use of neutral values is lower on both channels especially on 
KNN TV which uses only 6.9% and 17.2%on GK TV. Thus from the general trend in 
terms of the way the news is reported, it can be seen that there is a significant 
difference in editorial policy between the two channels as GK TV tends more and more 
to adopt a positive value to the extent of 77.1% of the weekly news coverage on the 
four political issues analysed, while the dominant value identified on KNN TV is 
negative in 91% of its news coverage on the four political issues.  
Alongside this analysis using the three values in terms of the political issues in 
general, the data shows that the four identified political issues are addressed 
contradictorily by the two channels and also between or within each channel. For 
instance, KNN TV does not display a positive value in the coverage of three of these 
political issues, namely corruption, reform and citizens' trust, although the remaining 
issue, government performance, is addressed positively but only to the extent of 2.9%. 
In contrast GK TV shows a positive value in all aspects with a much higher rate, for 
instance citizens' trust is 100%, government performance is 83.3 %, reform 66.7% 
and even corruption is addressed positively with 71.4%. It can be deduced from this 
that GK TV does not accuse the government of being responsible for corruption and it 
covers corruption cases as a separate  issue from the government's performance, 
which will be shown more clearly in the qualitative analysis section later through the 
analysis of specific news items. 
GK TV does not use any negative value in the coverage of corruption and citizens' trust 
due to the fact that the channel reflects the policy of the ruling political party, as the 
101 
political parties in power argue that corruption has become the norm and can be 
observed in every country.  
5.2.2 The news coverage of political issues across the (Sbeiy website, Xendan 
website and Awena website) 
The previous section showed the level of news coverage across KNN TV, which is 
owned by one of the opposition parties and GK TV which belongs to one of the political 
parties in power. This section looks at the three websites owned respectively by the 
ruling political parties, the opposition party and an independent website. The table 
below shows the three websites in terms of the extent of their coverage of the political 
issues (reform, corruption, government performance and citizens' trust) compared to 
their coverage of other news. 
Table 5.4  
News Categories 
Sbeiy Awena Xendan Total 
F % F % F %   
News relating to political issues 
(reform, corruption, government 
performance and citizens' trust) 
63 28.9 64 37.4 55 16.9 182 25.5 
Other news (non-political news and 
foreign news) 
155 71.1 107 62.6 270 83.1 532 74.5 
Total 218 100 171 100 325 100 714 100 
The news coverage across Sbeiy, Awena and Xendan websites during one week between 11-17 of 
April 2013 
The data shows that the coverage of four political issues across the three websites 
comprises only 25.5% of their total coverage (see Table 5.1), whereas both TV 
channels devoted 48.6% of their coverage to these issues (see Table 5.4). The 
difference between both TV channels and the three websites is that the latter devote 
more coverage to entertaining news compared with the TV channels, particularly the 
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Xendan website which covers internal political issues only to the extent of 16.9%. The 
number of its news items covering other aspects is 270 out of 325, which is more than 
the total news articles of the other two remaining websites, which means that the 
Xendan website has affected disproportionately the average of the total number of 
news items related to internal political issues. 
According to the data, the independent Awena website has the highest level of 
coverage of internal political issues, with a rate of 64 news articles out of 171, 
representing 37.4%. By contrast the average of internal political issues identified on 
the Sbeiy website (is owned by the opposition) is 63 news articles out of 218 
representing 28.9% and the other remaining Website is Xendan (owned by the ruling 
political parties) whose coverage rate as mentioned above is 55 news articles out of 
325 representing only 16.9%. It can be seen that the number of news articles relating 
to internal issues across the Sbeiy and Awena websites is quite similar, in particular 
relating to the number of news articles, for instance Awena has 64, Sbeiy has 63 and 
Xendan 55. Whereas there is quite a large difference between them in terms of the 
percentages as Sbeiy devotes the majority of its news coverage to Iraqi political news 
and foreign news and some non-political news, while Xendan is not solely a political 
website which means it is more of a general website, and Awena is a more political 
website, as will be clarified further in the later section which explores the opinions of 
the media workers from the three websites.  
5.2.2.1 The news coverage of political issues across each website: Sbeiy, Awena 
and Xendan 
This examines the four political issues (reform, corruption, government performance 
and citizens' trust) that are covered by each website. The present section compares 
each website in terms of its coverage of each of the four issues to identify its 
individual interest or agenda, as it supposed that the three websites vary according to 
their ownership. 
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Table 5.5  
Political News 
Sbeiy Awena Xendan Total 
F % F % F % F % 
Corruption 11 17.5 4 6.3 2 3.7 15 8.3 
Reform 2 3.1 7 10.9 16 29 25 13.7 
Government Performance 30 47.6 46 71.9 35 63.6 113 62.1 
Citizens' Trust 20 31.8 7 10.9 2 3.7 29 15.9 
Total 63 100 64 100 55 100 182 100 
The coverage level of the main political issues across each website: Sbeiy, Awena and Xendan 
The data shows that government performance is the dominant issue covered among 
the four categories under study here. The Awena website comes first with its coverage 
of government performance by devoting 46 news articles out of 55, representing 
71.9%. While the lowest coverage of any issue according to the data is corruption 
which featured in only 15 news articles representing only 8.3%. Xendan had the 
lowest level of coverage in the website that addressed corruption with a proportion 
rate of only 3.7%. The later point will look at the values used to address these issues 
across each of the three website whether positive, negative or neutral and it will be 
clearer whether each print media attempts to interpret the government's 
performance as positive or negative. 
Specifically, in relation to news items connected to the reform process, Xendan is first 
among the websites devoting 29% of its coverage to the issue of reform as the website 
belongs to the PUK, one of the ruling political parties. The ruling political parties are 
trying to communicate to Kurdish citizens their new projects and developments in the 
public sector, and this raises the question of whether the government provides this 
kind of news only to their media or whether the other media channels choose not to 
cover government related news items. It is clear that both the opposition and 
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independent website devote much less coverage to reform than the media owned by 
the political parties, for instance the proportion of coverage of Sbeiy is 3.1% and 
10.9% for Awena. However, both Sbeiy and Awena do not just frame the news about 
government’s undertaking positively, which means they criticise the reform process 
of the government in their news coverage as well. This will become clear in the 
discussion below that investigates the values used in the news coverage, as well as 
identifying the reason why Sbeiy and Awena tend not to cover news related to the 
reform process. This will be analysed in the section that focuses on the editorial policy 
and attitudes of the media workers interviewed for this research. 
5.2.2.2 The dominant values in the news coverage across Sbeiy, Awena and 
Xendan 
There are considerable variations among the three websites in terms of the values 
expressed in relation to the four political issues considered in this research. The 
previous section showed that Xendan gives more coverage to reform news than the 
others. The present section supports the argument that Xendan tries to show the 
government positively, for instance the data in table 5.6 below shows that Xendan 
adopts a positive value in its coverage of the four issues to the extent of 72.7% with 
18.2% having a neutral value and only 9.1% negative. The negative value relates to 
criticism of the government across the media and the negative proportion seen on 
Xendan (9.1%) is significantly lower than on Sbeiy which is 85.7% and 68.8% for 
Awena. Furthermore, Xendan used negative values in the news related to the Yellow 
Zone and the departments for which the KDP is mainly responsible as will be shown 
more clearly in the later section based on a qualitative analysis of the news content. 
This means that Xendan tends not to criticise the government, particularly in the zone 
of PUK influence, as it is a party website it is obvious that the criticism would be 
minimal.  
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Table 5.6  
Political News 
Sbeiy (opposition website) 
Positive Negative Neutral Total 
F % F % F % F % 
Corruption - - 11 100 - - 11 100 
Reform   1 50 1 50 2 100 
Government Performance 1 3.3 23 76.7 6 20 30 100 
Citizens' Trust - - 19 95 1 5 20 100 
Total 1 1.6 54 85.7 8 12.7 63 100 
Political News 
Xendan (website of ruling political parties) 
Positive Negative Neutral Total 
F % F % F % F % 
Corruption 1 50 - - 1 50 2 100 
Reform 14 87.5 - - 2 12.5 16 100 
Government Performance 25 71.4 4 11.4 6 17.2 35 100 
Citizens' Trust - - 1 50 1 50 2 100 
Total 40 72.7 5 9.1 10 18.2 55 100 
Political News Awena (Independent website) 
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Positive Negative Neutral Total 
F % F % F % F % 
Corruption - - 1 50 1 50 2 100 
Reform 5 71.4 - - 2 28.6 7 100 
Government Performance 1 2.1 37 77.1 10 20.8 48 100 
Citizens' Trust - - 6 85.7 1 14.3 7 100 
Total 6 9.4 44 68.8 14 21.8 64 100 
The dominant values (Positive, Negative and Neutral) used by Sbeiy, Awena and Xendan 
The table above shows the dominant value used by each website; Sbeiy uses negative 
values to the extent of 85.7% particularly when discussing corruption, reaching 100% 
and 95% for news related to citizens' trust. In the same way, Awena is more similar to 
Sbeiy than Xendan in using these values, for example the dominant value used by 
Awena is negative with a rate of 68.8% in relation to the four political issues and the 
highest level is citizens' trust which is 85.7% followed by 77.1% for the government's 
performance. By contrast, Xendan's dominant news values are positive with an 
average of 72.7% and it reaches a value of 85.7% on reform news, whereas in both 
Sbeiy and Awena there was no identifiable positive stance, with a rate of 0%. In terms 
of using positive values across Awena and Sbeiy, Awena adopts positive values in the 
coverage of government performance to the extent of 9.4% particularly in the news 
related to reform which is 71.4%, whereas the news related to corruption and 
citizens' trust is zero percent. In the same way, the positive values expressed across 
Sbeiy are only1.6 %. 
The data in Table 5.6 show that Awena and Sbeiy are more similar in terms of using 
values in their news coverage, as Xendan tends not to criticise the government but 
rather focuses on showing the government positively. This argument will become 
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clearer in the later section which relies on a qualitative analysis of the news content 
across each website. 
5.3 The Frames Used and the Nature of News Coverage across the Kurdish Media 
 The previous section showed the agenda and values adopted by specific Kurdish 
media outlets in their news coverage and provided some indicators of the variation in 
terms of their level of coverage and use of values regarding each of the four political 
issues, most of it based on the type of ownership of each form of online media. The 
present section looks at why the media vary in terms of how they cover the issues and 
how they use positive and negative values. A framing analysis will be applied 
qualitatively to explore the dominant frames as well as the nature of news coverage. 
This present section examines the news content across the two television channels 
and the three websites studied in this research. 
5.3.1 The frames used and the nature of news coverage across KNN TV and GK TV 
This examines the four political issues (reform, corruption, government performance 
and citizens' trust) through a framing analysis qualitatively by applying the four frame 
components (problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and 
treatment recommendation) that were determined by Entman (1993). Alongside the 
four frame components, the news will be analysed according to the four main issues 
identified as the focus of this research, in order to show how the media address these 
political issues.  
5.3.1.1 The four frames components in the coverage of corruption news across 
both GK TV and KNN TV 
The news coverage relating to corruption by both GK TV and KNN TV will be analysed 
according to the four frame components to demonstrate how each channel defines 
corruption and thereby determine its causal factors. The moral evaluation component 
particularly in the framing of the issue of corruption is important in evaluating the 
editorial policy of each channel and website. In terms of the treatment 
recommendation component it will become clear what proposals the media suggest to 
solve the issues of corruption, such as offering a suitable plan, or new regulations 
required from the government. 
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From the seven news items that focused on corruption across GK TV, problem 
definition is the dominant component among the others and the second component is 
causal interpretation which is used in four out of seven news items. However, the 
channel does not refer to the main causal factor but it silences the wider issue by 
localising it, for instance in the following news item from GK TV it can be identified 
how the channel turns a nationwide corruption issue into a local one: 
A number of drivers demonstrated in front of the Rezgary petrol station 
(government petrol station) in Sulaymaniyah and they began to block 
the road because the directors of the petrol station would not issue 
their cards. One of the drivers said they had been coming for several 
days and the workers at the petrol station promised to distribute the 
cards to them, but every day they claimed they had not yet received all 
the cards from the other department. The administrator of the petrol 
station said he had contacted the department to send the cards, but they 
said they had already sent them but the car which was to collect the 
cards had been disrupted (GK TV, 13 April 2013). 
From the above news item it can be seen that GK TV did not examine the main issue 
which is why petrol is being sold by cards. This card was issued by the government 
during the petrol crisis to determine the distribution of petrol to people on a weekly 
basis with each driver entitled to 50 litres. In terms of moral evaluation and treatment 
recommendation, GK TV did not use either in the above news item nor in all the other 
seven news articles, except one in which GKTV interviewed the Minister of Health 
who suggested that it was important to control corruption relating to pharmaceutical 
products. 
The same news item regarding the sale of petrol was addressed on KNN TV which 
outlined the reasons for the demonstration by drivers which is connected to how 
petrol is distributed. KNN TV argued that the lack of petrol in public petrol stations 
was because it has been monopolised by the ruling elite elders as though they were 
their own private petrol stations. As a result petrol is sold at higher prices by private 
petrol stations compared to public petrol stations and this is the reason why the 
drivers demonstrated. The KNN channel reminded its viewers that demonstrations 
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about petrol had been frequent and that the government still had not solved this 
problem, in spite of Kurdistan being rich in oil reserves as well as being an 
international exporter. On KNN TV, the causal interpretation component was clear and 
the news represented the government as being not only the origin of the petrol crisis 
but also the one that should solve the problem. GK TV's ownership by the PUK ruling 
party does not allow it to focus on the underlying reasons for any negative news item 
or to adopt any form of moral evaluation. Generally it tends not to cover news that 
identifies corruption; for example GK TV broadcast only seven news items out of 121 
in relation to corruption during the week selected for analysis while KNN broadcast 
30 news articles out of a total of 101. 
This highlights KNN TV's wider focus on corruption news; it interprets corruption-
related issues with a negative value as discussed in the previous section (see Table 
5.3). The 30 news items covered the four issues from various angles because the 
channels addressed them through a number of different news stories. In this way 
some of these issues were continued over several days, therefore it is clear that KNN 
was trying to make its audience aware of these issues through cumulative coverage. 
The relevant themes in terms of corruption analysed from the week’s sample news 
coverage on KNN TV are shown below according to the 4 frame components. 
Table 5.7 
Problem Definition  
- intervention in the constitution  and regulation using an inconsistent 
approach 
- controlling security and military institutions 
- delay in government pensions 
- corruption in investment projects 
- intervention  and  controlling investment projects by local officials 
-corruption in  importing health medications 
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Causal Interpretation 
-exploitation of laws, regulations and institutions to remain in authority 
-  lack of accountability with officials and employees due to affiliation to 
ruling parties 
-  exploitation and controlling investment projects 
Moral Evaluation 
- lack of transparency and  accountability by Government 
- lack of democracy 
- the government has  poor  economic priorities 
- the ruling parties monopolise the public sector and  big private 
companies 
- the ruling parties give priority to their parties rather than to national 
issues 
- the government does not have a suitable method  of accountability 
Treatment 
Recommendation 
- adhere to the laws and legislations 
- conduct accountability with negligent persons and aspects in public and 
private sectors 
The 4 frame components in framing corruption news across KNN TV 
The above table is an example of how KNN TV uses the 4 frame components in framing 
corruption news, particularly problem definition and moral evaluation which were 
the dominant components used in framing the 30 news items. The definition of issues 
and their causal factors are important particularly through the coverage of corruption 
issues, where it helps to understand the issue and its causality factors. Cobb and 
Coughlin (1999) argue that the determining of the definition of an issue is a central 
feature of the framing process; in the same way Prim and Clark (1996) show that the 
definition of an issue and the determining of its causal reasons are important before 
providing any moral evaluation and treatment recommendation. The determining 
causal factors in the news coverage on the corruption issue display the moral 
evaluation of the media. For instance, GK TV specified only 7 news items on corruption 
and it did not show the main causal factors in order not to criticise the government. 
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5.3.1.2 The four frame components in the coverage of reform news across GK TV 
and KNN TV 
This section discusses how both GK TV and KNN TV used the 4 frame components in 
framing the news related to certain projects and policy changes that the government 
introduced and which I have called reform news. GK TV devoted 9 news items to 
covering reform news, and as was shown in the last section investigating the values 
used in the coverage of the news, GK TV used positive values to the extent of 66.7% 
and only 11.1% carried negative values (see Table 5.3).  Following on from this, it can 
be seen that the channel used positive evaluation in framing the reform news 
compared to other values. In the same way, it demonstrated that moral evaluation and 
treatment recommendation were the dominant components used in the framing of 
reform news, while problem definition and causal interpretation were of secondary 
importance. The problem of framing the reform news is the value and treatment 
recommendation given to the reform issue in terms of how far any new projects and 
plans will offer a suitable solution and whether they will provide a beneficial political 
programme and have a positive influence on the public. It is understood that the 
government should carry out reforms when there is something wrong or 
improvements are required, for instance as seen in the topic of road building taken 
from the following news item covered by GK TV: 
In the framework of projects undertaken for the development of roads 
by the government, the new road in Darbandixan town has been opened 
and it will help to reduce the number of car accidents due to the 
increased traffic on the main road between Sulaymaniyah and Garmian 
region (GK TV, 14 April 2013). 
From the above news paragraph it can be seen that the government has completed the 
project to develop the road and solve the problem of car accidents. The channel did 
not conduct interviews with any independent observers or offer any opposition views 
about this project to interpret and evaluate whether the project was successful or not. 
The report infers that the new road is the best solution, yet the previous road and the 
newly-opened road are single carriageway, and citizens have been asking the 
government to build a dual carriageway or motorway in this region since the 
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establishment of the KRG. The problematic of this channel is that it tends to conduct 
interviews with government officials during its news reports and it ignores the 
independent and opposition aspects to explain whether the new road project was 
completed successfully or not. Enayat (2012) argues that the government has not 
solved the car accident problem due to the lack of CC TV on the roads. He went on to 
claim that most of the projects are not completed to any standard quality measures as 
the majority of companies carrying out these projects are controlled by the ruling 
official elite. These companies do not do their jobs properly because they know that 
when their projects are completed they will be approved by ministers because they 
have a strong lobby in the government. Thus we can identify several examples where 
GK TV did not criticise the projects undertaken by the government in the framing of its 
news coverage.  
In terms of using the four frame components, the framing of the news on reform by 
KNN TV is predominantly influenced by problem definition. It is adopted in three 
news items out of the five which deal with KRG policy towards Baghdad. These three 
news items were addressed briefly by KNN TV, while the other two remaining news 
items were broadcast using moral evaluation components and there was criticism of 
the reform process through the coverage, for example in this news article from KNN 
TV:   
The government has increased the vehicle number plate registration fee 
to provide them with funds to solve the public banking crisis. However 
it is not clear whether these fees will go to public funds or to the ruling 
parties' accounts. The government does not have a strategic plan to 
reduce the deficit in the balance of payments and as a result the public 
banks have faced the bankruptcy issue again this year. In the wake of 
this, the majority of projects are influenced negatively, such as projects 
involving real estate, labour and transportation (KNN TV, 17 April 
2013). 
The news paragraph above is basically a reform-related news item about a new plan 
which is to increase the vehicle registration fee, nevertheless KNN TV has criticised 
this by linking the plan to its negative consequences and reminding viewers that this 
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case happened in the previous year and has been repeated in the current year and 
accusing the government of misuse of public revenue from fees. KNN TV conducted 
interviews about these different aspects and encouraged the general public to support 
its argument in addressing the wider issues at stake as reported in the news item. 
5.3.1.3 The four frame components in the coverage of government performance 
news across GK TV and KNN TV 
Both channels use the four frame components in framing the news about government 
performance, as this topic was the one which received more coverage than all the 
others. GK TV devoted 18 news items out of 35 to government performance while KNN 
devoted 51 news items out of 101 to this topic. The dominant component used by GK 
TV is moral evaluation with positive description, which means it relies on positive 
values in its coverage of the news about the government. As seen in the previous 
section, GK TV used a positive value to the extent of 83.3% as it praised the positive 
activity of the government particularly in the Green Zone and among the senior 
leaders of the PUK. GK TV took the views of those foreign politicians who visited 
during the week’s coverage to praise political and economic development in Kurdistan 
as well as the democratisation process. For example, Luis Ayala, Head of Socialist 
International, Damertash, Head of one of the Kurdish parties in Turkey and a 
delegation from the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs all visited during the week 
selected. In terms of the other three frame components, they are used much less, 
particularly treatment recommendation due to the nature of the news that focuses on 
the government’s performance and the evaluation itself takes on the role of a 
recommendation. Problem definition and causal interpretation came in second place, 
particularly problem definition which means the majority of news stories across GK 
TV are based on the definition of subject matter with a positive moral evaluation.  
The problem of the coverage of government performance is that it focuses on one 
specific aspect of the four political issues. For example, the coverage of the 
commemoration of the Anfal incident, which was the genocide conducted in the 
Kurdish rural areas by the Saddam regime in 1988. GK TV focused on the event as a 
ceremony and on how the government used the event to publicise itself to the 
international community by inviting a number of representatives from around the 
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world. Whereas KNN TV addressed this event by concentrating on the effects on the 
lives of the remaining victims' families and their demands from the government. Also 
KNN TV covered this case in ten different news items during the selected week’s 
coverage, and their intent will be clearer when looking at the following news text as 
an example: 
The families of the Anfal victims did not allow the Minister of Martyrs of 
Anfal to read his speech in the Anfal ceremony in Chamchamal town, as 
the local official there accused those people of creating chaos. The 
families of the Anfal victims stopped the minister's speech due to the 
government not punishing some Kurdish people who helped the 
Saddam regime in the Anfal operation or putting them on trial. They 
also claim that the government has not offered suitable public services 
in the towns inhabited by the families of the victims (KNN TV, 13 April 
2013). 
It can be seen that KNN TV has taken advantage of the above issue by framing the part 
that presents an opposing view to the government and it has also addressed this issue 
across ten news items from five towns during four days. Alongside this, both channels 
address the same event, either by reporting the event directly or in a press conference 
and by using interviews to support their arguments. Clearly these two channels use 
their own frame to cover the news and the events, for instance in the press conference 
given by the officer responsible for the Human Rights Commission in Kurdistan. 
Another example of this can be seen below from GK TV: 
The officer responsible for the Human Rights Commission in Kurdistan 
declared that the human rights situation in Kurdistan is fine, however it 
needs some reform to be better. This is in contrast to the argument 
presented by the opposition parties, as the officer responsible for the 
Human Rights Commission in Kurdistan argues that the level of human 
rights here is much better than in those countries surrounding 
Kurdistan (GK TV, 11 April 2013). 
The news of the same issue as broadcast by KNN TV: 
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The three parliamentary members in the Commission on Human Rights 
in the Kurdistan Parliament have detected two detainees who were 
arrested in secret by security forces and they have not sent them to trial 
for several years. Alongside this, the officer responsible for the Human 
Rights Commission in Kurdistan declared that the situation of human 
rights is not fine (KNN TV, 16 April 2013). 
From the two news texts above, we can see how each channel covers the issue 
through use of different framing: GK TV has interpreted the issue so as not to blame 
the government in terms of the human rights situation, whereas KNN TV directly 
accuses the government by presenting an example of two persons who have been 
treated by the government in an inhumane way. The variation between these two 
channels in their coverage is visible in the use of the moral evaluation component as 
well as the causal interpretation of the specific issue. In terms of which frame 
components were used more, on KNN TV we can see that it is moral and causal 
interpretation, while problem definition comes in second place. The main difference 
between the two channels is ascribable to how they use moral evaluation of the 
government’s performance, for example KNN TV uses treatment recommendation in 
some news stories by conducting interviews with independent political observers and 
opposition leaders. In other words, the main difference in using the four frame 
components is moral evaluation and how the reports recommend alternative 
solutions for the government. The other issue raised in terms of the news coverage by 
the two channels is that they do not seek different views in reporting the news, so 
each channel conducts interviews with people who support the arguments of the 
channel rather than seeking views from different constituents. This issue will be 
investigated in a later point which will specifically examine editorial policy by 
conducting interviews with the news makers of each channel and website.   
5.3.1.4 The four frame components in the coverage of citizens' trust news across 
GK TV and KNN TV 
There are quite large differences between GK TV and KNN TV in terms of covering the 
news that focuses on citizens' trust. GK TV covered this issue in one news item only, 
which was about the people of Qaladze town who demanded the government replace 
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the Qaladze town interchange. In this news report the channel did not use any moral 
evaluation components while the treatment recommendation of the issue was 
addressed by conducting an interview with an administrator from Qaladze Town 
Council who said they had asked the government to solve the issue and the 
government responded that it would do this. The majority of government officials, 
when asked by journalists about specific issues, said they had future solutions and 
plans. While KNN TV addresses this issue by reminding viewers that the government 
had made promises and the issues have still not been solved, GK TV does not remind 
viewers that the government has not fulfilled its promises to reform the country. 
Furthermore, KNN TV focuses on these issues by reminding viewers throughout the 
week’s coverage in twelve news items covering the four main issues, thus achieving a 
cumulative effect of influencing people’s views. This means that KNN TV through the 
use of moral evaluation components accuses the government of non-implementation 
of its promises. 
The number of news items on citizens' trust broadcast by KNN TV comprised 15 out of 
101 and most of these were constructed with negative values, as the stories covered 
issues such as the lack of public services, demonstrations about delays in salary 
payments and the demand for equality with Baghdad, objection to certain judges' 
rulings and people who have not been compensated by the government. KNN TV 
focused on these issues even if the issue only attracted a small group of 
demonstrators, either in government departments or in other places. Furthermore it 
tended to devote longer news reports to these items compared with other news 
channels. The moral evaluation of these kinds of reports was created by conducting 
interviews with a sample of people who were demonstrating or severely criticising 
the government's actions. Furthermore, the news reporters of KNN TV quoted the 
views of other writers from newspapers or individual political observers on social 
media to criticise the government, in other words KNN TV used different sources to 
express its moral evaluation in framing the issue of citizens' trust and it used these in 
all 15 news stories about people who do not trust the government. Moreover, in two 
news reports it showed people who had been forced to ask international 
organisations to intervene in their cases, as can be seen in the news text below as an 
example: 
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The families of young people who were killed by the security forces in a 
demonstration for reform and fighting corruption on 17th February 
2011 asked the Swedish Parliament delegation during their visit to 
Kurdistan delegation to exert pressure on the Kurdish government to 
arrest the accused and prosecute them (KNN TV, 15 April 2013). 
The news paragraph above is a clear example of the lack of trust in the government, 
while in another news item the family of Akram asked Human Rights Watch to 
investigate the decision of the Dhouk Provincial Court. KNN TV made a short 
sensational video graphic to affect the emotions of its viewers by repeating this story 
several times a day during the week. The video graphic showed a recorded interview 
with Akram's father who is an old man and who said, while crying, that the "Kurdish 
Authority is unfair to us and we said that Saddam was unjust but the Kurdish 
Authority is even more unjust".  
KNN TV used the four frame components in framing the citizens' trust issue in the 
majority of the 15 longer news items and thus it allowed for the inclusion of all frame 
components. Moral evaluation was the dominant frame component used, as can be 
evidenced by the following points:   
The Human Rights Watch challenged the trial of Syed Akram, as 
Akram's family argues that all judgments and courts are controlled by 
the political ruling elite (KNN TV, 11 April 2013). 
The news of the same issue (lack of independence of the judiciary) as broadcast by 
KNN TV was as follows: 
The political chamber of Gorran argues that both the political parties in 
power have used the Anfal catastrophe to control the families of the 
victims to support them in the election and they do not represent this 
event as nationally important. Therefore, both parties do not allow the 
prosecution of accused (KNN TV, 13 April 2013). 
From the two quotes above it is clear that KNN portrayed the judiciary and courts as 
being controlled by the two political parties. In the second quote KNN relied on the 
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argument of Gorran which owns the channel rather than conducting interviews with 
interested parties and legal observers. KNN relies on chambers which were 
established in other fields such as economics, journalism and culture. These conduct 
research for Gorran and provide information to its media outlets, such as KNN TV and 
the Sbeiy website. Gorran's media uses the argument of these chambers to form moral 
evaluation of the political issues in their news coverage, as the offices of both the 
chambers and the KNN and Sbeiy are located in the same area, which helps to conduct 
interviews on any case easily and quickly. The Managing News Editor of KNN argues 
that they try to conduct interviews with government officials on the issues and events 
that arise daily but they mostly refuse to co-operate (Interview, 22 April 2013).  
The moral evaluation components demonstrated that KNN focused on the negative 
aspects of the government as this channel is owned by the main opposition party. In 
the week’s news coverage selected for the content analysis, KNN TV focused critically 
on several aspects that showed the government in a negative light. 
Taking the same case across GK TV, it can be seen that the items are covered quite 
differently. GK TV devoted several news items to the same topic, namely the ceremony 
held annually in the middle of April and implemented by the Saddam regime to 
commemorate the genocide of Kurds in rural areas in 1988, as can be seen in the 
following example quoted on GK TV: 
Qubad Talabani, the Iraqi President's son and leader of the PUK, along 
with a  number of politicians participated in the Ceremony of Anfal at 
the Monument of Anfal in Chamchamal Town. He met the victims’ 
families who appreciated the role of the government and PUK in helping 
them psychologically and providing them with pensions (GK TV, 13 
April 2013).  
In the above quote it can be seen clearly that GK TV framed this event to describe the 
government positively and focused on the PUK leader’s son. Also GK TV forms its 
moral evaluation of the event by quoting the statement of one person who 
participated in the ceremony and who described the government positively. Thus both 
KNN TV and GK TV frame the news by conducting interviews with someone who 
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supports their policy rather than collecting information and different views to form 
their news report.  In this case, both channels covered the event differently through 
moral evaluation component in framing the news. 
5.3.2 Other frames used in the coverage of political issues on KNN TV and GK TV 
Alongside the four frame components, some frames were used in the coverage of 
political issues across both KNN TV and GK TV, such as reframing, magnified frame, 
consequences frame, simplifying frame, localising frame and internal security frame.     
KNN TV used the reframing of certain political issues by repeating single news stories 
in several news items where each item took a slightly different view of some aspects 
to discuss and support the same argument. In other words the channel tried to collect 
several points of view as a campaign to support the single news story or issue. KNN TV 
tended to present a one-sided argument, particularly that which supports the view of 
the Gorran Movement or expresses protest against the government. KNN TV used 
reframing as a tool in five news programmes out of seven and the average use of 
reframing varied from 4 to 8 news items in each daily news programme. Most people 
interviewed during the news report supported the argument of Gorran, as well as 
those who were invited as independent political observers to interpret the issue on 
live news programmes. By contrast, GK TV news did not rely on reframing in its 
coverage of political issues but used this to praise President Talabani by dedicating 15 
news items to the  anniversary of his becoming President of the Republic of Iraq in the 
news programme on 13 April 2013 where this item occupied more than a half of the 
programme. News items related to the party's activities and personalities is a 
dominant feature across GK TV, whereas KNN TV did not focus on these topics. 
The consequences frame is the second most widely-used frame on KNN TV, 
particularly in its coverage of the corruption issue and its interpretation of the 
negative influence of corruption on the future of the government and society in 
general. By contrast, GK TV relied on the consequences frame in its coverage of the 
news relevant to reform and the government’s performance to show the positive 
implications of the reform process in the future political development and 
democratisation process in Kurdistan, for example in this news article from GK TV:  
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Parliament has started to issue regulations to fight the control of 
business and trade in Kurdistan, which will solve the problem of 
monopolies in business and trade absolutely (GK TV, 12 April 2013). 
The above quote infers that the government will definitely solve the monopolising of 
business and trade in the future. By contrast, KNN in 2 news reports claims that any 
new regulations and rules are not practised by the government which means that 
even if parliament issues new rules this will not solve the corruption issue. For 
example in the following quote we can see how KNN portrayed the law and its 
implementation: 
The Attorney General criticised the fact that Parliament send several 
projects to be regulations and laws but Parliament itself ignores them 
(KNN TV, 14 April 2013). 
Another news article about the passive role of parliament and government can be 
seen in the following example:  
The parliamentary member mentioned that after the issue of the law of 
Political Detainees the courts have changed the law text because the 
courts are controlled by the government (KNN TV, 15 April 2013). 
From both quotes KNN described how the government controls parliament and does 
not rely on the law in the administrative process. GK TV uses a consequences frame in 
order to show that the government has ongoing plans to resolve these issues. The 
government covers its shortcomings by telling people that it has a plan to solve their 
problems in the near future, as this was repeated during the week's coverage. For 
example when people asked the government to replace the Qaladze town interchange, 
Qaladze Town Council in the news report on GK TV said they already had  a plan to 
solve this in the future (GK TV, 17 April 2013). 
The other frame used was to present a magnified version of the issues or events, 
which leads to the normalising or localising of the issue. KNN TV used the magnified 
frame in presenting corruption and the negative aspects of the government by 
highlighting the issue by repeated coverage and reinterpretation of the story, thus 
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providing several points of view. For instance, in the news report about the person 
who was secretly captured by security forces, KNN covered this in the following way:  
The family asked the government about their son who was arrested in 
1998 during the civil war between the KDP and PUK. This case is one of 
the hundreds who have paid the price for the mistakes of the ruling 
parties (KNN TV, 15 April 2013). 
KNN TV reports this story or single case which happened in the past in order to 
enlarge the size of the problem and portray the government's performance, thus 
magnifying the case by generalising one single example to others. In this respect 
Entman (1993) claims that in framing the news the media seeks to heighten the issue 
or maintain silence if they choose to ignore certain elements of the case in the news 
story. This can be done through the field of experience of editors who have 
information about the social and historical context of the society and issues across the 
media.  
Conversely GK TV uses the magnified frame in the coverage of its political project to 
portray the government’s performance. Furthermore, the moral evaluation 
component was the dominant frame used across GK TV which showed reform 
positively as mentioned above. In the same way, GK TV used the localising and 
normalising frames in its news items related to corruption, for example through 
focusing on one factor of the specific issue only or by localising the issue through 
covering corruption in a small area instead of covering whole cities and towns. An 
illustrative example of this from the news items analysed during the sample week was 
the item about 32 people who were given out-of-date medication which caused some 
of the patients to lose their eye sight, thus producing a crisis which was discussed 
across all the media. GK TV showed the report that the Ministry of Health decided to 
investigate the company who imported the out-of-date medication. During this crisis 
GK TV prepared a news report about the pharmacy to localise the issue as can be seen 
in the following example: 
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The team monitoring the quality of production and services punished 3 
pharmacies as these pharmacies did not use air-conditioning (GK TV, 12 
April 2013). 
This can be seen as an attempt to shift the blame or focus away from central control of 
imported medicines to local bad practice in pharmacies issuing these medicines. This 
in turn was designed to show that the government was actually in control of the issue 
of medication distribution. Similarly GK TV adopts a normalising frame to cover the 
shortcomings of the government, for example in the following two quotes it can be 
seen how GK TV uses this frame to support the government:  
Because of using this vaccination 40 people now face a decline in their 
eyesight and the government has formed a team to investigate the case 
(GK TV, 12 April 2013). 
The number of people treated in this case was more than 40 and several of them lost 
their eyes. This case was covered across most of the media and became a big crisis 
because of the tragic outcome. GK TV did not focus on this case and it only devoted a 
short time to this, without discussing the details. In another example it can be seen 
how normalising is applied: 
 The head of the Human Rights department stated that the 
circumstances of human rights in Kurdistan is good, however the 
opposition parties asked this sector be improved because it needs 
reform compared to other countries (GK TV, 11 April 2013). 
During the week’s coverage the opposition and independent media focused on the 
circumstances of human rights in Kurdistan particularly in prisons and they criticised 
the government strongly. KNN TV presented the news report 3 days after GK TV's 
report as follows: 
The situation of human rights in Kurdistan is bad. During the 
investigation of three members of the opposition parliament, a secret 
prison was found. Accordingly, It can be assumed that there is another 
secret prison in Kurdistan (KNN TV, 16 April 2013). 
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Looking at the same case it can be found that GK TV seeks to normalise the case by 
inviting the Head of the Human Rights Department to describe the case positively. 
Conversely, KNN TV covered the case negatively and it connected this to another news 
story related to the case. Alongside this, KNN TV added the assumption that this case 
might be the worst seen so far. Arguably GK TV tended to normalise and simplify the 
case while KNN TV tended to magnify the case by presenting the negative hypothesis 
of the case. 
Furthermore GK TV used the internal national security frame particularly in 
constructing its treatment recommendation. For example in 10 news items the phrase 
“protect the Kurdish gains” was used. This phrase was mainly used by GK TV during 
crises and in the normal meetings of political party members, as evident in the 
following quote:  
 Kosart Raul, the PUK Vice President, received Farhad Sangawi the 
senior PUK radio presenter. They discussed political issues and the 
relationship between the Kurds and Baghdad as well as protecting the 
Kurdish gains (GK TV, 14 April 2013). 
This news has no real value as a news item because members of the same party can 
visit each other every day. However, GK TV connects this normal story to the issue of 
security by reminding people with the phrase "protecting the Kurdish gain”. This 
phrase in Kurdish society means that the autonomy achieved in 1991 is still under 
threat whether from Baghdad or surrounding countries which have a Kurdish 
minority. GK TV uses this phrase to argue that internal political stability is more 
important than making reforms as Kurdish sovereignty may be threatened at any 
time. The ruling parties use this argument to avoid fighting corruption and making 
reforms. Emphasis of this phrase by the political parties in power delivers the 
message that they have achieved freedom for Kurdish society and the people should 
respect them and not ask them to introduce reform because security is more essential 
than introducing reforms. 
In terms of using all the frames during news debates, both channels rely on one 
political observer or one person who has some experience of the issue. Since both GK 
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TV and KNN TV display partisan news reporting depending on the views of their 
ownership, this means that there can be no real open debate and discussion of the 
issues involved and it is clear that one channel supports the government while the 
other supports the views of the opposition. 
5.3.3 The frames used across the (Xendan, Sbeiy and Awena)  
The four frames components and other frames will be applied to investigate how they 
are used across website which is classified into three websites according to their 
ownership; namely, Xendan which is owned by one of the ruling parties, Sbeiy for the 
main opposition party and Awena which is an independent website. The total news 
output to be analysed comprises 182 news articles divided into 55 news articles from 
Xendan, 63 news articles from Sbeiy and 64 remaining news articles from Awena. 
5.3.3.1 The four frame components in the coverage of corruption news across 
Xendan, Sbeiy and Awena  
During the sample week’s coverage Xendan covered the corruption issue in only two 
news articles, alongside this it did not use the causal interpretation component to 
determine who was responsible for corruption in order to avoid criticising the 
government. In terms of moral evaluation Xendan quoted an argument from the 
government's administrator without conducting any interviews or taking the views of 
any other political observers whether from the opposition or independent political 
observers. For instance, in one of the two news items, the Head of the Garmin Region 
said that "corruption is not too widespread and it will be controlled in the near future" 
(Xendan, 17 of April). It can be seen that Xendan constructed the moral evaluation and 
the treatment recommendation components from only one point of view, namely that 
of the government. By contrast, Sbeiy covered the corruption issue in eleven news 
articles and the dominant components used were problem definition and causal 
interpretation, while leaving moral evaluation and treatment recommendation to the 
readers. However some news stories consisted of moral evaluation and treatment 
recommendation components and these were longer and included some interviews. 
Through this moral evaluation of the news stories on corruption it can be identified 
that Sbeiy addresses corruption more objectively than KNN TV, although it is also 
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owned by the Gorran Movement Party. Sbeiy tries to evaluate corruption by avoiding 
using moral evaluation and some phrases have only random descriptive meaning. The 
second reason is the reader can understand the issues without further explanation, as 
website readers are more conscious of the issues than TV viewers particularly in 
developing countries because website users are already educated while a part of TV 
users are not necessarily very well educated. (Al- Hadidi and Imam, 2004). The news 
text below illustrates the coverage style of Sbeiy in terms of using the four 
components: 
During the distribution of salaries to the Peshmerga (Kurdish Army 
Forces), they were asked to pay membership fees and join the two 
political parties in power (Sbeiy, 16 April 2013).   
It can be seen from the above quote that the political parties forced the Kurdish Army 
forces to become members of the ruling political parties, while Sbeiy's readers would 
implicitly understand that it is against democratic values for the national army to 
become members of the ruling parties. Therefore, Sbeiy did not mention the moral 
evaluation component as the coverage of this issue is clear and does not need any 
further explanation. 
Awena, the third online website under analysis, used the four frame components in its 
coverage on corruption in only two news items, and these were very long news items. 
Awena varied from both Sbeiy and Xendan, because of its independent status and lack 
of partisan political agenda, by taking into account both sides of the arguments, such 
as the opinions of the ruling parties or the opposition and independent views. Thus, 
Awena tries to address the corruption issue and evaluate it from different viewpoints 
and arguments; for example some news items selected consisted of few sentences 
without many details. In this respect, the Chief News Editor of Awena said that his 
website lacks sufficient staff such as news editors and correspondents to offer fuller 
coverage due to a lack of funds. Awena criticised the government in terms of 
corruption news rather more than Sbeiy, although Sbeiy is owned by the main 
opposition party which consistently attempts to present more severe criticism of the 
government. Awena conducted more interviews with people who strongly criticised 
the government and quoted their views from these interviews in another media form 
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such as TV programmes, interviews from the newspapers and social media accounts 
of political observers, and they also took opinions from people’s social media accounts 
where people usually criticise the government with greater freedom. For instance, 
Awena quoted an argument from an interview in the Leveing Press Magazine which 
was conducted with Salahadin, former president of the Kurdistan Islamic Union 
opposition party: 
The KDP is one of the ruling parties which accused Yasen who is a 
journalist accused of espionage simply because he criticised the KDP. 
Therefore, the government should take a lesson from the dictatorship 
regimes and it should make reforms and listen to the people (Awena, 15 
April 2013).   
From the above example it is clear how Awena evaluates the level of freedom of 
journalists by showing the view of the opposition expressed in other media sources. 
By quoting and publishing this kind of argument, Awena expresses its attempt to 
criticise the government. 
5.3.3.2 The four frames used in the coverage of reform news across Xendan, 
Sbeiy and Awena  
Xendan was the website which covered most news relating to the reform process by 
the government and it was covered in 16 news items, while Sbeiy covered it in only 
two and Awena in seven. This is because Xendan is owned by the PUK which is one of 
the ruling political parties. The dominant frame component used in this news was 
moral evaluation and most of the views were taken from interviews with the 
government's representatives, while alternative views were not available without 
seeking other opinions. Therefore, although certain projects were not completed 
successfully by the government according to the opposition and independent website, 
Xendan did not conduct interviews with their representatives in order to avoid 
criticising the regime. The majority of news items covering reform were identified as 
corruption news in other media as they showed an opposing view to the reforms and 
they were not considered as real examples of reform. Seven news articles were 
covered by Xendan as reform issues, while the opposition and independent websites 
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addressed these issues as corruption in the same period. For instance, Xendan showed 
that the government established a modern hospital in Sulaymaniyah, whereas Sbeiy 
interpreted this topic and showed the corruption evident during the completion of the 
project. In a similar vein, Xendan showed that the government had improved oil 
production, while Sbeiy and Awena criticised this news story by conducting an 
interview from other angles and arguing that the government had a poor plan in the 
oil sector. The oil sector is one of the main issues criticised by the opposition and 
independent political observers, who argue that the level of income from oil is unclear 
and that it has been totally controlled by the two ruling families. Several political and 
journalist authors have shown that the income from oil is controlled by the two ruling 
families and even the Ministry of the Economy is unaware of what oil contracts have 
been issued and the exact revenue from these (Salar, 2012). The Minister of the 
Economy absented himself from his job for one week and complained about his lack of 
power compared to his assistant who belongs to the other ruling party (the KDP). He 
also claimed that recently the KDP had taken control of the oil revenues, thus 
undermining his power.  The main problem with Xendan's news coverage is that it 
reflects the views of the government, while Awena attempts to maintain a balanced 
approach by focusing on various topics and seeking views from across the political 
spectrum. However, Awena’s editorial policy is more similar to that of the opposition 
website, particularly in terms of its use of negative values, which it displayed in the 
framing of five news items out of the seven analysed. This shows that the projects that 
were covered by the government as reforms were not real reforms and a consequence 
both Awena and Sbeiy have criticised them. For example, Awena is an independent 
website and it does not have any political interest to support either the opposition or 
the government. 
The problem definition component is the dominant frame used by Awena in the five 
news items relating to reforms by the government. The interviews used in these 
reports used both independent and opposition points of view to demonstrate that the 
reform projects described were not completed successfully, but offered no moral 
evaluation. Thus by giving negative examples of some projects and plans carried out 
by the government, these issues can be evaluated independently by the audience. For 
instance, in its coverage of the news on the economy, Awena quoted a statement from 
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April 2013 to remind readers that the government controlled the public economy as 
can be seen in the following quote: 
Bays Talabani has been the Minister of the Economy of the Kurdistan 
Regional Government for 11 years and admitted that he did not have 
any information about the income from oil exports. He claimed that he 
did not have any information about oil income during the discussion on 
the budget in Parliament in 2012 and 2013 (Awena, 17 April 2013). 
The above is a good example of how some issues can be presented to the public 
without offering any editorial evaluation of the issue, whether negative or positive. 
Drawing readers’ attention to issues in this way requires experienced journalists and 
an editorial policy determined to address the issues whether by criticising the 
government by adding details and comments or supporting the government by 
remaining silent on certain points. The use of silence or the adding of some points 
during news coverage has more influence on readers according to Entman (2009). 
The framing of the news needs to be related to the media organisation’s general policy 
and the editors should have a wide experience of cultural and political matters. 
Goffman (1981, p 63) notes that: "frames are a central part of a culture and are 
institutionalised in various ways". It would appear to be the case in the Kurdish media 
analysed in this research that the frames adopted by each media outlet do show 
institutional bias dependent on ownership of the media, which in turn reflect the 
political divisions in wider society. 
Sbeiy covered reform news in two news items only and it used negative values in the 
coverage of one of them. For example, this news was the increase in car registration 
fees by the government and Sbeiy criticized this decision through taking the views of 
some people who argued that this would have negative consequences, during the 
news report on TV. By contrast, the same news was covered across the ruling parties' 
media as a reform issue by arguing that the government increased these fees because 
the level of the economy has increased too. Sbeiy does not focus on reform news in 
general and tries to emphasise any negative points as it is owned by the opposition 
party. In the coverage in one news item out of the two it used problem definition and 
moral evaluation components by conducting interviews with the opposition and the 
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government in order to keep the balance of the two different arguments. This is the 
main negative factor of the partisan media in Kurdistan that do not use the media as a 
platform for debating the different arguments on the political issues. 
5.3.3.3 The four frame components in the coverage of government performance 
news across Xendan, Sbeiy and Awena  
The quantitative findings (see Table 5.6) showed that Xendan addressed the news on 
government performance positively to the extent of 87.5% and it used negative values 
9.1% only while Sbeiy used negative values 76.7% of the time and the figure was 
77.1%. This means there is quite a large difference between them, and particularly 
Xendan showed the positive features of the government. Furthermore Xendan did not 
express any negative views on the issues either by eliciting the views of ordinary 
people or by conducting interviews with opposition and independent political 
observers. The dominant frames used by the Xendan website were the moral 
evaluation component and it was based on interviews and opinions taken from 
government officials and people who supported the government. As seen in the 
example of the Anfal ceremony discussed above, Xendan did not always present the 
negative arguments regarding government performance. Thus Xendan showed that 
the government was interested in the Anfal case to show the new generation and the 
world how the Saddam regime had committed genocide against the Kurdish people in 
1988 through six news items during three days. By contrast Awena and Sbeiy 
addressed the victims' families points of view and were critical of the government for 
ignoring their situation. Both Sbeiy and Xendan showed that the government did not 
fulfil the promises it had made to the families of the victims to prosecute the people 
responsible and provide compensation and services to the towns where they were 
living.  
Therefore, it could arguably be claimed that Xendan addressed the events by using 
frames that do not show the negative performance of the government, for example its 
misuse of cash, particularly in the Green Zone which is administered by the PUK. By 
contrast Xendan showed the negative performance of some government departments 
located in the Yellow Zone by posting four news items to show the negative aspects of 
the KDP, although this area is under the control of the other ruling party. The 
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interviews with the government officials only have an influence on the framing 
process when constructing the problem definition and moral evaluation components 
as the interviewees never criticise the government’s performance. For instance, in the 
coverage of the government's performance in the oil sector, Xendan argued that the 
government is conducting itself in an honest and effective fashion, while some leaders 
of the PUK claimed that the government has failed in its oil management policy 
according to Talabani (2014). The negative oil management policy of the KRG has 
created a grave crisis between Baghdad and Erbil due to the fact that Baghdad claims 
that most oil contracts have been signed in secret. As a result Baghdad stopped 
sending the budget to the KRG for three months. Farage (2014) argues that the KRG 
has a wrong oil management policy and this led to the crisis instead of aiding the 
development process. 
Sbeiy criticised the government in most news items that related to the government’s 
performance through using problem definition, causal interpretation and moral 
evaluation components in the majority of its news. Any criticism of the government’s 
projects and quality of provision in public services needs to be fully explained by 
exploring the background issues and causality factors, which in turn leads to the 
increased length of articles relating to reform or corruption. The dominant frame 
components used were moral evaluation and problem definition, and particularly 
moral evaluation was used in most of the news articles. Sbeiy depends on several 
sources to collect critical arguments against the government’s performance, for 
example KNN TV reports and programmes, independent website reports and the 
personal accounts of some independent authors on social media. Some of the main 
points that criticise the government’s performance and which are used constructing a 
moral evaluation are listed below:   
The presidency of the Kurdistan Region started to amend the 
constitution in order to allow Barzani to stay in power longer (Sbeiy, 17 
April 2013). 
Another example from Sbeiy: 
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The conflict between the PUK and KDP to control the oil income led to 
the people of Kirkuk becoming uncomfortable (Sbeiy, 17 April 2013).  
The examples quoted above are a sample of statements quoted by Sbeiy from the 
personal accounts of other online media journalists to construct the moral evaluation 
component in its own news coverage. This means that Sbeiy seeks to find opposing 
statements against the government or political parties in power from other media to 
support its agenda which is basically to criticise the government or politicians in 
power. This technique is characterised by Sbeiy more than on other media outlets 
studied here, because Sbeiy uses this style more than the others. 
There were many similarities between Sbeiy and Awena in terms of using the frame 
components and negative values in framing the news that related to government 
performance. However, Awena focused more on the government’s performance with 
48 news articles out of the 64 displaying a dominant negative value. Awena focused on 
some topics where people and opposition parties criticised the government and the 
majority of interviews quoted to construct the moral evaluation component were 
from those who criticised the government. Moral evaluation and problem definition 
were the dominant frames used while the other two remaining components came in 
second place, particularly treatment recommendation because improvements in the 
level of public services were proposed. The news titles of Awena were different 
compared to Sbeiy and Xendan as they were longer and composed from the opinions 
expressed in different interviews. The critical features of Awena appeared in the titles 
of the news items, which highlighted government performance issues negatively, as 
can be identified in the following titles: 
It asked the government to ensure pension equality for the families of 
the Anfal victims with those traitors who served Saddam's regime in the 
Anfal operation (Awena, 13 April 2013). 
Another example of a long title from Awena:  
A Doctor states the health situation of Kurdistan is terrible because of 
the poor national health care system and the policy of the Ministry of 
Health  (Awena, 13 April 2013). 
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From the first title above it can be seen that Awena highlighted the fact that those 
people who worked in the security services under the Saddam regime and who 
participated in the Anfal operation in 1988 and Awena were awarded a higher state 
pension by the Kurdistan Regional Government than the victims’ surviving family 
members. During the annual ceremony of Anfal, Awena connected the situation of the 
families' victims and the negative role of the government, claiming that it should 
prosecute those people accused of playing a role in the Anfal operation rather than 
rewarding them. 
In the second quote Awena formed its negative moral evaluation through the 
statement of one doctor who criticised the role of the government and the Ministry of 
Health. From the title the reader can understand the rest of the news. Awena is 
characterised for using long titles compared to the other remaining websites studied 
in this research. 
5.3.3.4 The four frame components in the coverage of citizens' trust news across 
Xendan, Sbeiy and Awena  
Sbeiy is the website that devoted most coverage to the issue of citizens' trust, which 
was covered in twenty news items during the sample week and most of the items 
showed that people did not trust the government. Some of the news items were based 
on demands or statements from various groups in society, for instance it published 
seven demands in one week which means that people were trying to form a group to 
petition the government. The dominant frame used was treatment recommendation 
embedded in causal interpretation which came in second place and focused on issues 
that people argue the government should take action on. The majority of the causal 
interpretation explaining why people do not trust the government is evident from the 
news covered by both Sbeiy and Awena. The main causal factors can be inferred from 
both websites as shown in the 5.8. 
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Table 5.8  
 Causal factors of the lack of citizens’ trust of the government 
Sbeiy 
- Interference in the courts by the two ruling parties 
- Controlling the security sectors by the two ruling parties and using them for their 
objectives 
- Lack of consideration of the opposition members of Parliament by the two ruling 
parties 
- Lack of public services 
- Lack of freedom for journalists to access information about the government  
- Extension to the period rule of the President of Kurdistan 
- Delay in the paying of salaries to government employees 
- Lack of social justice 
Awena 
- Lack of public serves 
- Lack of freedom for journalists to access information about the government  
 -Interference in the court's decision by the two ruling parties 
The main causal factors behind the lack of citizens’ trust of the government 
From the above table it can be seen that there are several similarities between Sbeiy 
and Awena in terms of identifying the causal interpretations of why people do not 
trust the government. However, the number of factors from Sbeiy are much higher 
with 20 news items relating to the citizens’ trust issue while Awena only covered 7. 
The number of news items does not mean that there is a difference between them 
because the both Sbeiy and Awena websites showed that people do not trust the 
government. In contrast, Xendan devoted only 2 news items to citizens' trust and it 
showed the government negatively in one news report which was on the people in 
Dhouk Province located in the Yellow Zone. In the one remaining news item Xendan 
only focused on the statement published by a group of young doctors that asked the 
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government to control the import of medication to protect people, which means that 
Xendan blamed the government in Dhouk by relying on the causal interpretation 
component to explain why people do not accept the government’s plan to establish an 
airport in the area as determined by the government. In the second news item the 
problem definition component was used along with a treatment recommendation. 
Xendan did not address the citizens’ trust issue but chose to remain silent on this 
matter. 
The other point identified in terms of the online news media compared to television 
news is that the magnification of the issues was less common online than on 
television. Alongside this Awena and Sbeiy addressed some news issues without 
identifying the name of the persons interviewed while arguing that they wanted to 
protect their identities particularly on sensitive issues. The issues of lack of freedom 
and other factors that need to be considered by newsmakers will be discussed below 
in a later section. 
5.4 The Attitude of Media Professionals towards the Coverage of Political Issues 
and Freedom of Information Access 
This section examines the level of freedom to access information about the public 
sector and the restrictions on journalists in obtaining information, particularly 
relating to the identified political issues, which will allow examination of government 
transparency. Alongside this, the section seeks to understand the use of values and 
frames in the news coverage according to the views of media professionals in the 
media studied in this thesis. To this purpose, five newsmakers were interviewed, 
three of them were Chief News Editors, and of the two remaining one was the 
Managing Editor of news and the final one was the Head of Public Relations. The table 
below outlines the details of the interviewees and type of interview conducted with 
each individual. 
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Table 5.9 
Position of Media professionals 
Date of in-depth 
interviews 
In-depth interviews 
News Chief  Editor of Xendan 22/4/2013 Face to face interview  
Managing News Editor of KNN TV 22/4/2013 Face to face interview  
The Head of Public Relations of GK TV 14/4/2013 Face to face interview  
News Chief Editor of Awena website 19/2/2013 By Skype 
News Chief Editor of Sbeiy 1/5/2013 Face to face interview 
The Media professionals according to their jobs, date and method of interview 
5.4.1 The freedom to access information about the government sectors and the 
transparency issue 
According to the media professionals from the opposition and independent media 
there is no real freedom for them to access the government sectors to collect 
information, as the Managing News Editor of KNN TV said:  
Even if journalists enter the public sector to conduct an interview about 
some issues, the administrators and media offices of these departments 
do not provide us with real information and they refuse any personal 
communication (In-depth interview , 22 April 2013). 
Alongside the restriction of access, the government departments tend to provide 
information exclusively or predominantly to the partisan media controlled by the two 
ruling parties. Therefore, news items relating to the positive aspects of government 
performance and reform are covered much more extensively in these media 
compared to the media owned by the opposition parties and the 135 other 
independent media outlets. According to the Chief News Editor of Awena the media 
offices of the different government departments do not provide any news which 
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shows a lack of transparency. In turn this leads to the media being restricted in 
fulfilling its role and functions by the government. He also argues that the media office 
of the government does not provide any negative information about the government 
and these offices are created to hide the information instead of providing them to the 
media and public, as he said: 
When we try to investigate some issue or verify any news that has been 
covered and broadcast by the other media with the media 
administration of the government sectors they send us to the media 
office. The media office argue that they do not have any information and 
when we try to contact them by phone they do not respond to us as they 
know we are from the non-ruling parties’ media. Whereas the media 
office often call the ruling media to cover their news and events (Skype 
interview, 19 February 2013).   
The above is a good example of how the media are not treated equally due to lack of 
transparency particularly in some departments, such as security, the armed forces, the 
economy and oil sector. As these sectors do not have a media spokesperson any 
investigation becomes very difficult.  
In terms of the transparency of the government and the providing of information by 
different departments, the Chief News Editor of Xendan has a different view compared 
to his counterpart at Awena. He argues that the government provides Xendan with 
more information and usually Xendan is the first media outlet to receive information 
due to the fact that the government trusts Xendan more than others and the reason is 
related to its objectivity (in-depth interview, 22 April 2013). This lack of transparency 
forces the media to depend on the second level to obtain information so the 
opposition and independent website try to gain information from the government in 
secret and by covert persuasion. This argument began to emerge when the 
independent and opposition media were asked during their in-depth interviews why 
they did not mention the names of any people who offered them information. The 
Chief News Editors of Sbeiy and Awena mentioned that the government did not 
provide them with information about certain issues particularly relating to corruption 
or the shortcomings of the government when they requested an interview or tried to 
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conduct an investigation, so as a result they attempted to contact certain employees 
and promised to conceal their identities. This is because the government is more likely 
to punish those employees who provide information to the media, particularly 
regarding corruption and the negative aspects of the government’s performance. This 
phenomenon of anonymity can reduce the credibility of the news and the media. On 
this issue the  Chief News Editor of Awena said that there is no other choice for the 
media if they wish to provide up-to-date information if the government refuses to 
hold a press conference and its media offices do not provide timely information. 
Alongside the lack of transparency mentioned earlier, anonymity becomes a 
significant phenomenon across the online independent and opposition print media for 
several reasons. The first factor is the development of the opposition parties, 
particularly the emergence of the Gorran Party which split from the PUK and the 
majority of employees who work in the public sector and support Gorran are willing 
to provide information to the Sbeiy website and KNN TV. For example, the Chief News 
Editor of Awena notes that the opposition media can obtain more information 
compared to the independent websites, as the opposition parties have a huge number 
of employees who provide them with information and send them sensitive 
documents. Furthermore, the Chief News Editor of Awena believes that the other 
opposition media channels also depend on gaining information on government 
sectors from their affiliated government employees. The second reason is that each of 
the ruling parties consists of several political currents and groups and sometimes a 
specific current provides information about corruption among other colleagues to the 
independent website by guaranteeing them anonymity. The aim of providing 
information is not only to interpret reality because some groups and leaders try to 
influence their colleagues or the other ruling political party in order to reduce their 
popularity. This means that the independent website face the prospect of being used 
for the settling of scores and rivalries that exist, whether inside the one ruling party or 
between the two ruling parties, however the Chief News Editor of Awena said: 
We do not allow Awena to be used for political interest and to favour 
any political currents or groups. We publish news and information that 
have positive consequences for society even when we obtain them from 
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a certain party or political currents (Skype interview, 19 February 
2013). 
The above paragraph demonstrates the lack of transparency in Kurdistan, 
consequently both the opposition media and independent websites are forced to find 
other ways to obtain information, such as the use of government officials and party 
leaders in order that they will provide the information secretly. The Chief News Editor 
of Awena said that a section of its website was devoted to allowing people to publish 
their comments and articles in order to encourage them to take the role of journalists 
due to the general lack of transparency.  
5.4.2 The editorial policy of the coverage of political issues across the Kurdish 
media 
This focuses on the nature of political news coverage to understand the factors in 
using the values and frames to analyse the coverage of news across the media selected 
in this study. The news content analysis found that each website and TV channel 
examined in this study are dominated by a specific set of values and frames. This 
allows an understanding of the arguments of newsmakers in those media in terms of 
how they rely on values and frames during their news coverage. In terms of the 
interest in political issues, both the Managing News Editor of KNN TV and the Chief  
News Editor of Sbeiy noted that KNN TV and Sbeiy focus more on corruption and the 
negative aspects of the government. This is due to the fact that KNN TV and Sbeiy are 
owned by the Gorran Party which is the main opposition in Kurdistan and they also 
mentioned that the government is more corrupt and people claim that the 
government does not offer good services to the public. Therefore the coverage of 
these issues has become the priority of both KNN TV and Sbeiy. Furthermore they 
mentioned that the media should criticise the government rather than being used as a 
means of propaganda for manipulating the people, as happens in the media owned by 
the ruling parties that do not focus on the negative aspects of the government, but 
focus only on reform and showing the government in a positive light. Specifically, KNN 
TV and Sbeiy work for the Gorran Movement and this political party has clear political 
interests and specific targets as the Managing News Editor of KNN TV stated: 
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The Gorran Movement argues that the Kurdish political system is 
corrupt and needs reform. The Gorran media seeks to focus on these 
political issues, however we are working completely independently and 
Gorran has no control over its media. For example, the team which is 
working in the Gorran media has different views to the Gorran Party 
and some of the individuals are even affiliated to other political parties. 
So I can say that we are just working according to the principle of 
objectivity and professionalism. (In-depth interview, 22 April 2013). 
Regarding the use of reframing and magnified frames during the news coverage 
across KNN TV, the Managing News Editor of KNN TV claimed that the importance of 
the events or issues causes his television channel to cover them in several news items 
and at different times. In terms of inviting government officials to discuss political 
issues on KNN TV news programmes, the Managing News Editor of KNN TV claimed 
that government officials do not want to discuss political issues on his news 
programme. He said that government officials were asked several times to participate 
in discussions and they refused as they did not want to answer sensitive questions in 
particular relating to corruption in the public sector or the shortcomings of the 
government. The editorial policy of Awena is closer to that of Sbeiy compared to 
Xendan in terms of how it uses values and frames in its news coverage, however the 
Chief News Editor of Awena claims that he seeks to cover political issues 
independently. He argues that the nature of political issues in Kurdistan has made the 
independent website become similar to the opposition media rather than the ruling 
media. In other words, he claimed that the main political issue in Kurdistan is 
corruption and lack of social justice. Therefore, both independent and opposition 
websites try to discuss corruption and the shortcomings of the government to a 
greater extent than other topics of interest. In terms of covering the political issues 
and events in short and superficial news items on Awena, as detected in the news 
content analysis in this research, Awena clearly did not cover the news in much detail. 
The Chief News Editor of Awena admitted this and claimed it is due to several factors, 
as he stated: 
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The main reason is the lack of a large Awena news team and we cannot 
cover all news and events in detail. We are only four editors and we do 
not have specific correspondents who send us reports. Furthermore, 
Awena correspondents work for alternative remuneration not for a real 
salary as we have a problem of funds. All of those working for Awena 
are kind of voluntary and we rely on other jobs because the salary of 
each editor is only around $300 (Skype interview, 19 February 2013).  
The above example is also evidence that the independent media has funding problems 
and the views of the Chief News Editor of Awena on this situation raise a series of 
issues, particularly the reasons for Awena’s apparent lack of funding. He stated that 
the big companies in Kurdistan are controlled by the ruling parties and these 
companies do not give advertising contracts to those media companies who criticise 
the ruling parties, therefore it is hard to obtain any income in this way.  
The Chief News Editor of Xendan argues that this is an independent website and he 
said that there are 27 editors and journalists working for it. He claims the monthly 
cost of Xendan is about $18,0000 and this is covered by funding from NGOs and 
advertising. In other words, he claims that Xendan is an independent website as it 
does not rely on funding from the PUK which is one of the main ruling parties. In this 
respect, the newsmakers from Awena, Sbeiy and KNN TV argue that Xendan is 
completely controlled by the PUK and they claim that Xendan obtains moral and 
financial aid from the party. They said that it is clear that the ruling parties have 
opened up some media, arguing that they are independent and Xendan is one of them, 
and these types are called the “shadow media”. The Chief News Editor of Awena 
argues that Awena can only raise $3500 and every year ends with a budget deficit, 
while Xendan claimed it does not have any funding problems at all. 
The Head of the Public Relations Unit of GK TV argues that his channel has the same 
political attitudes as the PUK as well as focusing on the political issues related to that 
party’s policies. He said the PUK is one of the main parties in Kurdistan and that Iraq 
and its situation makes its media focus on several topics not only on corruption. The 
Head of the Public Relations Unit of GK TV acknowledged that the government is 
corrupt and GK TV has decided to cover corruption issues along with other topics 
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since 2011. In terms of why GK TV uses more positive values and magnified frames 
regarding government performance and the projects carried out by the government, 
the Head of the Public Relations Unit of GK TV stated that: 
The opposition media tends to overrate corruption and use it as a 
political target and to gain popularity. The ruling parties have faced 
strong criticism from the opposition media. So, we need to respond to 
them by covering projects and plans that have been done by the 
government. We seek to show the reality of political issues on the 
ground, against the opposition media showing the wrong image to the 
public (In-depth interview, 13 April 2013). 
The above quote shows that the ruling party’s television channel has been forced to 
take a defensive position towards the coverage of the opposition and independent 
media by focusing on the projects carried out by the government as reform news. 
Consequently, the ruling media try to avoid any news that relates to corruption or the 
shortcomings of the government, which in turn means that the ruling media fail to 
provide an effective platform for providing the viewers with information on 
corruption. 
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5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has set out to present the findings of the first research questions which 
comprise a qualitative investigation into the interest in the coverage of political issues 
and the use of values in covering the news across the two television channels and 
three websites. This chapter also examines the second research question through 
investigating the professional media managers' views of the editorial policy in the 
coverage of political issues and freedom of obtaining information in the public sector. 
According to the findings, in the opposition media including KNN TV and Sbeiy and the 
independent website Awena, negative values dominate their coverage of political 
issues. This demonstrates that the agenda of the independent media is much closer to 
the opposition media than that owned by the ruling political parties, however the 
independent media used neutral values more than the other media outlets analysed. 
By contrast, the ruling television and website focused on positive values in their 
coverage in order to show the government positively. Therefore, both GK TV and 
Xendan devoted a small proportion of negative values to criticise the government, and 
a large proportion of these negative values were devoted to criticising the Yellow 
Zone which is administered in reality by the other ruling party, the KDP. This means 
that both political parties in power have established media platforms mainly to give 
publicity to officials that either have a position in the coalition government or partisan 
posts. According to Warty (2008), the partisan media divides Kurdish society along 
media lines according to individuals’ political background. Although there is no public 
broadcast service, there is no state media either, therefore each political party in 
power relies on its own media to cover the positive aspects of the government located 
in its area of influence or department which is administered by party officials. As a 
result, the PUK media do not emphasise coverage of the government in the Yellow 
Zone compared to the Green Zone, and  vice versa. 
The key findings of the qualitative analysis of news content obtained by applying a 
framing analysis can be summarised into several key points. The dominant frame 
components used across KNN TV were causal interpretation and moral evaluation and 
the majority of moral evaluation was taken from the views and arguments of the 
opposition politicians and independent political observers. KNN TV depends on 
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reframing the political issues which means repeating the same news and events 
through varied news items in one news programme. KNN TV used the magnified 
frame as a tool to construct the four frame components, particularly in the framing of 
causal interpretation and moral evaluation to highlight corruption and showing 
government performance negatively. GK TV focused more on the moral evaluation 
component in covering the news to show the government’s performance and the 
reform process in a positive light. GK TV constructed these two components by 
conducting interviews and quoting views from government officials and people who 
support the government. In terms of the issues of corruption and citizens' trust GK TV 
depended on simplifying and localising them. Both television channels did not invite 
political observers to discuss political issues from different viewpoints. KNN TV 
invited political observers from the opposition and independent, unlike GK TV which 
invited government officials to analyse the political issues, mostly in relation to 
government performance. By contrast, KNN TV dedicated discussion time in the news 
programme to corruption and negative aspects of the government’s performance. The 
opposition and independent website were quite similar in terms of using the frame 
components. However, Awena conducted more interviews with government officials 
than Sbeiy, and the problem definition component was the dominant one used in their 
coverage. Both Awena and Sbeiy published some news items on corruption and 
negative aspects of the government without showing the name of the persons who 
gave them the information. Regarding Xendan's coverage of political issues, this was 
quite similar to GK TV in terms of using the frame components as both of them are 
related to the PUK and they did not tend to show the government negatively. 
Alongside this, on Xendan the majority of news items that showed the government’s 
performance negatively referred specifically to the Yellow Zone, however it did not 
focus on these issues when compared to the independent and opposition media. The 
findings showed that criticism against the government on KNN TV was much stronger 
than on Sbeiy and Awena, due to the television focusing more on an audience 
consisting of the general public, some of whom are not educated. The television news 
tends to criticise the government or other aspects of society more severely compared 
to the website. Furthermore, the regulations and laws which have been imposed to 
control the media tend to focus on the print media (Sleman, 2013). 
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The final section in this chapter is designed to discuss the freedom for journalists to 
access government sectors to carry out investigations and the editorial policy of these 
television channels and websites were considered in this case study. The findings of 
this section relied on in-depth interviews with the Chief News Editors and Managing 
News Editor. According to the findings, those working for the opposition television 
and both the opposition and independent website claimed that the government 
sectors did not provide them with information compared to the ruling media. They 
argued that some government departments did not have a media office such as the 
Security Department, the Peshmerga (Armed Forces) and the oil sector. As a result 
both the independent and opposition media seek to obtain information from 
employees and government officials in secret. In this regards, Sleman (2013) 
suggested that Kurdistan needs to solve the issues of freedom for journalists by 
issuing a new resolution to obligate government departments to allow them to 
investigate. This suggestion might be helpful but it will not solve the freedom issue 
properly because this issue is very complex and related to democracy and the political 
system. Accordingly, reducing the intervention of the ruling political parties in the 
public sector is supposed to activate freedom for journalists to investigate political 
issues in the public sector. This is further complicated by the fact that the whole public 
sector is monopolised by the ruling political parties and all public sector posts are 
distributed to people who are members of the political parties or have been appointed 
to protect the parties’ interests even if it comes at the expense of freedom (Hussain, 
2015). 
In terms of editorial policy, ownership plays a key role in the news coverage of their 
respective news media channels. Those who work for the opposition and ruling 
party’s television and website claimed that their media relies on the political attitudes 
of their parties who provide them with their funds. The editorial policy or the attitude 
of the independent website was more similar to the opposition than the media of the 
ruling parties in their coverage of political issues. This is because the independent and 
opposition media focused more on corruption and reported the government’s 
performance in a negative light. The findings showed that the independent website 
covered some news in scant detail, where it does not explain the issues through taking 
views from different political observers. The Chief News Editor of the media  
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platforms complained about the lack of funds to appoint news editors, while the Chief 
News Editor of Awena noted that his team consists of volunteers who have to rely on 
other jobs to supplement their incomes.  
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Chapter Six 
6. Young people’s views on:  the news coverage of political issues, the 
government’s performance and the role of elections in the political 
process.  
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter looks at young people's understanding and their response to the four 
political issues (corruption, reform, government performance and citizens’ trust) in 
the news coverage across the Kurdish media by conducting seven focus groups. It also 
examines young people's attitudes towards the government’s performance and 
political process in Kurdistan by conducting in-depth interviews and semi-structured 
interviews. This chapter consists of three sections.  
The first section discusses how young people understand and respond to the news on 
these political issues across each television channel and website and the data was 
collected by conducting seven focus groups (see Appendix 1). This section enables the 
researcher to understand how young people evaluate these media in terms of the 
coverage of the four political issues, as it investigates the role of the demographic 
characteristics and political background of young people in their understanding and 
their response to the coverage of the four political issues across the Kurdish media. 
The second section looks at how young people evaluate the government’s 
performance and the data was collected by conducting in-depth interviews (see 
Appendix 2). Similarly to the first section, this section will take the demographic 
characteristics and differing political backgrounds into account. 
The final remaining section looks at the role of political participation in the election in 
shaping democratic politics and future government performance through the views of 
young people using data obtained from semi-structured interviews (see Appendix 2). 
6.2 Young people’s views on the news coverage of political issues 
This section discusses how young people understand and respond to the political 
news in particular relating to the four political issues across GK TV, KNN TV, Xendan, 
Sbeiy and Awena. Furthermore, this section will investigate the role of demographic 
characteristics and the political background of young people in their understanding 
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and response to the political news across the two television channels and three 
websites. Accordingly, the section is divided into two parts and in the first the five 
media platforms will be discussed separately in order to provide details of each from 
young people's viewpoint. The second part will investigate the role of demographic 
characteristics and the political background of young people.   
6.2.1 The understanding and response of young people to the coverage of 
political issues across the five media platforms 
This discusses how young people understand and respond to the political news in 
particular relating to the four political issues across GK TV, KNN TV, Xendan, Sbeiy and 
Awena. This helps to investigate how young people evaluate each media platform 
studied in this research through the focus groups. 
6.2.1.1 Young people's perception of the political issues on the ruling party’s 
television channel (GK TV)  
The first and second focus groups, composed of nine students, were selected from the 
Department of Media Studies at the University of Sulaymaniyah to discuss GK TV as 
the ruling party’s television channel and its coverage of the four political issues. 
The majority of young people in both the first and second focus groups argued that GK 
TV did not focus on corruption and they returned to the topic with several comments. 
In the first focus group Lanya said: 
The media channels of the ruling parties do not focus on corruption as 
the main aim of these media is only to show the government positively. 
GK TV cannot be relied upon to provide people with information about 
the real issues due to its extensive coverage of international news and 
its focus on the positive achievements of the government (First focus 
group, 28 April 2013).  
This respondent argued that GK TV has lost people's trust in addressing the main 
political issues objectively. Which means that GK TV does not give importance to the 
political issues as required by young people, as she believes that the priority of this 
channel is to highlight the government’s performance positively. In this respect, Warty 
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(2008) argues that the media owned by the ruling political parties in Kurdistan were 
essentially established to provide publicity for politicians and the government rather 
than to criticise the shortcomings of the government. 
In the same focus group Daban confirmed Lanya's argument and said: 
The coverage of the corruption issue has become a function for the 
opposition channels as they have taken a critical stance against the 
government. Therefore, the opposition media have forced the media of 
the ruling parties to assume a defensive stance.  
The above comment infers that the opposition media increasingly highlight 
corruption while the media owned by the ruling parties seek to reduce the amount of 
corruption in its coverage. Furthermore, 4 young people out of the 9 in both the first 
and second focus groups mentioned that the ruling media have been forced to take a 
defensive position in terms of their coverage of corruption and the negative nature of 
the government’s performance. The other reason for the lack of coverage of 
corruption by GK TV is the negative role of the government in fighting corruption and 
making reforms as can be clarified further by Lara’s comment when she said: 
This is a negative aspect of the ruling political parties as they cannot 
make reforms and most of their members have lost their sense due to 
money and privileges. Instead of behaving logically and reflecting our 
society, they try to manipulate people for the small numbers of families 
or groups who monopolise power. The government is fundamentally 
corrupt and the media are not able to cover all aspects of this 
corruption. It is clear that the government has expired, but at the same 
time it is not allowing the rotation of power in a peaceful manner. 
Young people are aware of all the facts but there is no real choice. We 
understand we need change but we do not know how to implement 
change. (First focus group, 28 April 2013). 
The participants in the focus groups evaluated GK TV according to its ownership by 
arguing that people do not trust the government to make any reforms. Therefore even 
if GK TV or any other ruling media cover the corruption issue, they will not positively 
149 
affect the attitudes of young people towards the government’s performance. This 
implies that coverage of corruption is not crucial because the government does not 
pay any attention to criticism. Bahasht was a participant in the second focus group 
who demonstrated that she never believed that the ruling television channel 
represents political issues objectively and  she said:  
I watch GK TV to know about certain projects and activities conducted 
by the government, especially in the Green Zone. The majority of 
participants in the two focus groups showed that GK TV focuses more 
on the positive aspects of the government, in particular in the Green 
Zone ( Second focus group, 15 April 2013). 
This respondent claims that the function of GK TV is becoming a platform to deliver 
information and announcements from the public sector located in the area dominated 
by the PUK. This is the main issue of the nature of Kurdish media which has become 
localised, because each media outlet has a specific target and is used by a specific 
group due to the partisan nature of both politics and the media. This in turn leads to 
media users being divided along partisan lines as well. Barzingy (2015) argues that 
Kurdish society is already divided because of the intervention of the two political 
parties in power in all aspects of people's lives. 
In both the first and second focus groups there were opposite views on GK TV in terms 
of its coverage of corruption and they argued that GK TV has the right not to focus on 
corruption due to this channel belonging to one of the main ruling parties which has 
the aim of showing the truth. Soran in the first focus group said: 
GK TV addresses corruption to a minimum level compared to the 
opposition media. The opposition media tends to magnify corruption 
and remain silent in its coverage of the reform process and the 
establishing of new projects by the government. (First focus group, 28 
April 2013). 
This respondent believes that it is possible for the ruling media to cover corruption to 
a small extent. People are becoming familiar with the fact that the partisan media 
were established for publicity rather than forming a critical body to investigate the 
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shortcomings of politicians based on critical values during their coverage of the 
political process. This respondent in another comment suggested that the 
independent television channels should appear to reflect the political issues 
positively. However, Aso was one of the young people who criticised all the Kurdish 
media as he thinks they do not work objectively, as can be seen in his following 
comment: 
GK TV and the other media that belong to the ruling parties have gone 
into a defensive position as they have tended to exclude news and 
reports about corruption. At the same time the opposition media have 
focused on corruption to the extent that people do not trust the 
government, only those who belong to the ruling parties. Moreover, the 
opposition media try to convince people that the opposition parties are 
a viable alternative to take power. Accordingly, sections of the 
population do not trust either the opposition or the ruling parties’ 
media because they believe that both have lost their reliability. This 
reason has motivated people to look to the independent media, 
although the latter are rather similar to the opposition media. 
Therefore, I can say that we need a professional media which could 
operate objectively. (First focus group, 28 April 2013). 
The above comment reveals that competition between the ruling and opposition 
parties dominates their channel and leads to the distortion of reality. Much worse is 
that, even the independent media tend not to be trusted because they are close to the 
opposition media, particularly because they mainly focus on corruption. It seems that 
people have become uncomfortable because the agenda of the ruling media is quite 
different from that of the opposition and independent media. The content analysis in 
this thesis found that the ruling media largely use positive values to cover the 
government’s performance while the opposition and independent media use negative 
values to cover this issue (see Table 5.3 and 5.6 in Chapter Five). This in turn means 
that some people do not trust the media. In this regards, Krmanj (2015) believes that 
the government is absolutely corrupt and the media is only able to show a little of the 
corruption. People might think that corruption is much greater than that covered in 
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the media because the detection of each corruption case makes people believe in the 
truth of other corruption cases. 
6.2.1.2 Young people's perception of political issues on the opposition television 
channel (KNN TV) 
The third focus group was selected from the Department of Media Studies and the 
young people in the fourth focus group who were not in higher education. These third 
and fourth focus groups were selected to discuss KNN TV as an opposition television 
channel and its coverage of political issues and they consisted of 14 participants. The 
majority of young people in both third and fourth focus groups showed that KNN TV 
has played a considerable role in covering the issue of corruption due to the fact that 
people were not entirely familiar with the corruption concept in Kurdistan. During the 
focus groups the young people proposed several arguments to support KNN TV in 
terms of its coverage of the political issues. In the third focus group, Shaida said:  
KNN has changed the critical thinking of Kurdish society. Before the 
emergence of KNN TV the other opposition parties were weak and they 
did not dare to address corruption more openly.  KNN has opened 
horizons for debating several cases that contribute to helping people 
understand what their rights are and how to demand these rights. 
However, there is not full freedom in more places which could help the 
media to investigate several issues due to a lack of democracy as well as 
the right to access of information. (Third focus group, 14 April 2013). 
This respondent claims that KNN TV has played an important part in the coverage of 
corruption; it has expanded critical thinking amongst the society by arguing that the 
opposition parties were weak before the emergence of Gorran. The partisan media 
model in Kurdistan directly reflects the political discourse of the parties, and the 
above comment shows that this respondent evaluates the role of the political parties 
through their media, for instance this respondent has connected the growth of critical 
thinking with the emergence of KNN TV. This has opened horizons for debating 
several cases that contribute to helping people understand what their rights are and 
how to demand them. This argument is in line with Krmanj (2015) who believed that 
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the emergence of Gorran and its media m arkedthe beginning of the real opposition 
party in Kurdistan. 
This argument was accepted by the majority of respondents in both the third and 
fourth focus groups who agreed that KNN TV had raised political awareness in 
Kurdish society. The respondents in focus groups 3 and 4 showed that KNN TV 
focuses on the political issues through its critical views while the ruling party 
television channels only show the advantages of the government. In terms of the 
coverage of corruption across KNN TV, the majority of respondents believe that they 
trust KNN TV and they thought corruption is addressed much more fully than by the 
independent media. They thought the lack of democracy and transparency meant the 
media is not able to cover all corruption issues, as in the fourth focus group when 
Gaylan stated: 
The emergence of Gorran led to people discovering to what extent the 
ruling parties had become corrupt because previously there was no 
method of investigating government activity and the opposition parties 
were weak at that time due to the lack of freedom for journalists and 
the media. Therefore, I can say that corruption is much greater than is 
presented to the people and if we made a full investigation, more and 
more corruption could be uncovered.  So I want to say that KNN has a 
good role to play in enabling young people to understand political 
issues. (Fourth focus group, 21April 2013). 
The respondents believed that greater coverage of corruption in the public sector 
means that the majority of young people do not trust the government. Sarwar 
criticised Alan in the third focus group, when Alan said that KNN TV tends to magnify 
corruption. By contrast, Sarwar said that KNN TV has clarified some concepts in 
particular relating to corruption which were not familiar to a wide range of Kurdish 
society, such as clarifying the corruption of the government by using data. Sarwar 
explained that KNN has helped people to understand their rights through explaining 
the budget of the government and government economic policy. The debate between 
the respondents in the focus groups allowed the researcher to observe and 
understand how young people are influenced by the media in terms of the coverage of 
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political issues. The arguments of the respondents can be divided into three categories 
or views in each focus group of the research. The first category criticised the 
government strongly and supported the opposition media in the majority. In the 
second category there was a minority who supported the government while refuting 
the opposition media, and the third category that criticised both the media of ruling 
parties and the opposition media. This division of young people into the three main 
views will be discussed in the second section which focuses on the extent to which 
demographic characteristics and political background influence young people’s 
evaluation of the media and help form these three views.   
The opposite views towards KNN TV expressed by the young people in the focus 
groups were collected according to certain points or arguments. The main point was 
that KNN TV did not show the positive aspects of the government and the reform 
process and another main argument was that KNN TV is owned by the opposition 
party which has its own political agenda. Alan said: 
KNN TV shows corruption during election campaigns and in periods 
when the relationship between the government and opposition 
becomes poor. (Third focus group, 14 April 2013). 
This respondent claims that KNN TV does not address corruption at all times, rather 
he believes this channel highlights corruption only during the election campaigns or in 
times of crisis in the relationship between government and opposition. This is further 
evidence that the partisan media is believed to be a tool used for political purposes of 
the party owning the channel.  
 Another criticism point about KNN TV was mentioned by Lana as follows: 
I think KNN TV shows an overestimated image of corruption because 
this TV channel has a specific agenda that concentrates on the negative 
part of the government. I think if the opposition parties took power they 
would behave in the same way as the current government. In particular, 
the Gorran movement as most of its members were members of the 
PUK prior to the split between them. (Fourth focus group, 21 April 
2013). 
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The participant in this focus group does not trust KNN TV and she argues that it tends 
to overrate corruption and show the government’s performance negatively because it 
is owned by Gorran, the main opposition party which seeks to take power.  
The respondents were influenced by the issues covered on KNN TV and they 
supported their argument giving examples of what they had watched on the channel.  
The majority of young people during the focus groups demonstrated that KNN TV has 
played a big role in detecting corruption and explaining the government’s 
performance. In terms of the government’s performance, the respondents focused on 
the government’s attempt to create a crisis in order to prevent people from asking for 
reform and claiming that the public sector should be improved.  
6.2.1.3 Young people's perception of the political issues in the ruling website 
(Xendan) 
The fifth focus group, composed of seven students, was selected from the Department 
of Political Science at the University of Sulaymaniyah to discuss the Xendan website as 
an example of the ruling website and its coverage of political issues. The majority of 
young people in this focus group said that Xendan and the other ruling parties’ 
websites do not focus on showing corruption or on presenting a negative image of the 
government. According to the majority of participants the ruling media are absolutely 
controlled by the ruling parties. Dana said that there is no public broadcasting service 
in Kurdistan, so even the media of each of the two main ruling political parties focus 
on activities conducted by those ruling politicians who at the same time fund the 
media. In the same way, Hazar confirmed his colleague’s statement and said: 
The Xendan website and other media channels belonging to the ruling 
political parties are a means of defending the government instead of 
being used to inform people of what is being conducted on the ground. 
(Seventh focus group, 20 April 2013). 
From the above two examples expressed by Hazar  and Dana it can be seen that 
Xendan does not work objectively as they argued that it focuses on the positive 
aspects of the PUK as a propaganda means to support that party. This can be 
demonstrated by the discussion of the role of Xendan in the coverage of political 
155 
issues when a majority of participants stated that Xendan does not focus on 
corruption. The government is corrupt but Xendan tries to ignore this and is unable to 
fight corruption, preferring to remain silent when it comes to covering those issues 
that help to galvanise opposition attitudes towards the government, particularly 
towards the PUK which funds it. Some of the participants referred to the role of 
funding in the policy of the media, whether ruling media or opposition media. For 
instance, Salam said: 
We need an independent media to actually report the facts to the people 
because the media channels belong to the political parties, and even the 
opposition media does not function objectively, particularly in periods 
of crisis, as each of these media channels has a specific agenda in order 
to help its given political party to take power. (Seventh focus group, 20 
April 2013). 
Despite this focus group being specifically tasked to discuss Xendan, the participants 
discussed a range of the Kurdish media to explain their views about the case study. 
From the above example it can be seen that the participants criticised the political 
parties’ media as they do not take a balanced approach in relation to the coverage of 
either the positive or negative aspects of the government. Salar, for instance, argued 
that the majority of Kurdish media channels are biased because they belong to the 
political parties and the media workers are from a specific political and social 
background as well. Throughout all seven focus groups it was observed that some of 
those who criticised the media linked to the political parties also tended to detract 
from the role of the opposition parties and their media. The intention of this group 
was not to criticise the partisan media because they did not support the independent 
media either. Arguably this category wanted to evaluate the ruling media positively 
but when they were asked to evaluate the opposition media they tended to criticise 
the partisan media in order to show the shortcomings of the ruling parties and their 
media.  
In terms of the role of Xendan and its coverage of the four political issues the 
respondents' dominant view demonstrated that Xendan and the other ruling media 
tend to present them negatively. The participants argued that the ruling media try to 
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manipulate people through their coverage of the local political issues and by avoiding 
the main political issues on the ground. Dana said:  
The media channels of the political parties in power try to focus 
people’s attention onto certain issues so that people do not think about 
the main issues. For instance, when people ask for reforms, the media of 
the two ruling political parties focus on the political crisis with 
Baghdad. The government has suspended some decisions regarding 
relations with Baghdad in order to use them when any internal crisis 
may occur. (Seventh focus group, 20 April 2013). 
From the above paragraph it can be seen that the ruling media has lost its influence on 
people as the participants argued that the ruling party’s buying of votes is also part of 
the corruption issue. In this focus group, Harem criticised the government strongly, 
describing it as corrupt.  According to Harem, people do not trust the ruling media due 
to all the false promises made by the government over the last decade that they would 
introduce reforms. Alongside this, Harem thought that all people understood that the 
two ruling parties are not capable of fighting corruption and some people have an 
interest in maintaining the current situation. The participants argued that the 
negative political situation of Kurdistan is caused by the common interest of 
maintaining corruption by the two ruling parties and their affiliates. Harem confirmed 
this point clearly as follows: 
The government supports some people by offering financial support 
and privileges, so this group of people are helping the government by 
giving them votes and legitimacy. (Seventh focus group, 20 April 2013). 
In the same way, Mardan stated that the leaders of the two political parties have 
become a kind of Mafia because they are clearly stealing public funds. During this 
focus group, the participants claimed that the independent media played an important 
role in informing people of the main political issues, as well as the ruling party’s 
media. Mardan stated that, if the independent media and opposition media did not 
exist, nobody would know to what extent the government is corrupt. During the focus 
group Salar responded to the criticisms against the government and argued that his 
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colleagues exaggerated when describing the government negatively particularly in 
terms of the lack of reform and the level of public life. He went on to give an example 
to support his views and said that the government is capable of carrying out reforms 
because more and more people are becoming rich or poor whereas the middle classes 
are faltering every day and the majority of society are more likely to be in favour of 
the poor instead of the rich. Since the majority of this focus group had negative views 
towards the government the arguments of Peshraw and Hasan were criticised by his 
colleagues again. Mardan responded to Salar and he gave an example as evidence to 
support his argument by saying that "we cannot trust the government because it has 
already acknowledged corruption for several years and has not punished anyone".  On 
the whole, the majority of participants in this focus group showed that Xendan does 
not reflect the political issues in the real political arena because it is owned by one of 
the ruling parties. At the same time the ruling parties are perceived as being incapable 
of fighting corruption and introducing reforms. Thus Xendan tends to avoid covering 
corruption by focusing on the not so important issues or local issues in order to 
deceive people. Whereas some of the participants claimed that the government has 
introduced reforms and will control corruption. In the next section there will be a 
discussion of the factors influencing the different views of young people in terms of 
their evaluation of the role of the media in the coverage of political issues. 
6.2.1.4 Young people's perception of the political issues in the opposition 
website (Sbeiy) 
The sixth focus group, composed of four students, was selected from the Department 
of Political Science at the University of Sulaymaniyah to discuss the Sbeiy website as 
an example of the opposition website and its coverage of political issues. Two of the 
participants believed that Sbeiy and the other media channels of Gorran have 
participated in raising the political awareness of people and forcing the government to 
introduce some reforms or do some new projects through highlighting corruption and 
the low standard of public services. The other two participants of the focus group 
criticised Sbeiy for its concentration on the negative aspects of the government, they 
believed it reflected the ambitions of the opposition party to take power. Rezaw was 
one of the two participants who criticised Sbeiy and said: 
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The competition between the ruling political parties and those in 
opposition means that I don’t trust either of them. We understand the 
government is corrupt because this is covered by the media that do not 
have any political interest. Accordingly I prefer the independent media 
because it does not use propaganda to assist any particular political 
party to take power. (Sixth focus group, 24 April 2013). 
From the above paragraph it can be seen that the problem of Kurdish media is its 
ownership by the political parties and this is reflected in the attitudes of a part of 
society. This argument by Rezaw and other participants in all the focus groups shows 
how the respondents prefer the independent media because they are disappointed by 
the political parties who manipulate the media controlled by themselves. 
The opposition media have more employees in the public sector to provide them with 
information and documents than the independent media has. The other factor 
mentioned in this focus group as a critical point against Sbeiy is the lack of coverage of 
some projects undertaken by the government. The chief editor of KNN TV earlier in 
Chapter 5 said news related to government projects is not given any consideration in 
the opposition media unless corruption was clearly identified in the projects. 
Otherwise, the audience needs to be informed about important projects done by the 
government as claimed by participants in all the focus groups in the research project.  
This is the negative aspect of the opposition parties according to the participants in 
the focus groups. The ignoring of the positive aspects and projects by the opposition 
media was interpreted by the majority of the participants of the whole focus groups as 
demonstrating a clear lack of objectivity. The reason for the importance of this issue is 
that although the majority of the participants said they did not want to become 
pessimistic, they did not believe that the political system could be changed or 
reformed.  
There were two participants who criticised Sbeiy for showing that the government is 
corrupt and this issue is covered more by the opposition and independent media. 
Furthermore, they argued that Sbeiy did not function objectively and ,did not focus on 
the positive aspects of the government. For instance in this focus group Sheren said: 
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The daily coverage of corruption by the Sbeiy Website makes me feel 
pessimistic about the government even though the government has 
some positive points. I would prefer Sbeiy to show the advantages and 
disadvantages of the government in order to appear more objective. 
(Sixth focus group, 24 April 2013). 
This means that the daily coverage of corruption by the opposition media makes 
people feel pessimistic because they do not believe that the two political parties in 
power intend to introduce reform. Another reason for pessimism is that the 
opposition media does not cover new projects undertaken by the government. In turn 
this means that people do not trust the opposition media because they only highlight 
the negative image of the government and this makes people think that the opposition 
media are not working objectively. According to some respondents, objectivity in the 
media is crucial so that there is a balance in the coverage of the news relating to both 
negative and positive aspects of the government.  As the news content analysis in the 
previous chapter (see Table 5.3 and 5.6 in Chapter Five) showed, the opposition 
media largely highlighted the government’s shortcomings rather than showing any 
side of its positive performance. Another reason for complacency is that many people 
feel the economic level and public services have improved since 2003 and this makes 
them approve of the government’s performance in general, particularly the middle 
and older generations. This generation feels quite comfortable with their current 
living conditions because they had suffered so much lack freedom and lower level of 
economic stability under Saddam’s regime, but the majority of the new generations 
are looking for greater progress. 
6.2.1.5 Young people's perception of the political issues in the independent 
website (Awena) 
The seventh focus group, composed of eight students, was selected from the 
Department of Political Science at the Human Development University to discuss 
Awena as an independent website and its coverage of political issues. In this focus 
group the majority of the participants claimed that Awena and the independent media 
play an important role in helping people to understand the political process, 
particularly the government’s performance. The majority of those who support Awena 
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said that it is better than the opposition media as the independent media does not 
seek to obtain political power. In other words they mean that the opposition media 
seeks to show the negative aspects of the government in order to make people think 
that the opposition is a good alternative. Rozan said:  
Awena and the independent media are the best and most reliable 
resources, as the independent media cover the political ground clearly, 
while the opposition media merely try to create a bad image of the 
government.  (Fifth focus group, 20 April 2013). 
This respondent prefers the independent media to the opposition media in its 
coverage of political issues, arguing that the independent media tends to work more 
objectively than that of the opposition parties. Objectivity in the news coverage as 
expressed by this respondent means that the media should highlight the negative and 
positive aspects of the government. This claim does not fit with the editorial policy of 
the opposition parties’ media because the Managing News Editor of KNN TV (In- 
depth interviews, 22 April 2013) and the Chief News Editor of Sbeiy (In- depth - 
interviews, 1 May 2013) mentioned that they adopt negative values in the news to 
cover the political issues and they insisted that the audience should be provided with 
the shortcomings of the government rather than publicising any successful projects 
completed by the government. In this respect, Abdulaziz (2013) notes that the media 
in Middle Eastern countries are largely employ positive values in the news coverage 
due to the lack of democracy and the fact that the media have been controlled by the 
ruling political parties for so long. This makes people believe that objectivity in media 
coverage is achieved by focusing on publicising the government’s activities and 
introducing projects completed by the government positively rather than criticising 
the shortcomings of any particular activity. 
 During the focus group some of the participants responded to Rozan’s argument 
because the nature of the focus group was dynamic and allowed the respondents to 
interact by criticising each other and responding to opposite arguments. One of them 
was Jutyar, who said : 
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 Awena often shows sensitive documents regarding the corruption of 
the government (which he claimed was one of the best ways of 
informing the viewers). One major problem with Awena is that the 
people providing information were kept anonymous, with the result 
that many viewers could not trust the website. The opposition media is 
bolder in showing corruption, particularly KNN TV as the opposition 
parties are more powerful in defending themselves while the 
independent media can more easily be punished by the government. 
(Fifth focus group, 20 April 2013). 
The above views are not real criticisms of Awena; during this focus group two 
participants totally disagreed with both the opposition media and independent media 
in their handling of several arguments, as can be seen from the following comment by 
Massud: 
We should understand that we are in a transition stage and the 
situation is improving step by step. Kurdistan needs reconstruction, 
whilst the opposition and independent media claim that everything 
should be perfect straightaway. Moreover, the Awena website focuses 
on deficiencies and defects in the government, so consequently it gives 
people the wrong idea about the government’s performance and 
encourages pessimism. (Fifth focus group, 20 April 2013). 
The above argument faced strong critical views from the majority of the participants 
and stated that the government is not interested in introducing any reform. In this 
aspect, Rebaz claimed that both the independent and opposition media report 
corruption every day and the government does not oppose this. Alongside this, the 
majority of the participants believed that the government cannot be trusted to change 
and they presented several arguments to support their views. One of the main 
arguments was that the government controls public funds to keep power by 
distributing money to buy votes. This argument has become a generalised statement 
by respondents, who, although they were asked to focus on the media, always tended 
to talk about the government as well because the nature of this research made them 
link media coverage with government performance. Another point is that the 
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respondents argued that there is no difference between the partisan media and the 
political parties, in another words, they argue that it is difficult to distinguish between 
the parties and their media channels, as the media organisations are part of the 
parties' overall unit and all the media professionals working in them are likely to be 
members of these parties. 
The four main political issues identified in this case study and discussed by the focus 
groups are all connected to each other and all stem from corruption or the lack of 
social justice. In this last focus group the participants concentrated on another role of 
the independent media in the political process, for example, Fahmey said: 
The independent media played a role in the emergence of the Gorran 
Party by raising awareness of political rights among different sectors of 
society. Following this, Gorran obtained the attention of that group in 
society who sought reform. The independent media encouraged some of 
the political elite to make reforms through supporting these issues and 
some of them had split from both ruling parties. . (Fifth focus group, 20 
April 2013). 
 Alongside this role, Rebaz argued that:  
The independent website has given space to some members of the 
independent elite to raise awareness of the people through their critical 
essays. . (Fifth focus group, 20 April 2013). 
According to the above two arguments and the others who supported Awena, the 
independent website and their online versions have become a platform to connect 
three groups. These groups include the general public, independent authors acting as 
a pressure group and the opposition parties who criticise the government’s 
performance through their coverage of corruption and by offering suggestions for 
further reforms. 
6.2.2 Demographic characteristics and political background: young people’s 
understanding of the news 
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This section seeks to understand how the background of young people has an 
influence on their attitudes.  It is divided into two parts and the first one will discuss 
the demographic characteristics including gender, place of residence and whether the 
young people are in higher education or not. The second part is the political 
background of young people divided into two categories, namely young people’s 
political affiliation or political attitude and political knowledge or political interests. 
The participants were selected from different backgrounds to analyse how this 
variable has an impact on their understanding and responses to political news. The 
composition of the seven focus groups are categorised in more detail in the following 
table: 
Table 6.1 
Focus 
Group 
Numbers 
Demographic characteristics of the participants in the focus groups  
Gender Place of Residence 
Higher Education or not in 
higher Education 
Total 
 
Fe Ma City 
town and 
villages 
In higher 
education 
Not in higher 
education 
 
First 2 3 4 1 5 - 5  
Second 1 3 4   4 4  
Third 3 4 4 3 7  7  
Fourth 3 4 5 2 7  7  
Fifth  7 3 4 7  7  
Sixth 4  4  4  4  
Seventh 2 6 6 2 8  8  
Total 15 27 30 12 38 4 42  
Focus 
Political background of the participants in the focus groups  
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Group 
numbers 
Political affiliation or political attitude 
Political knowledge or 
political interests 
Total 
 
Ruling 
parties 
opposition 
parties 
Independent  
First 2 2 1 Media 5  
Second 1 2 1 not in higher education 4  
Third 1 4 2 Media 7  
Fourth  1 6 Media 7  
Fifth 1 4 2 Political science 7  
Sixth  2 2 Political science 4  
Seventh 2 2 4 Political science 8  
Total 7 17 18  42  
The participants in the focus groups according to their demographic characteristics, political 
background  
6.2.2.1 The role of demographic characteristics in the understanding and 
responses of young people to political news 
 During the selection of the focus groups, different demographic characteristics were 
considered in this case study in order to seek to understand to what extent 
demographic characteristics influence young people’s understanding and response to 
political news. 
In terms of striking a balance between the genders, it was essential that the young 
people in the university who participated in the focus groups were divided equally 
between the genders, otherwise the male students would have dominated as they are 
more interested in political communication than their female counterparts. During the 
selection of the sample, I tried to strike a balance between the male and the female 
participants, but the young males were more eager to participate in the research 
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project than the female participants, as evidenced by the 27 male and 15 female 
participants in all the seven focus groups. 
Despite the fact that the number of females who participated in the focus groups in 
this research project were fewer than the males, they were quite similar to the males 
in particular relating to their level of understanding and political attitudes towards 
the media of the ruling parties, the opposition or independent media. Consequently, 
gender is not a significant factor in the focus groups in this case study relating to any 
difference in support for the various politically-based media channels, although the 
majority of females tended to support the independent media, and they were very 
interested in political communication. The findings of this thesis differ from research 
conducted by both Al Hadidi et al, in the Arab countries and Al- Bada in Lebanon, who 
both found that young females largely watch entertaining TV programmes while 
young males mostly view political news programmes (Al- Hadidi et al, 2006; Al- Baida 
2008). This research findings suggest that both genders in Kurdistan are interested in 
political news for two reasons. Firstly Kurdish culture might be different from Middle-
Eastern society, particularly the Arab world, which was the focus of the two 
aforementioned research studies by Al-Hadidi et al (2006) and Al-Baida (2008). The 
second reason may be related to the thesis sample which mainly collected the views of 
female students. Mustafa (2010) found that young females in universities tend to view 
political programmes more than those women who have not completed university or 
are not in education. 
This group of females in the focus groups were more optimistic about changing the 
system compared to the other groups where the majority considered the system and 
argued that the Arab spring had not succeeded as an example. While the males from 
the focus groups were divided into two groups where the majority group criticised the 
ruling media and the government. This group argued that the system needs to be 
changed and they also argued that both the opposition and independent media  help 
people to understand political issues, particularly the opposition media as they are 
more powerful. 
With regard to the factor of whether young people were in higher education or not, 
there is no clear difference in terms of their understanding the political issues across 
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the media as they were all interested in political communication. The other reason is 
that the unstable political situation made young people focus on the political issues 
because they are all affected by the system. Furthermore this research is based on 
purposive sampling and the young people were selected because they are interested 
in the research topic and because this research relies on a qualitative approach as was 
explained in the methodology chapter.  
The place of residence variable of the participants in the focus groups showed that the 
majority of young people who were from towns and villages criticised the government 
more strongly compared with those from the cities. For example, although the 
respondents in the focus group were asked to evaluate the media selected, they 
insisted on offering criticism of the government, arguing that they do not distinguish 
between the ruling parties and the government itself, as they believe that their media 
channels promote the agenda of these parties. 
The young people from town and villages felt disaffected and argued that the 
government should focus more on their areas compared to the cities and they felt that 
rebuilding was appropriate compensation for them. Below can be seen some 
examples of the comments made by young people who were from the category of 
villages and towns during the focus groups, for instance Mardan said: 
I do not believe that the government is able to fight corruption and 
make reforms in any way, as the leaders of the two political parties have 
become a kind of Mafia because they are clearly stealing public funds. If 
the independent media and opposition media did not exist, nobody 
would know to what extent the government is corrupt. (Seventh focus 
group, 20 April 2013). 
Harem said:  
The people are quite sure that the government is corrupt; accordingly 
people do not trust the government and the media channels which 
support the government due to all the false promises made by the 
government over the last decade that they would introduce reforms. 
(Seventh focus group, 20 April 2013). 
167 
Sarwar said:  
The government has adopted the wrong policy whether at the level of 
internal policy or that towards Baghdad due to the actions of President 
Massoud Barzani who has tended to be over-authoritarian. (Third focus 
group, 14 April). 
Gaylan siad:  
I can say that corruption is much greater than is presented to the people 
and if we made a full investigation, more and more corruption could be 
uncovered. (Fourth focus group, 21 April 2013). 
From the above examples it can be seen that they have used strong words such as 
“Mafia”, “stealing public funds”, “the government is corrupt” and the description of the 
system and president as “authoritarian”. Even those who supported the government 
and the ruling media criticised the opposition and independent media strongly. For 
example, Kamaran during the focus group which discussed the independent website 
said the independent media does not address corruption cases objectively as it is not 
accurate. He went on to argue that, usually the independent and opposition media 
present a big headline without addressing the issue in-depth. The majority of young 
people from the cities who supported the government in the focus groups did not tend 
to refute the opposition and independent media absolutely and some of them even 
said that they use these channels to understand the negative aspects of the 
government. The question arises here, as to why they believe that the government is 
corrupt but they still do not support the opposition parties, and the answer can be 
related to the political background of some of them, as will be clarified in the next 
point. 
6.2.2.2 The role of political background in young people’s understanding and 
their responses to political news 
This part investigates the role of two factors: the political knowledge or political 
interest and the political affiliation or political orientation of young people and how 
this influences their understanding and response to political issues. The previous part 
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showed that young people, whether in higher education or not, are similar in terms of 
their understanding and response to political issues. In the same way this part shows 
that all the young people were interested in the political content across the media 
whether they were studying in the Department of Media and Political Science or were 
not in higher education at all. This interest stems from the feeling of all young people 
that they are not given attention by the government in general and as a result they feel 
it is important to focus on political content across the media. Alongside this reason, 
the research project depends on purposive sampling and most of the interviewees 
were interested in political communication regardless of their educational 
background. However, political affiliation or political orientation of is a significant 
factor as it plays a large role in determining young people’s understanding and their 
response. During the focus groups the young people were asked about their political 
orientation to allow analysis of how this variable has an influence on their evaluation 
of the media according to whether they favoured the ruling parties, opposition or 
independent parties. 
In all the focus groups 7 young people out of 42 supported the ruling parties and the 
majority of them sought to discuss the shortcomings of the ruling media in their 
coverage of the political issues, particularly corruption and the negative aspects of the 
government through several arguments. This is due to two factors, firstly the 
government is corrupt (Krmanj, 2015) and the ruling media do not reflect this 
corruption in their reporting. Instead they emphasise projects done by the 
government as part of the reform process and show the government positively, as 
revealed in the content analysis where the ruling media devoted positive values with 
higher percentage  levels than the other media channels (see findings in Table 5.3 and 
5.6 in Chapter Five). The qualitative news textual analysis also demonstrated how the 
ruling media devoted magnified framing to show the government's performance and 
used localising framing and simplifying framing to reduce the issues of corruption. 
Furthermore, the ruling media reflects the common arguments which are derived 
from the government's political discourse to create external threats on internal 
security. The government uses this threat to make people obliged and obey their 
reigns to avoid introducing reform and to develop internal systems. Qani (2012c) 
found that the ruling media use security framing in this way, with similar conclusions 
169 
to the current thesis. This approach is characteristic of authoritarian dictatorship 
regimes, for instance the Iranian regime always describes the US as ‘the Devil against 
Iran” in order to distract the Iranian people from seeking democratic reform and focus 
only on the external threat which targets Iran. (Qani, 2012b ). Similarly the two 
political parties largely devote news coverage to show that Kurdistan is always under 
threat from Baghdad and surrounding countries. In this respect, Hardy (2012a) notes 
that the young people in Kurdistan are very aware of government’s political discourse, 
and they cannot be deceived easily. The second factor which makes the majority of 
young people feel influenced by the opposition and independent media rather than 
the ruling media is that this sector of society face issues such as unemployment, lack 
of social justice and they receive scant attention from the government. Therefore they 
are not influenced by the ruling media. Al-Hadidi and Imam (2004) argue that young 
people do not use media which ignores issues relevant to them. Essentially, the 
government does not give importance to young people and in turn the ruling media 
does not cover young peoples’ issues. This argument is clearly expressed by the 
respondents, for example, Soran claimed that: 
 GK TV is the representative of the PUK which is one of the main 
political parties in Kurdistan and Iraq; therefore it needs to focus on 
external news. The coverage of external news has affected the average 
rate of GK TV news coverage of corruption, and this means that the 
opposition party is too local compared to the PUK and this reason helps 
the opposition media to focus on internal issues more than the ruling 
media. (Second focus group, 15 April 2013). 
This shows that young people understand the agenda of the Kurdish media and they 
are also able to determine the priority of the media ownership types. The dominant 
argument which was repeated is that the ruling media is adopting a defensive 
position, and this phrase implies that the other media are focusing on the 
shortcomings of the government. As a result the ruling media is forced to show the 
positive aspects and news projects or some reform process carried out by the 
government.  
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The young people from the ruling parties category argued that the opposition and 
independent media are not working objectively as they do not cover the positive 
aspects of the government. They argued that the coverage of the non-ruling media 
forced the ruling media to focus on the positive aspects of government more than the 
negative. Another argument was mentioned by Shwan who said: 
 The PUK needs to protect itself through providing news coverage of the 
positive aspects carried out in the areas administered by the PUK 
because the KDP is focusing solely on positive aspects in its areas of 
control as well. (Fifth focus group, 20 April 2013).  
This argument by Shwan shows that the competition or conflict between the ruling 
parties is a factor which means that both ruling parties do not show coverage of 
corruption in their respective areas of influence. Soran at the beginning of the focus 
group meeting said that: 
GK TV shows some news on corruption however it does not cover the 
big cases because GK TV is owned by the PUK which is in power. 
(Second focus group, 15 April 2013). 
The above paragraph by Soran presents the opposite argument to his comment that 
the ruling media do not focus on internal issues because they are not local political 
parties and they feel frustrated at not being able to address them. The participants 
from the ruling party supporters’ category during the discussion on the media 
touched on the government’s shortcomings, for example Massud said: 
We should understand that the KRG is not like a developed country, so 
we should understand that we are in a transition stage and the situation 
is improving step by step. Kurdistan needs reconstruction, whilst the 
opposition and independent media claim that everything should 
become perfect. (Fifth focus group , 20 April 2013). 
The above is a good example of how the people affiliated to the ruling political parties 
give them legitimacy even if they are seen as corrupt. This can also be seen from the 
arguments of participants in the same category, for instance Aso showed that people's 
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evaluation relates to their political orientation. He went on to say that political 
orientation depends on financial benefits received from the government, as he 
explains in the following statement: 
I think the effect of the media is related to the political background of 
the viewer, as the political background of each person depends on the 
family political background of that person. Moreover, the political 
background of the majority of people depends on the financial benefits 
gained by families from the political parties. So, those who still have not 
received any financial benefit from the ruling political parties prefer to 
support the opposition parties. (First focus group, 28 April 2013). 
According to the above paragraph the political background of the audience is more 
powerful than the media messages themselves, in other words the effects of the media 
messages depend on the political background of the viewer. According to Talat (2006) 
who conducted research into political participation and affiliation among young 
Kurdish people found that the Kurds are generally becoming a partisan society 
because the two political parties have forced people into this situation as they are 
generally not treated equally for example in terms of employment  opportunities. He 
also reported that the family is the main channel for shaping the political attitudes of 
their young people. According to this research schools and universities came as a 
second channel for political socialisation of young people as the two political parties 
have monopolised the students unions in this sector. Conversely, the research reports 
that young people form the sector of society which has affiliated least to the political 
parties compared to other categories because their loyalty has not yet been bought. 
Political background is not related to financial interest, in particular among the 
opposition parties because they are not able to provide benefits to people who 
support them in elections. The majority of participants from the independent and 
opposition categories  positively evaluated the independent website. While half of the 
participants from the ruling party category, particularly those in the focus group 
which discussed the independent website, criticised the independent media. 
Moreover, the majority of the participants from the ruling party category criticised the 
opposition media during the focus groups that discussed the opposition media and 
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some of them even suggested that the independent media is the best as it does not 
have a political agenda. This category does not prefer the opposition and the 
independent media because of the political objectives of these media but rather 
because of the level of objectivity of these media. In other words, trust in the media 
among the participants from the political party category varies according to the 
ownership of the media and not on the actual content of the news. 
The relationship between the political background of the participants and their moral 
evaluation can be clarified further by analysing the attitudes of the views of the 
participants supporting the opposition parties, for instance some of them criticised 
KNN TV and Sbeiy website owned by the Gorran Party which is the main opposition 
party. This was clearly expressed by those participants from different opposition 
parties as illustrated in the following quote by Nian: 
KNN TV is one of the channels that have been an active participant in 
addressing corruption; however it shows that the Gorran Movement is 
the only alternative that has a suitable solution. However, that is not 
true because most of the political leaders of Gorran were in power 
before the split from the PUK. (Third focus group, 20 April 2013). 
In this focus group, Nian evaluated KNN TV positively while at the same time 
criticising the Gorran Party which is the owner of the channel and arguing that the 
Gorran leaders were formerly members of the PUK. During the focus groups the 
participants clearly supported the political parties to which they were affiliated, so the 
question arising here is which political parties the participants from the independent 
category supported most, ruling or opposition. The majority of the participants from 
the independent category criticised the ruling parties and their media and they 
supported the opposition media.  They claimed that the opposition media helped 
people to understand the real political situation of Kurdistan through detecting 
corruption and the negative aspects of the government. During the focus group which 
discussed GK TV, Hawar criticised the ruling media strongly: 
Every person is sure that there is more corruption even among the 
political leaders, although this is not covered by GK TV or other media 
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that are owned by the political parties in power. The media owned by 
the political parties in power are faltering in popularity, especially 
amongst young people because they do not give a true account of the 
government's performance. The Kurdish authorities do not want to 
provide any services to the general public; instead they give services 
only to those who have political affiliation to them.  The government 
only started to improve the country’s infrastructure due to critical 
pressure from the opposition parties. (Second focus group, 15 April 
2013). 
The above quote shows that Hawar did not trust the government and ruling media as 
the government is corrupt and does not make any reforms. This infers that the 
opposition media forced the government to develop some public services. The 
majority of the participants from the independent category did not support the 
government, while at the same time some of them criticised the opposition parties 
and argued that they cannot be trusted to take power. The issue of the independent 
participants was not related to the situation of the opposition parties as they have not 
held power yet and therefore cannot be criticised for their performance.  
According to the independent participants the opposition media should focus on both 
positive and negative aspects of the government, as this would help to provide a more 
balanced picture. Some of the independent participants believed that by remaining 
silent about some positive aspects of the government, the media was showing a lack of 
objectivity. They argued that this silence gives people the wrong impression of the 
government. This issue was raised with a Chief News Editor at KNN TV and he said 
that KNN TV focuses on corruption and the negative aspects of the government 
because the positive aspects have no significance in the editorial policy of KNN TV. 
6.3 The attitudes of young people towards the government’s performance 
This section examines the positive and negative attitudes expressed by the 
participants about the government’s performance and the role of demographic 
characteristics and the political background or political orientation of the participants 
in forming their evaluations. The data of this section was collected by conducting in-
depth interviews with 15 young people from varied demographic and political 
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backgrounds. This section is divided into two parts and the first part examines the 
positive and negative attitudes of young people towards the government’s 
performance. The second part analyses the role of demographic characteristics and 
the political background or political orientation of the participants in forming their 
evaluations. The previous section included a similar point which aimed to identify the 
role played by the demographic characteristics and political background of the young 
people in forming their understanding and responses in terms of the media coverage 
of the four political issues. It may be assumed that these factors become significant 
intervening variables in terms of the role of the media in shaping the political 
communication of young people. Moreover the examination of the role played by 
these demographic characteristics will lend further understanding to this case study 
and enable the researcher to investigate how and why young people demonstrate 
different or similar understanding of and response to the media coverage of the 
identified political issues. 
6.3.1 The positive and negative attitudes of young people towards the 
government’s performance.  
 This part examines the positive and negative attitudes expressed by the participants 
about the government’s performance and political process. The results show that 10 
out of 15 young people held negative views towards the government while the 
remaining 5 viewed the government and political process positively, therefore these 
two different views will be examined separately in the following two categories. 
6.3.1.1 The negative attitudes of young people towards the government’s 
performance  
The dominant views of the larger part of the sample, comprising 10 of the 15 young 
people interviewed, were negative and critical towards the government. The main 
arguments proposed were related to four main factors: inability to introduce reform, 
fighting corruption, lack of democracy and control of the government departments by 
the ruling parties' offices. Zala, from the Department of Media Studies at the 
University of Sulaymaniyah, during her in-depth interview stated that:  
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I cannot imagine how the government can make reforms because the 
KDP and PUK have held power since the revolution in 1991 and they 
have divided Kurdistan into two zones of influence. Ever since then 
there are many people who support these parties throughout the 
military, intelligence and security services. Alongside this, the two 
parties started appointing many people to the public sector and giving 
pensions to people in order to influence them in the elections (Zala, May 
5 2013). 
These respondents feel frustrated that the two political parties have failed to 
introduce reform because since 1991, many basic issues still have not been addressed, 
for example public services are still poor despite major budget increases since 2005 
(Mahmwd, 2015). The KRG is weak and dominated by the two political parties which 
have entered every sector in society, such as the military, intelligence and security 
services. In this respect, Qani (2015) argues that the political system is becoming 
centralised and the two political parties in power do not allow any change in power. 
This interviewee supports the opinion that there is a lack of legitimate democracy in 
Kurdistan and claims that the two ruling parties have taken power by controlling 
public funds. As a result, ordinary people who are not affiliated to the ruling parties 
cannot find jobs in the public sector, particularly since 2009 because a large number 
of people were appointed to the public sector during the elections in 2009 to buy their 
votes. This affected the future young generation because public sector posts were 
entirely filled and the private sector remains weak because government's revenue is 
predominantly based on oil production (Salih, 2015). He noted that 95% of the budget 
of Iraq is derived from oil and the economic structure of Kurdistan is quite similar to 
that of Baghdad because the budget of Kurdistan is based on 17% of the overall Iraqi 
budget. The distribution of jobs and posts in the public sector has led to a generational 
division of society. For instance, Rabar, from the Media Studies Department in the 
same university stated: 
I am not happy with the government's performance due to the lack of 
job opportunities in the public sector for this generation (2 May 2013). 
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 In a more direct response, Zana from Media Studies in the same university accused 
the older generations of supporting the two ruling parties out of self-interest. The 
views were explicit about the age divide and are visible in the following statement: 
Most people of middle age and above do not have any sense of 
responsibility towards the younger generation and they are just looking 
after their own interests because they support the government, 
although they are quite sure that the government does not treat the 
public equally. Accordingly, the government does not tend to make 
reforms because a large section of society is happy with the current 
situation (2 May 2013). 
The above response infers that there is a kind of mutual co-operation and interest 
sharing between the ruling parties and the older generations which is causing 
problems for the younger ones. A majority of the interviewees were unsure who is 
more responsible for creating the current political situation, whether it is the political 
parties through monopolising power or the people themselves, particularly the older 
generations through their collusion with the status quo. The interviewee above 
suggests that some members of the older generations may be happy with the current 
political situation as they enjoy job security even though they acknowledge there is 
corruption in the public sector.  
Rabar at the same university, said:  
The corruption has also affected people who have a vested interest in 
the political parties.  The people who are affiliated to the political 
parties in power people feel that the distribution of privileges is not 
divided equally among them. The majority of people who are affiliated 
to the ruling parties are not happy and he states his views that they 
prefer reform, whilst at the same time they are afraid of losing their 
current privileges provided to them by the regime. (2 May 2013). 
According to this statement corruption has a negative impact on people who are 
already involved in the political parties whether in the partisan organisations or those 
appointed to the public sector because inside the ruling political parties there is no 
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fair system for distributing jobs and posts among non- partisan members. In turn, this 
affects employees’ performance because, although they might not be qualified 
nonetheless they are appointed on the basis of nepotism.  In this respect, Zaidi and 
Sadiq (2012) argue that Kurdish citizens are not treated equally on the basis of their 
citizenship, but instead politics in the country is dominated by a culture of nepotism 
leading to inequalities. Bellamy (2013) further notes that this type of clientelism 
system creates social inequality and lack of opportunities for all citizens to seek 
employment on the grounds of their merits rather than their connections. Warner 
(1997) indicates that another issue prevalent in this system is the level of over-
employment in the public sector caused by the constant necessity for politicians to 
create new jobs in order to maintain their client base. 
The intervention of the political parties in the public sector in all cities and towns is 
characteristic of the KRG, as Soma, from Media Studies at the same university noted:  
The government is weak if compared with the political parties' offices in 
all the main cities, as the KDP holds most power in its zone of influence 
and the PUK holds most power in its zone, whereas the central 
government is controlled by them both.  What is clear is that the 
government is administered by the personal whims of government 
officials in the political parties instead of being run through regulation 
and the terms of the constitution (10 May 2013). 
According to the opinion expressed by this participant, the government has 
distributed power in the public sector according to the whims of local officials rather 
than by adhering to regulations. In other words, the main issue of the government is 
the system which does not rely on individual accountability and this lack of 
accountability frequently leads to further corruption. Al Zaidi and Sadiq (2012) 
mentioned that the two political parties, since the first elections in 1992, have insisted 
on staying in power to control society through their local partisan organisations. 
From the interview material, it appears that the majority of interviewees suggest a 
need to change the system and their is a lack of trust in the government and 
parliament to do so. This raises the further question as to how the participants 
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believed these changes could best be made, whether through the democratic election 
process or by other means. According to the comments of the interviewees, the 
majority of them were unable to give a clear answer to this question because they did 
not expect the two ruling parties to allow any sharing of political power, in spite of the 
electoral system. Rabar said: 
The main problem with the present system is that there is no long-
standing or established tradition in the exercise of democracy in 
Kurdistan. (2 May 2013).   
This view implies that the system could be developed and become more democratic if 
the government manages to focus on transparency and conducting fair elections. This 
view also implies that the people and the opposition parties do not have any real 
choice in the elections as they are not conducted fairly given the ruling parties’ use of 
public funds to buy votes.  
Alongside this critical point, which claims that the political system is absolutely 
monopolised by the ruling parties and is therefore impossible to change, there was a 
pragmatic point made that argued that Kurdistan is passing through a transitional 
phase similar to any newly established democratic society. Shorsh, from Political 
Science at the University of Sulaymaniyah during his interview commented that: 
The two main parties do not make reforms because they want to stay in power in any 
way possible. So the devolution of power in a peaceful manner in any new democracy 
is difficult. I want the opposition parties to be stronger in order to evaluate the 
government and stand firmly against corruption. Accordingly, the reform of our 
system will need more time (13 May 2013).  
This shows that the respondent believes any change in the political system needs time 
and is not achieved quickly, this perspective differs from the aforementioned 
statement with an interviewee who feels frustration. This respondent  claimed that:  
The people should understand that the solution is to test the other 
political parties in the elections because the two main parties in power 
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are absolutely corrupt, and they will not make any reforms if the people 
do not stop supporting them in the elections (13 May 2013). 
This vision differs from some interviewees because it appears optimistic for the future 
of the political system, however there is no really clear indicator to show any positive 
development of the political system in Kurdistan. Some interviewees argue that the 
living standards and the democratic process have not improved although the economy 
of Kurdistan has advanced due to the growth in oil production. 
During the interviews the majority of young people focused on the government’s 
economic record and the distribution of oil-generated revenues, many referring to the 
fact that the budget of Kurdistan has risen since 2003 due to increased Iraqi oil 
exports, whereas the standard of living has not improved compared to the rise in 
national income. Kwvan, who did not complete his education because he left school 
during the period of economic sanctions which meant his family could not support 
him to study when he was a child in the 1990s, was very critical of the government’s 
economic policy and said: 
The government does not have any stable economic plans. He 
supported this argument by saying that the government exports oil and 
yet there is a petrol crisis inside Kurdistan (25 May 2013).   
The above paragraph reveals that the respondent understands the economic potential 
of the country and he compares the public services which are currently not enjoyed by 
the country with what could be achieved if the political will existed. The negative view 
of the respondent is based on real cases which have not yet been solved and this 
argument seems logical given the country’s oil exports yet despite this, the petrol 
crisis is still ongoing in Kurdistan. This argument conforms to the qualitative textual 
news analysis of the opposition media which describes the government’s poor 
economic policy (see Table 5.7 in Chapter Five).  
6.3.1.2 The positive attitudes of young people towards the government’s 
performance 
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The previous category outlined the negative attitudes expressed by ten of the young 
people towards the government’s performance. This category reviews the attitudes of 
the 5 young people who viewed the government’s performance positively. These 5 
participants introduced several arguments in terms of their positive attitudes towards 
political issues while at the same time the majority of them argued that the opposition 
parties are not a viable alternative to take power. Hanan, from the Education 
Department in Garmian University, said: 
The opposition parties do not have enough experience to take power, 
particularly in the security sector. The government is not perfect like in 
Western countries but it is widely accepted by people in Kurdistan 
because the level of public services in Kurdistan is much better than in 
other parts of Iraq (19 May 2013). 
The above comment is in direct contrast to those who criticise the government and 
accuse it of dereliction of its duty in the administration and provision of services. The 
above interviewee argued that the ruling parties are more suitable to govern by 
arguing that the opposition parties do not have any experience in managing the 
security and armed forces. This perspective is related to two widely held beliefs in 
Iraqi Kurdistan, firstly that the security and the Peshmerga are partisan forces, 
meaning that they owe their allegiance to the ruling parties rather than the Kurdish 
national government. Secondly that the two ruling parties alone through the control of 
the security forces and Peshmerga have protected people against the oppression of 
the Saddam regime. This respondent still believes that the ruling parties have a right 
to control their own militias, while in a developed political system the military and 
security belong to the state and are not partisan. The problem is that a large number 
of people have no political or legal awareness to understand that the political parties 
should not keep their own militias or control the army and security. Hussain (2015) 
states that control of the militias and army by political parties is against the 
democratic process and threatens democracy because the political parties are more 
likely to use their forces against their partners if they fail to win an election. 
In the same way, Barzan, argued that the level of public life and public services has 
improved greatly over the years. He expressed optimism for the future due to 
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enhanced security and the increased government budget as a result of higher oil 
revenues. Qani (2012a) argues that a part of Kurdish society has become consumerist 
and politically passive like in the Arab Gulf states as the country has moved from 
suffering under economic sanctions to the current stage of development. He notes that 
the Kurdish people had many political concerns prior to the fall of Saddam’s regime.  
Another strange point was raised by Heshw,  from the Media Studies Department in 
the same University, who said: 
I will give my vote to one of the political parties in power, although I 
know this party has become corrupt due to the fact that some of my 
family were victimised by this party, but still we are getting pensions 
from the party as well as receiving some privileges (10 May 2013). 
This is an example of how some people support the ruling parties based on the 
distribution of privileges and a state pension to their supporters. People who were 
victimised during the Saddam regime came from the two ruling parties and they were 
subsequently entitled to a state pension. Receiving pensions from the ruling parties, 
obligates them to support the two ruling parties, this is especially the case with 
families who lost some of their members during the Kurdish National Movement and 
who now receive pensions as a result. Each political party created its own pension 
fund to provide state pensions to the families of the martyrs who were killed during 
the armed Kurdish National Movement who fought against the regime in Iraq and 
during the civil war in the nineties.  
 The majority of the families that had been victims of Saddam's regime believed that 
they had to support the ruling political parties in honour of the martyrs and as thanks 
to the political parties that had given them a pension as compensation. Arguably, the 
two ruling parties used the state pension to buy votes while at the same time some of 
the people who were given a state pension did not fully understand the value of their 
vote in the political process because they believed that they should give their vote to 
the ruling parties. The problem of this perspective is that it relies on people’s 
assumption that the state pension comes from the ruling parties' funds not from the 
income of the state because until 2008 the majority of jobs in government 
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departments were provided to people who promised to give their votes to the ruling 
parties. Thus, when applying for jobs in the public sector people were forced to 
register in the two ruling parties’ organisation as a member of one of them. 
6.3.2 The role of demographic characteristics and political background in 
forming the political attitudes of young people toward the government 
performance. 
The previous section in this chapter sought to evaluate the role of demographic and 
political background in determining the division of young people into two categories, 
those who prefer the opposition and independent media coverage of political issues 
and those who prefer the coverage of the media owned by the ruling political parties. 
Similarly this section looks at the role of demographic characteristics and the political 
background or political orientation of the participants in forming their evaluations in 
terms of the government’s performance.   
6.3.2.1 The role of demographic characteristics in forming the political attitudes 
of young people  
The general findings from the previous part show that the participants are divided 
into two main categories and the largest group held negative attitudes towards the 
government's performance. Each group comprised three demographic variables 
meaning that they did not have a great influence in determining the views of these 
participants towards the government and the political issues. From this it can be 
assumed that young people are interested in political communication regardless of 
their demographic characteristics. However, some of the young people from the 
Political Science Department presented more critical arguments and all of them were 
located in the group which negatively evaluated the government’s performance and 
political issues. Shorsh, from the Department of Political Science, questioned the views 
of some young people and the general public in particular relating to their level of 
political awareness. This respondent claimed: 
The two main parties do not make reforms because they want to stay in 
power. So the devolution of power in a peaceful manner in any new 
democracy is difficult. I want the opposition parties to be stronger in 
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order to hold the government to account and stand firmly against 
corruption. Accordingly, the reform of our system will need more time. 
Alongside this, I fear these people will lose their endurance to support 
the opposition parties, but I am sure we will change the system given 
time (13 May 2013). 
The above quote shows that the respondent is concerned that some people prefer a 
quick result from the opposition parties to change the system or introduce reform 
directly, but this may not always be the best way to introduce reform. The level of 
critical thinking shown in the above statement means that the participant has a 
broader level of awareness of international politics and is able to place the Kurdish 
situation in a broader context. In the same way during the interviews the young 
people in higher education were more confident and they tended to provide more 
detail and longer answers compared to those unemployed who tended to give shorter 
responses. I tried to ask the individuals in the latter group more questions and help 
them express the information they wanted to say. In other words, the variable of 
educational background had an influence on the level and intensity of expression but 
not on political affiliation because the respondents expressing positive and negative 
views towards the government belonged to both groups, those in higher education 
and those not. This means that educational background does not determine young 
people’s affiliation to either the ruling or opposition parties, or determine their 
political attitudes divided between the two categories. Conversely young people from 
both the departments of Political Science and Media Studies evaluated the 
government’s performance and the political issues negatively and positively, which 
means that the subject studied by the participants was not a significant variable, while 
the presence of a general university education was a considerable factor.   
In terms of gender, the female participants tended to decline the invitation to take 
part in the interviews compared to males. This is because many females in Kurdistan 
feel uncomfortable when speaking to a male interviewer. However, this factor did not 
appear to influence the political attitudes expressed by the female participants who 
were as comfortable and uninhibited in expressing both positive and negative 
opinions of the government’s performance and the political issues as were the male 
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participants. Apart from gender, the respondents were equally divided according to 
their attitude towards the government’s performance which means that gender was 
not the determining factor for dividing the categories. Talat (2006) suggested that 
young people in general shape their political attitude and their political affiliation 
from their family and argues that the family in Kurdish society tends to be 
authoritarian in terms of educating their members and guiding them politically or 
otherwise. 
This does not mean that demographic factors do not have any influence on young 
people’s attitudes and behaviour. Mustafa (2010) found that education level has an 
impact on young people’s media use in Iraq and he found that young females who are 
university students or graduates tend to use political news more than those who are 
not educated. The present thesis found that females are generally interested in politics 
and presented their comments very actively and differed very little from young males. 
This seems to show a new feature of females in Kurdistan who are interested in 
politics compared to the traditional view which holds that females do not attach 
importance to politics as they do not take responsibility of their lives’ expenses.  
In the same way the place of residence did not have any influence on shaping 
attitudes, although there is a specific geographical area of influence controlled by the 
two main ruling political parties, whereas the opposition parties show that they 
influence opinions in all parts of Kurdistan, according to the results of the election 
campaign. However, it must be borne in mind that the election results refer to all the 
people in general and there is no available specific data referring to young people. 
According to the findings of the focus groups presented in the previous chapter, the 
majority of young people accessed the opposition and independent media rather than 
the media of the ruling parties. Furthermore the focus groups demonstrated that the 
political background of the participants was a main factor in determining attitudes 
compared to other demographic characteristics. In the same way, this section has 
shown that demographic characteristics do not play a determinant role in young 
people's attitudes towards the government’s performance and the political issues.   
6.3.2.2 The role of political background in forming the political attitudes of 
young people  
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The findings of the previous section depended on data from the focus groups proved 
that the political orientation of young people played a major role in terms of how 
young people understand and respond to the political issues across the media. In the 
same way, this section identified that the political affiliation or political orientation of 
young people has an absolutely vital role in shaping their attitudes towards the 
government’s performance. The 5 young people out of 15 who positively evaluated 
the government’s performance and level of political issues were seen to be affiliated to 
the ruling political parties. Moreover the 7 young people out of the remaining 10 who 
criticised the government’s performance in terms of the political issues adhered to the 
opposition parties while the remaining 3 declared themselves to be independent. 
Following this, these participants were categorised into three categories, the first 
were those who supported the opposition parties, the second were those supporting 
the ruling parties and the third were the independents whose views were closer to the 
opposition category. 
The 3 independent participants' comments during the in-depth interviews were quite 
similar to those in the opposition category. Participant number 5, a male student from 
Political Science categorically suggested that the people should test the opposition 
parties in the elections. This respondent claimed that the two ruling parties are not 
capable of making reforms and the other two remaining independent participants 
showed that they did not trust the government (Ekram and Kwvan, May 13 2013). The 
dominant view of these three independent participants was that the system must be 
changed through elections, which is quite similar to those participants in the 
opposition category. For instance, it can be clearly seen in the following comment by 
Sayran, from the opposition category, from the Educational Department at the 
University of Garmian: 
As I said, we need to introduce reforms to our system whereas the 
political parties and the majority of people are not ready to do that. I 
think the elections will change the surface appearance of the 
government rather than the foundations of the system due to the fact 
that we have held elections but the basic political issues have still not 
been addressed (13 May 2013). 
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From the above comment it can be seen that the independent participants are closer 
to the opposition than the ruling parties' participants in terms of their political 
attitudes.  
A large part of the population in Kurdistan have become partisan or has already held a 
prior political affiliation due to the structure of the political system (Talat, 2006), 
because the two ruling political parties control the government departments through 
their offices and officials who administer it. Helal and Mused (2006) argue that the 
partisan societal phenomenon is distributed across the Arab world and dates back to 
the age of colonialism. They noted that this phenomenon is reduced but it is still 
apparent in Lebanon as a result of ethnic and religious conflicts. This phenomenon in 
Kurdistan can be traced back to the clientelism system, established by the two 
political parties to control society (Hussain, 2015).  Until 2008, the two ruling parties 
did not appoint people to the public sectors without referring back to the political 
ruling parties. In other words, both opposition members and the independents did not 
have a right to be an employee in the public sector from the revolution in 1991 until 
2008.  The Clientelism model in Kurdistan means that the governing parties have 
provided jobs to those people who are willing to support them, in the form of a 
reciprocal exchange of profit. As a result both the political system and the wider 
democratic process suffer as unqualified persons are promoted to positions of power 
and influence within the public sector while voters do not necessarily choose those 
candidates who have the most beneficial manifesto to improve conditions in the 
country. Thus Stokes (2013, p.14) notes that such ‘exchanges seem to violate the free 
action or autonomy of voters’. As, In Kurdistan still jobs in the army, security sector 
and higher posts in other public sectors are still not given to independent and 
opposition members.  As a consequence, the two ruling parties have established a 
strong popular base in society through offering jobs and state pensions to people in 
order to gain their support in the election process. For example Zala, a Media Studies 
student at the University of Sulaymaniyah from the independent category stated that: 
The largest part of Kurdish society obtains such privileges from the two 
main parties, for instance there are 1.5 million employees in the public 
sector. Accordingly the largest part of society still supports the 
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government because of their own vested interests. Well, most of them 
are middle aged and above, particularly those who live in rural areas 
and are not educated, as well as some young people who are affiliated to 
the political parties due to their salaries and jobs (10 May 2013). 
This paragraph shows that the respondent is pessimistic about the government’s 
performance and gives an example to evaluate this, claiming that it is not reasonable 
that 1.5 million people have a salary or state pension in a society numbering less than 
5 million. This economic policy seems to have negative implications on the psychology 
of young people because the poor economic policy has negative consequences for the 
long term and the new generation always seem to pay the price of this. The above 
quote shows how young people feel that they do not have any suitable opportunities, 
particularly those who have graduated from university. The problem facing young 
graduates is that they cannot find jobs in the public sector particularly in their specific 
educational background. Jobs in the public sector were widely available until 2006 
and then it became difficult to obtain one, while at the same time more jobs in the 
army and security sectors were available until 2012. From 2006 to 2012 many young 
people who were not educated became employees in both the army and security 
sectors as these sectors did not require any educational qualifications. The ruling 
parties offered these jobs as bribes for votes and it is easier to control the political 
attitudes of people who are bribed. The new generation who are educated and those 
currently studying are disappointed when they cannot find jobs, which has caused the 
majority to support the opposition parties in order to fight corruption and introduce 
reforms.     
The critical points mentioned against the government’s performance from the 
interviewees in the opposition category and who support the opposition parties is 
quite similar to those of the interviewees in the independent category. The dominant 
concerns focused on by these two categories refer to the lack of social justice created 
by corruption. Consequently, the majority of opposition and independent participants 
believed that the two ruling parties do not seek to introduce reforms because they 
attempt to keep their popularity by using public funds and distributing them among 
those who are affiliated to them through providing posts, state pensions and 
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privileges. Soma, from Media Studies in the University of Sulaymaniyah and from the 
opposition category argued that: 
The opposition parties still do not have any real choice in the election 
campaign because of the lack of transparency and free and fair elections 
(10 May 2013).  
The above statement shows that the respondent does not believe in the political 
process or democratic exercise delivered by the political parties because they have 
seen how the two governing political parties have failed several times in local 
government elections and have not allowed any change in power. For example, Gorran 
won in the election of 2013 in Sulaymaniyah province but the PUK did not agree to 
give a post to the Gorran candidate. 
In the same way, the participants of both the opposition and independent categories 
believe that although the two ruling parties have not succeeded in providing effective 
administration, nevertheless people continue to support them out of self-interest. For 
instance, Rabar, from the Media Studies Department at the University of 
Sulaymaniyah, claimed:  
Some of the young people who vote for the two ruling parties know 
these parties are corrupt, but they are afraid to lose certain advantages 
and privileges if the opposition parties win the elections (13 May 2013). 
From the discussion above we can infer that the different attitudes towards the 
government’s performance can be divided into two categories. The majority of the 
respondents expressed a negative attitude towards the government’s performance 
and these consisted of the opposition and independent categories because they view 
the government as corrupt. Most participants in both the opposition and independent 
categories thought that real change in the political system is a solution which will 
mean a shift of power from the two ruling parties to the opposition parties. At the 
same time this same group of young people claimed that their peers who positively 
evaluated the government’s performance belonged to the ruling parties' category and 
they were affiliated to both political parties. This category was generally viewed as 
acting out of self- interest due to favours received from the two ruling parties.  
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6.4 The views of young people on their political participation in elections 
This section investigates the perception of young people of the role of political 
elections in a democracy and how this might affect potential government performance 
after the election. The data examined in this section were collected by conducting 
semi-structured interviews with 7 young people during the last election campaign in 
September 2013. Most participants in this section were young males because the 
majority of young people who participated in public electoral campaigns were male. 
The campaigns were largely conducted at night in public squares, and as a 
consequence few females participated and those who did just passed through with 
their own cars or came out with their families. Consequently, it was difficult to 
conduct any semi-structured interviews with females. However, it was not anticipated 
that this factor would affect the overall results. The previous two sections in this 
chapter showed that gender did not influence young people’s political attitudes 
compared to political background in particular relating to the categories of the 
respondents, whether they support the ruling parties or the opposition parties.  
The respondents highlighted different aspects of the role of elections in Kurdistan and 
they raised several points as arguments to show their views and expectations. The 
dominant views focused on their disillusionment and lack of trust in elections caused 
by several factors which were reiterated by several of them. In this regard, Azad from 
Sulaymaniyah City argued that elections do not lead to big changes, and as a 
consequence he claimed that he is not optimistic, as can be seen more clearly in the 
following comment: 
I think it is a shame for the ruling political parties who say they will 
carry out reforms, because what about 22 years ago when they had 
absolute power in Kurdistan, why did they not do it then? I am not like 
some people who may forget that political parties have frequently 
promised things and have not carried them out. However, I am not 
optimistic that I have a right to choose because there is no real choice 
on the ground due to everything being controlled by the KDP. I predict 
the KDP will win because it will use public funds to buy votes, therefore, 
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the opposition parties will not be able to take power in this election (6 
September 2013). 
The above comment is an example of young people’s lack of trust in the ruling parties 
and shows that they do not believe that elections offer an effective opportunity for the 
public and opposition parties to determine a democratic change of government in 
Kurdistan. The above comment also implies that the elections are not conducted with 
integrity. In other words, the main issue relates to the level of democracy exercised on 
the political ground in Kurdistan.  The comment also infers that the two ruling parties 
are responsible for creating the current political system and its inherent problems, as 
they have held power since the revolution in 1991 until today. Furthermore the two 
ruling parties have not always governed effectively, while at the same time they have 
monopolised power without changing the system. 
In another semi-structured interview with Bestwn, this participant made the 
following comments about why he feels the two ruling parties do not allow any 
change in power and how they go about conducting the elections:  
The two political parties in power do not want to lose control and they 
call elections to successful exercise from the international community 
and to say to people that they are practising democracy. (2 September 
2013).  
In the same way, Dashet from Sulaymaniyah City said: 
The elections should be an opportunity for both political parties and for 
the people to make decisions about the political process in order to 
improve society (5 September 2013).  
The two statements above reveal that the respondents would prefer the political 
system to be changed because they do not feel the elections provide a chance of 
changing the government. The issue of the election is that the two political parties 
always form a coalition government so they do not have to leave power because the 
system is based on the client system and each of the two political parties fear 
becoming the opposition. The two governing parties are part of the clientelism 
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system. This means Kurdish people look to a majority government system which 
characterises Western democratic societies. Krmanj (2015) believes that people do 
not trust either political party to abandon power because each one has its own 
security and armed forces within its own sphere of influence. Consequently, people 
believe that each ruling political party would be more likely to use military power if 
faced with exclusion from political power through the elections. In other words, if one 
of the two ruling parties failed in the election it would not accept this and would try to 
use its armed forces to protect its power.  
Asos (2015) notes that the majority of people think that the opposition parties are not 
able to win elections and as a result they feel disillusionment and lack of trust in the 
election process. One of the questions addressed is how to reach an understanding of 
young people’s behaviour in elections particularly those who claimed they were not 
optimistic.  One respondent, Azad said: 
We need to send a message to tell the government that large numbers of 
people do not want the current political parties to stay in power. As well 
as this, voting for the opposition parties can be helpful for people, 
especially in parliament because the opposition members of parliament 
were the only ones defending projects and regulations that were useful 
for ordinary people (6 September 2013). 
Bestwn also went on to say: 
I will cast my vote just to tell the current government we want to 
change. We hope to change the system in any way we can and we 
cannot do that because the majority of people still support the ruling 
parties out of their own self-interest. Moreover, as I said the ruling 
parties still control everything (2 September 2013). 
The two examples above show that young people do not believe that election 
campaigns are helpful in the fight to change the power structure in Kurdistan. They 
gave two reasons for this. Firstly, the government monopolises power through using 
public funds to buy votes and secondly a large part of society supports the ruling 
parties out of their own self-interest. These particular respondents believe that 
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political development can be brought about by raising the number of opposition 
parties in parliament as these enhance the role of the legislative and regulatory 
bodies. Otherwise, the majority of respondents had no understanding of the role of 
parliament in the political system as the opposition parties were weak until the last 
parliamentary session (2009-2013). This in turn leads to some people not trusting 
parliament and the other reason is more likely related to people's political ignorance 
and the lack of media freedom. One respondent in the sample explained another 
advantage of giving his vote to the opposition parties. His name was Lawand, a young 
person from Erbil, who said: 
Although it is clear that no single opposition party could win outright, it 
was better to participate in the creation of an opposition coalition 
government as part of the national decision making process. The 
growth of the opposition after this election will reflect positively on 
political development and the reform process in the long term (semi-
structured interview, 4 September 2013).  
The above statement reveals that this respondent takes a long-term view of the role of 
election campaigns, which is very different from the previous respondent who 
expressed disillusion and frustration. Haji (2015) argues that Gorran participated in 
the coalition government in 2013 in order to keep its popularity because it thought 
that its members and supporters might feel disillusion and frustration.  
During the semi-structured interviews there was only one young person out of seven 
whose name was Farman who said:  
Well, the two political parties have provided public services to us since 
the Kurdish National Movement began. So, how can we not support 
them at a time when the opposition parties are not offering a good 
alternative? We also have to take into consideration the corrupt 
practices of the ruling parties and they will not accept losing power as 
they have some companies that have signed a lot of economic contracts 
for the long term, so if they fail in the election everything will be 
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revealed. Therefore, the two parties will do anything to protect their 
interests, even start a fire (4 September 2013).  
This respondent supports the ruling parties because they struggled against Saddam’s 
regime rather than because of the current performance of the government, as the 
ruling parties are promoting this particular historical discourse to achieve legitimacy, 
particularly the armed national movement against the Saddam regime (Ali, 2009). 
This is one of the obstacles facing the new political parties which were established 
after 1991, and a section of the population, particularly the older generation, believe 
that the two political parties should be respected because of their history. Conversely, 
the majority of young people do not hold this view and the new political parties, such 
as Gorran and the Kurdistan Islamic Union, essentially focus on young people to 
involve them and win them as supporters. This does not mean that all young people 
support the new political parties because their families still play a key role in 
determining the political attitude of their family members. The political affiliation of 
young people still plays a powerful role, for example the above comment shows that 
the respondent believes the ruling parties are corrupt but still insists on supporting 
them. 
The general perspective of respondents focuses on the lack of confidence in the 
integrity of the elections and the lack of opportunity for real competition between the 
ruling parties and the opposition parties due to the use of public money to buy votes 
by the opposition parties. This in turn leads to the majority of respondents not feeling 
optimistic about the elections, although some respondents believe that even if the 
opposition parties do not win in the elections they can have political influence if they 
win more seats in parliament. This argument was not believed by the majority of the 
respondents due to two factors; firstly it relates to their political ignorance because 
they do not believe that a strong opposition in parliament can have an effective 
influence on the government’s performance. Secondly they do not predict that the two 
ruling parties will ever introduce real reform because they believe that both parties 
have relied on corruption to stay in power. 
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6.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have discussed the third research question which examines the views 
of young people towards the media in the coverage of political issues, government 
performance and political process as well as the role of democratic characteristics and 
political background in shaping their attitudes.  
The outcome of the research found that the majority of participants claimed that KNN 
TV enables people to understand the concept of corruption and judge the level of the 
government’s performance. They also argued that the ruling parties are trying to draw 
the attention of people to external issues by creating crises with Baghdad in order to 
get them to ignore the issue of reform in the provision of public services in the KRG. 
By contrast, the other category which was in the minority argued that both the 
opposition and independent media do not work objectively as they do not cover any 
new projects or reforms in the public sector carried out by the government and they 
unduly criticise the government to favour opposition parties.  
Political background is divided between support for the ruling parties and the 
opposition. In this respect, Warty (2008) argues that the political parties have 
produced a Kurdish media and society based on partisan lines and resulting in a 
clientelism system, which seeks to control vital aspects such as media, the economy 
and jobs, security and the army. The clientelism system of Kurdistan divides young 
people into different categories based on the political parties and this has implications 
for their media use and trust of the media discourse because there is no national 
broadcaster (Warty, 2008). The lack of national media can affect the national identity 
of young people because the partisan identity dominates many young people, for 
instance some respondents believe the political party is corrupt but they still prefer it. 
This needs potential further research to examine the dimension of this attitude 
amongst young people regarding their values and role in the political process. 
The family plays a large role in the political socialisation of young people (Talat, 
2006),  particularly those who are affiliated to the political parties in power and this 
affiliation is mainly based on interests, such as securing a job, higher level post, or 
pension. However, it is not necessarily the case that all young people follow their 
family's ideology as a large number of the sample criticised the ruling political parties 
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while many of them held the opposite political orientation to their families. This 
particular group of young people relies on the opposition media for its political 
information, and at the same time it support the opposition parties to change power 
and introduce reform. They mainly looks for good governance rather than following 
the political party's ideology which means they would change their affiliation if any 
potential political party sought to fight corruption instead of continuing to support the 
existing opposition parties. The opposition and independent media play a large role in 
shaping the political views of young people as both opposition parties and young 
people are demanding reform. Hussain (2015) mentioned that the political discourse 
of young people in Kurdistan is largely formed by the opposition media and strategies.  
The prevailing perception of Kurdish society regarding females' attitudes to political 
issues and communication is that a large number of them are not interested in politics 
as they have no responsibility for covering living expenses. Conversely the findings of 
this thesis detected that young females are interested in political communication as 
the female participants in the mixed focus and separate focus groups clearly 
expressed in their arguments; this new generation of young females is interested in 
political issues and care about reform and democratisation.  
The living conditions of young people in general, regardless of gender, have become 
very difficult, and they remain cautious about their future career and life. A large 
majority of participants do not believe that elections can bring about any change in 
power for three main reasons; firstly the ruling political parties would not leave 
power even if they lost the elections, secondly the elections are not entirely fair and 
finally the political parties in power have already bought a large part of the adult votes 
in Kurdish society. 
 
 
 
 
 
196 
Chapter Seven  
Conclusion Chapter 
7.1 Introduction 
In my conclusion I am going to draw together all the findings which consist of four 
sections. The first section will review the main findings and arguments of the research 
project, while the second section will examine the reflections of the thesis on the 
theoretical implications, namely framing analysis, active audience theory (particularly 
the coding/decoding model and uses and gratifications model) and theories of 
clientelism. Similarly, the third section will discuss the reflections of the thesis on the 
practical implications of the findings. The final section will show the suggestions and 
recommendations deriving from the research project for further research.  
7.2 Review of the Main Findings 
This section reviews the main findings and arguments of the thesis according to the 
three research questions that are answered in the empirical chapters as presented 
here into three parts. The first part examines the news content analysis as well as the 
freedom to obtain information about political issues in the public sector and the 
editorial policies of the news providers according to the views of the media 
professionals interviewed as part of the study. The second part presents the 
participants’ understanding and response to the coverage of the political issues across 
the media as expressed through the focus groups. As the two parts are presented and 
argued in chapter five. The final part looks at the attitudes of young people towards 
the government’s performance and the role of elections in democratic politics in 
Kurdistan which is presented and discussed in chapter six.  
7.2.1 Media Coverage and the Editorial Policy 
The findings chapter demonstrated that the ruling party media, whether television 
channels or websites, did not focus on corruption issues and they did not use any 
negative values in their coverage of corruption. Furthermore, GK TV used positive 
values in their coverage of corruption. Which means that corruption is normal and 
does not affect the level of administration quality or the government. For this reason, 
the ruling party media tended to focus on the government’s performance and present 
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this positively. The ruling parties sought to cover other issues in order to avoid the 
topic of corruption and related issues that reflect the government negatively, for 
example GK TV and the Xendan website dedicated more of their news coverage to the 
external issues of Kurdistan. Qani (2012c) argues that both ruling political parties 
have created a crisis, such as worsening internal public services and the relationship 
between Erbil and Baghdad, in order to make people forget internal issues, 
particularly public service utility. Similarly the two research studies conducted in 
Egypt by Khalifa (2008) and in Syria by Ayish (2002) found that the state media 
mostly covered external issues to avoid covering corruption in the government. The 
qualitative framing analysis supports this argument, as it identified that the media of 
the ruling party rely on simplifying and localising corruption issues through their 
news coverage. The simplifying and localising frames were the main tools used to 
construct a news story in order to analyse the political issues. The framing analysis 
found that the moral evaluation component was dominant in showing the 
government’s performance positively and the magnified frame was the main tool used 
to construct this issue. The chapter demonstrated that the ruling party media has 
adopted a publicity position role for the government particularly for the party that 
owns it. Since there is no public service broadcaster and the government departments’ 
official websites are too weak, the government only faces criticism from the 
opposition and independent media. 
In terms of the news coverage across the opposition media, whether KNN TV or the 
Sbeiy website, internal political issues were the themes covered most by them. The 
findings show that the opposition TV and website predominantly used negative values 
in their coverage of political issues, particularly corruption and government 
performance issues were those most covered by the opposition media. By contrast, 
the ruling parties' television and online print media focused on positive values in their 
coverage. Both GK TV and Xendan used negative values in their coverage much less 
than the opposition and independent media. However, some of these proportions 
refer specifically to the Yellow Zone which is administered in reality by the other 
ruling party which is the KDP. The qualitative framing analysis identified that the 
opposition media focused on both the causal interpretation and the moral evaluation 
components in the framing of the political issues. 
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The findings showed the opposition media largely depended on interviews with 
opposition observers and independent political observers to evaluate the issues, 
which means that the moral evaluation component of the news coverage is taken from 
these interviews. In this regard, the Chief News Editor of KNN TV recognised that they 
conduct interviews to support the news coverage and discuss the issues as well as to 
show that they are working professionally. In terms of the interviews he 
demonstrated that the opposition media try to obtain the views of the government 
officials on the events and issues covered, but the majority of them refuse to co-
operate. The Chief News Editor of KNN TV and the Awena website argued that 
government officials avoid discussing political issues, in particular relating to 
corruption, with the opposition and independent media because they are weary of 
being punished by their government. This refers to the lack of freedom and 
transparency, as Iraq including the KRG comes in at the lower levels of transparency 
(Transparency International, 2014). In this respect Sleman (2013) argues that 
Kurdistan needs regulation to oblige every department of government to introduce a 
media office or public relations unit. This provides freedom for the journlist to be able 
to conduct their investigations. 
The qualitative framing findings discovered that the opposition television focuses on 
the magnified frame as a tool to construct the four frame components, particularly in 
the framing of causal interpretation and moral evaluation to highlight corruption and 
show the government’s performance negatively through using a simplifying frame. 
Entman (2004) noted that successful framing relies on magnitude, where the 
magnification of certain issues allows them to become prominent while shrinking 
other issues can be achieved by simplifying or localising them. Alongside this, KNN TV 
utilised several frames to construct the political issues, through showing how the data 
determines the negative implications of corruption. In the same way, the above frame 
was used to show the positive implications of the news relating to new projects 
completed by the government as reform news. Another frame which was dominant on 
KNN TV was the reframing of the news relating to political issues. This means that the 
same news is repeated over and over again by using different news stories. The 
reframing of the specific event or issues is part of the magnification process of the 
news coverage. Reframing was the main feature of KNN TV while the phrase 
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“protection of electoral gains” dominated the news coverage on GK TV. The protecting 
of gains means that the Kurdish people and the political parties should forego reform 
based on the argument that Kurdistan is surrounded by enemies. This argument is 
used as an explanation in order to discourage people from asking the government for 
reform. 
With regard to the independent website, the quantitative findings showed that it is 
more similar to the opposition website than the ruling parties' website, particularly in 
terms of using negative and positive values. Alongside this, Awena is characterised by 
certain features, particularly its use of neutral values in its news coverage, as it 
focused on this value more than the website of the opposition and ruling parties. In 
the same way, framing analysis demonstrated that problem definition components 
dominated in the news coverage across the Awena website. Problem definition is a 
central feature of the issues and it allows identification of causal interpretation and 
subsequently helps to present the treatment recommendation. The findings showed 
that the news titles of Awena were different compared to Sbeiy and Xendan as they 
were longer and composed of a varied set of opinions expressed in different 
interviews. Another relevant finding is that the Awena website attempted to strike a 
balance in terms of broadcast interviews, showing different aspects to support the 
news stories and discuss the issues in comparison to the media of the opposition and 
of the ruling parties (see section 5.3.3.2 on page:127- 129). Whereas the opposition 
and ruling media depended on interviews with persons who have a positive attitude 
towards them, particularly the ruling media which rarely depends on conducting 
interviews with opposition representatives.   
The phenomena of leaking news and providing information in secret to the opposition 
and independent media were examined through discussion with the chief news 
editors of the media platforms involved in the research project and these reveal 
various factors. The main factor is the lack of transparency in the government which 
would enable the media to report on corruption, particularly for journalists from the 
opposition and independent media. Consequently, most of the government 
departments do not conduct press conferences and their media offices are ineffectual. 
As the chief editors of the Awena website, Sbeiy website and KNN TV demonstrated, 
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many government departments do not have a media office and their administration 
does not provide them with any information, such as from the Ministry of Oil and 
Natural Resources, Intelligence and Security. In this respect, the news content analysis 
identified that the opposition media is characterised by the number of scoops it has 
compared to the independent website as the opposition parties have more members 
in the public sector who provide them with information surreptitiously. Whereas the 
independent media does not have enough sources to provide them with information 
in particular related to corruption compared to the opposition media. As a result the 
independent media outlets are less effective; however the findings showed that they 
function more objectively particularly in terms of giving a balanced view of various 
issues in their news coverage and their use of neutral values. The findings showed 
that the independent website covered some news without much detail, although it 
focused on obtaining views from different aspects due to its lack of funds to appoint 
news editors and journalists. The Chief Editor of Awena pointed out that the team 
working on his website are volunteers as most of them rely on other jobs to support 
their income. He also argued that the problem of the independent media in Kurdistan 
is the lack of funds and they feel they cannot accept advertising from larger companies 
because these belong to the ruling parties and therefore they could be accused of 
collusion and participating in corruption. 
7.2.2 The Perception of Young People in terms of the Coverage of the four 
Political Issues 
The findings demonstrated that young people believed that the opposition and 
independent media, particularly KNN TV mainly focus on corruption and the 
shortcomings of the government. The participants in the focus groups stressed that 
KNN TV helped people to understand their political rights and functions related to 
their votes and support for the specific political parties to take power. The majority of 
the young people who participated in the focus groups to evaluate KNN TV and some 
of the young people during the focus groups described KNN TV in similar terms for 
several reasons. Firstly they recognised its daily coverage of corruption issues and the 
shortcomings of the public services in the cities and towns of Kurdistan. Secondly they 
praised KNN TV for using data to explain the wrong economic policy and distribution 
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budget of the central government. Thirdly, they believed that KNN TV has taken 
measures to activate the government and lessen levels of corruption.  
By contrast, a minority of young people expressed a negative view towards KNN TV 
and they claimed that it attempts to underrate the government’s performance. This 
group of young people also argued that these media have a specific aim and agenda 
which is to help the opposition parties to become more popular and eventually to take 
power. In other words they argued that the opposition media are not established to 
inform people about corruption, but rather they believe that the opposition media 
constitute a tool for promoting the political parties that own them. The findings 
showed that this group rejects the independent website as it focuses solely on the 
negative aspects of the government. The division of young people into one group that 
is influenced by the opposition and independent media and a second group that 
adheres to the ruling media is related to their consequent attitude towards the 
political parties. In other words, the political orientation or affiliation of young people 
is largely due to the role of media impact. The findings demonstrated that political 
knowledge or interest did not have an impact on the evaluation of young people 
because the respondents from the Faculties of Political Science and Media Study were 
in the groups who evaluated the ruling media, opposition and the independent media 
either positively and negatively in similar proportion to respondents who were not in 
higher education or lacked further education of any kind. In the same way 
demographic characteristics did not influence young people’s attitudes to the media, 
whether owned by the opposition, ruling parties or independent. However, the set of 
respondents comprising young people from the towns and villages tended to have 
stronger opinions about both the ruling media and the opposition media. One 
important point that emerged is that young people believe the opposition and 
independent media are quite similar as they expected them both to focus on 
corruption and the negative aspects of the government. In the same way, the news 
content analysis showed that the independent website was more similar to the 
opposition media in terms of its coverage of the political issues, this means that young 
people are able to understand the media interests and media policy, which was 
further demonstrated in the focus groups.  
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7.2.3 The Attitude of Young People towards the government’s performance and 
the role of elections in democratic politics in Kurdistan. 
The findings demonstrated that young people were divided into two groups: the first 
group consisted of the majority of the participants expressing negative attitudes 
towards the ruling parties and the government in relation to the various political 
issues and several arguments were mentioned by this group of young people. 
Correlations were identified between the main arguments and points proposed by the 
respondents and the findings of the news content analysis of both opposition and 
independent online print media. 
Their main views can be summarised as follows: 
-  Using public funds and government posts to buy votes. 
- Corruption and lack of transparency. 
- The lack of accountability due to the two ruling parties’ desire to keep their 
respective areas of influence. 
- The poor economic policy of the government to develop infrastructure. 
- Monopolisation of the army and security. 
- Creating internal and external crises in order to prevent people from asking for 
reforms. 
The above points show the parallels between the content analysis and the young 
people’s understanding and response to these issues. This in turn arguably reveals the 
extent to which the opposition and independent website, particularly KNN TV, play a 
major role in shaping the attitudes of young people in terms of political issues, 
specifically corruption and the negative aspects and shortcomings of the government, 
compared to the media of the two ruling political parties. Qani (2013) noted that the 
political discourse of young people and those who hold negative views of the ruling 
parties are influenced by the opposition media, particularly the media controlled by 
the Gorran Movement Party. The current research findings support this argument, 
while the political orientation or affiliation of young people also assumes a major role 
203 
as is evidenced in the findings identified from the in-depth interviews and focus 
groups. In the same way, one group of young people who were actually affiliated to 
the ruling parties mentioned that they were a minority in supporting the policies of 
the ruling parties and government. They argued that Kurdistan should not be 
compared to Western countries, as proposed by the opposition parties and those who 
support them. In terms of the opposition parties, this group claimed that they did not 
yet represent a suitable alternative to assume power as they did not have any 
experience in government administration.  
In terms of the role of the political participation of young people in the political 
system and democratisation the findings showed that the dominant view among the 
majority of participants was disillusionment with the electoral process. They claimed 
there is no real choice for people and the opposition parties because the ruling parties 
have used public funds to buy votes. Consequently, the majority of participants did not 
believe that elections are an effective way of changing power because they argued that 
the two ruling parties represent hegemony of political power. Some of the participants 
argued that they only support the opposition parties in order to increase their 
numbers in parliament so that they might report on corruption. These respondents 
believed that the opposition will grow in the future which means supporting the 
opposition parties now will affect the political process and democratisation indirectly 
and in the long term. This shows that young people in Kurdistan have different views 
on the role of the opposition and the potential future development of the political 
system in their country, depending on the level of their political knowledge and 
understanding. Whilst the majority do not believe that change should occur in 
evolutionary stages, some young people recognise that deep-seated change can take a 
long time and cannot be brought about effectively by a sudden revolution. Another 
viewpoint identified from this research is that the participants claimed they did not 
trust parliament to hold the government to account as they believed it is controlled by 
the two ruling majority parties.  
7.3 Reflections on Theoretical Implications 
The use of framing analysis in this research presents outcomes that can be 
demonstrated as playing a decisive and fundamental role in the contribution of the 
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emergent frames, which were used as a tool in constructing the framing components. 
These consist of four main elements that interact with each other, namely: partisan 
media, ownership, the media worker culture and transparency or freedom of 
information. 
The partisan media element refers to the fact that the media plays a main role in 
framing the political issues in Kurdistan as both television channels in this research 
are totally controlled by their respective political parties. In other words, both 
channels were established for propaganda functions rather than for profit or public 
service, as the media became a rule or essential condition for each political party to 
claim legitimacy or maintain a presence in the public sphere (Warty, 2008). Mchakulu 
(2010) found the same issues and phenomenon in Malawi, where media ownership 
had a significant influence in determining the framing process. The other problem of 
the partisan media model is that it makes media workers biased because they adapt 
their journalistic practices to match the political needs of the ruling government 
rather than basing these on the ethics and principles of objective journalism. Hamdan 
(2009) states that an authoritarian regime seeks to have its own media in order to 
control it to stay in power, whereas in Western countries politicians seek to have a 
strong relationship with journalists to cover their activity positively (Shea et al, 2006; 
Theake, 2004). Entman (2010) notes that bias assumes three types or forms. Firstly 
there is distortion which falsifies facts in order to control public opinion and attitudes. 
Secondly bias is visible in the content that allows one side or opinion to be dominant 
in political news coverage. The third remaining form is decision-making bias, also 
identified in this research, which detected that the same specific issues are addressed 
differently across the opposition media and the ruling media.  
The second element is media ownership which is related to the fact that political 
parties exert greater influence on media policy. Most media workers in Kurdistan are 
obliged to have the same political attitude as the party of ownership, particularly in 
the ruling media, where most of them should be members of the ruling parties. 
Ownership has another implication in particular relating to the independent media 
because most of the large companies are monopolised by the ruling parties. This in 
turn leads to the independent media facing a funding problem, which leaves them 
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with a shortage of staff to cover the political issues with higher levels of quality and 
professionalism. 
The findings of this research project demonstrated that the website functions more 
objectively compared to the other media outlets. This means that the media worker 
culture element is related to the political values adopted by the organisation, while 
those working in some independent media outlets are not motivated by any financial 
benefit as they work as volunteers.  
The fourth and final element is related to the transparency or freedom of information 
issue, which is reflected in the framing of the news across the opposition and 
independent media. The media in Kurdistan seek to obtain information through those 
employees who work in the public sector and as a result they are forced to conceal the 
names of the providers of the news or information. This in turn affects the validity of 
the news content as some of the respondents thought that some information might 
not represent the truth. However, the findings showed that the Kurdish media is not 
restricted in relation to its freedom to broadcast and publish information. Some 
research which applied the framing analysis demonstrated that the laws and 
regulatory actions of governments can exert a major role in this respect. For instance, 
Eko (2004) notes that the framing analysis as used in the West may not be applicable 
in Sub-Saharan African countries due to the lack of freedom in those countries, and 
Mchakulu detected the same issue in Malawi (Mchakulu, 2011). 
In terms of active audience theory, the political affiliation or the prior political 
orientation of young people plays a major role in shaping their understanding of 
political news and determining their response in particular relating to political issues. 
Previous researchers have supported the active audience theory and focused on the 
demographic characteristics that cause the audience not to be influenced by the media 
to the same extent. For instance, Fiske (1987) showed that television audiences are 
not a homogeneous mass, and argued that they are composed of a wide range of 
different groups. In the same way, Clarke (2000) notes that specific audience 
members differ in their production of meaning in accordance with the different social 
setting in which media messages are received. Alongside this, other researchers have 
focused on the role of demographic characteristics in influencing political orientation 
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in political communication (Tian, 2011). The present study has identified that 
demographic characteristics did not play a significant role in influencing political 
orientation in young people. For instance, the findings demonstrated that young 
females are interested in political communication, which is contrary to the cultural 
norms dominant in Kurdish society that expect women to follow men in terms of their 
political interests and attitudes. Furthermore, the findings of this study differ from the 
research conducted by Al-Hadidi et al (2006) who found that females in the Arab 
world countries prefer to watch TV dramas, movies and music while young males 
prefer to view news programmes. It also differs from Al-Baida (2008) in her research 
in Lebanon which detected that females tend to prefer entertaining programmes such 
as movies, music and competitions. This implies that young females in Kurdistan are 
unique compared to those in other Arab world countries which is similar to Kurdish 
culture. One  reason for this may be that corruption has made the new female 
generation in Kurdistan consider politics more seriously because most of them are 
educated and want to work out of the home and take responsibility like their young 
male counterparts. Al-Hadidi et al (2006) argues that due to the lack of political and 
economic stability in Arab countries, young males there are mostly responsible for 
meeting the life expenses which makes them be involved more in politics. Educational 
level in this thesis, which was supposed to be a main factor in terms of affecting the 
understanding of the political news and responses of young people, proved not to be 
as significant as first predicted. Nevertheless, education seems to influence females in 
that they attach importance to political news as already above. In relation to theories 
of clientelism, the study found that young people believed that political issues, 
particularly corruption and the lack of government performance are rooted in several 
traditions, nepotism alongside handing out of positions, jobs and public funds to buy 
votes in order to buy votes to stay in power (Bardhan and Mookherjee,2011; Roniger 
2004). Alongside, clientelism, which is deep-rooted in Kurdish society, is supported by 
an economic system which is based on rentier state often intrinsic to oil-rich 
countries. (Hussain, 2015; Qani and Fatah 2012; Qani (2015)  
Chaudhry (2011) argues that the rentier economy system tends to lead to the client 
system. Future research may need to look more in-depth at the KRG's specific political 
economy and potential implications for democratic practices.  
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7.4 Reflections on the Practical Implications of the Findings 
According to the findings of the research both the ruling party’s media and opposition 
media, particularly the television channels, focus on using magnifying frames and 
localising frames in their coverage of the political issues and there is a strong 
distinction between them. Each one interprets political reality differently, which in 
turn leads to the viewers and readers becoming divided into two categories. This has 
been identified by some young people who claimed they need to use a range of media 
in order to understand what is going in the political field due to the lack of a public 
service broadcaster. Alongside this, the independent media has difficulty in obtaining 
funding because the biggest companies are monopolised by the two ruling parties. 
Consequently, the partisan media cannot be objective in terms of all the issues 
precisely because of its nature. Conversely, the opposition media are widely accepted 
by the majority of young people in terms of their coverage of corruption due to their 
daring to cover this issue, particularly since the emergence of the Gorran movement 
and its media channel.  
The other main finding of the research is that political issues are magnified on TV 
more than in the print media online. However, during the last Iraqi parliamentary 
election in April 2014 some print media online such as Millat Press and Post Kurdistan 
emerged from the two ruling parties although they claimed to be independent. The 
aim of these was to criticise the political parties who both sought to gain their support 
because the views of the journalists working in these types of media were not always 
clear.  Consequently, the future development of online print media seemed to become 
uncontrolled and outside the sphere of government influence. The problematic 
situation of these two websites is that their sponsors and funds are not stable and 
they use defamation messages against some political parties in favour of the other 
side. Moreover, it would require extensive effort to coordinate work between civil 
society organisations, pressure groups, syndicates of journalists and lawyers as well 
as the government to prevent this kind of journalism that is contrary to the 
professional ethics of the media and accepted democratic values. 
In addition there are still issues surrounding the lack of freedom to obtain information 
in the public sector and present the news or report it without reference to its source, 
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all of which need to be considered by news-makers. For instance the Awena and Sbeiy 
websites addressed some news issues without identifying the name of the persons 
interviewed while arguing that they wanted to protect their identities particularly in 
relation to sensitive issues. This problem aggravates the lack of transparency on the 
part of the government to allow freedom to publish. Therefore, media pluralism 
cannot be solved in Kurdistan without taking sufficient measures to promote 
democracy and political tolerance. Alongside this, the syndicates of journalists and 
other civil society organisations should take into consideration professional ethics for 
journalists through regulation and training. Another point is the importance of solving 
the transparency issue through developing the media offices of the public sector and 
expanding their powers in order to enable them to give press conferences on a regular 
basis and in an orderly way.  
This research suggests some points as a solution and challenges to the media in 
Kurdistan through two legal regulations. The first would be the establishing of a 
public service media in order to strike a balance between the opposition and ruling 
parties and to offer coverage of the political issues without the influence of political 
parties on their output.  
The second regulation would be difficult to achieve quickly because it is related to the 
level of corruption in the government and ruling parties that have monopolised the 
biggest companies in order to provide funds to the independent media for advertising. 
Al Zaidi and Sadiq (2012) argue that the independent media have played a major role 
in improving the political process through developing the opposition parties and 
expanding people's critical thinking about democratisation in Kurdistan. In addition, 
group pressure has become embedded in the independent media, while the majority 
of liberal members of the political parties publish their views in the independent 
media. Consequently, the actions taken to support the opposition media in Kurdistan 
will eventually have a positive effect on the political process and democratisation 
because independent and opposition media tend to criticise government's policies  
and investigate corruption.  The main independent media such as Awena and Hawlati 
have strived for objectivity, despite the lack of funds and the lack of transparency in 
the government. 
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7.5 Suggestions for Future Research 
The research project focussed on attempting to identify the frames and values of 
media coverage in particular relating to political issues while examining young 
people’s understanding and response to it. The examination of this process led to 
further understanding of political communication among young people, as this 
demographic category is important in Kurdish society as in many other developing 
countries. In recent years young people have played a major role in changing society, 
whether during the struggle of the Kurdish National Movement against the Iraqi 
regimes in the past or their participation in demonstrations during the Arab spring 
against the Kurdistan Regional Government. They have fought for several causes, such 
as combatting corruption, supporting reforms and asking the government to open up 
the democratic process. This research has examined the role of the media in shaping 
the political attitudes of young people. As an intervening variable the media is 
supposed to play an active role in shaping the political attitudes and participation of 
young people. During the research project some questions have been raised which 
were important in highlighting certain solutions that can contribute to the fight 
against corruption and hasten the process of reform, development of the political 
process and democratisation. Consequently, this research suggests the importance of 
conducting research into the role of the political background of young people, which 
has been seen to be a major factor in evaluating the media’s impact on them. 
Furthermore, research is required into why and how young people are engaged by the 
political parties, as this research has identified that the role of the political 
background of young people on their understanding and response to the political 
news was more significant than any demographic variables. Alongside this the thesis 
found that corruption and the lack of government performance originate in the client 
system which is in turn based on the rentier system. However, there was no 
opportunity to explore this dimension in depth as the present research is the field of 
media studies which do not allow wider analysis of clientalism. This would be 
valuable in any future research on clientalism. The outcome of this thesis can be taken 
as a starting point by future researchers of political science to investigate further and 
in more detail the issue of clientalism and its implication in Kurdistan.  
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Appendix 
Appendix (1) The transcription of the focus groups (14- 28 April 2013) 
Focus Group first was students from media study conducted in Sulaymaniyah 
University for discussing the GK TV in 28th  April, 2013 
1. Lanya, Female, Kurdish Islamic Union (opposition party) 
The media of the ruling parties do not focus on corruption and try to show people that 
the government is perfect. As I can say the media of the ruling parties is not really a 
platform to provide people with information about the real issues due to the extensive 
coverage of external issues and the advantages of the government. These channels 
have lost their influence because people believe these channels are attempting to 
manipulate people through the coverage of unnecessary themes. 
2. Daban, Male, (opposition party) 
The opposition media are focused on corruption and they have taken a critical stance 
against the government. This style has become the identity of the opposition channels, 
whereas the media of the ruling parties have become known for supporting the 
government and hiding its imperfections at any cost. The differing agendas of the 
Kurdish media have thus become more transparent for people. Moreover, the 
opposition media have put the media of the ruling parties in a defensive position. 
Furthermore, the media of the ruling parties try to ignore local issues through the 
coverage of external topics. So, the media of the ruling parties have lost their 
reliability and influence. 
3. Aso, Male, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) (ruling party) 
GK TV and the other media that belong to the ruling parties have gone into a defensive 
position as they have tended to exclude news and reports about corruption. At the 
same time the opposition media have focused on corruption to the extent that people 
do not trust the government, only those who belong to the ruling parties. Moreover, 
the opposition media try to convince people that the opposition parties are a viable 
alternative to take power. Accordingly, sections of the population do not trust either 
the opposition or the ruling parties’ media because they believe that both have lost 
their reliability. This reason has motivated people to look for independent media, 
although the independent media are rather similar to the opposition media. 
Therefore, I can say that we need professional media which could operate objectively.  
I think the effect of the media is related to the political background of the viewer, as 
the political background of each person depends on the family political background of 
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that person. Moreover, the political background of the majority of people returns to 
the financial benefits gained by families from the political parties. So, those who still 
do not receive any financial benefit from the political parties in rule prefer to support 
the opposition parties. 
4. Shwan, Male, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) (ruling party) 
GK TV is a means for showing the projects and activities done by the government, 
particularly in those sectors administered by the PUK, while at the same time the KDP 
uses its media for the same reason. Therefore, GK TV tends to show the advantages of 
the government, as it does not show any corruption issues. Alongside this, the 
opposition media underrate the government’s activities and projects. So, the media 
that belongs to the ruling parties are forced to take a defensive position, which means 
that the opposition media have taken an offensive position. 
GK is becoming a regional channel because it focuses on the other parts of Kurdistan, 
such as Turkey, Iran and Syria. So it cannot cover every internal issue. 
5. Lara, Female, independent 
I don’t agree with the argument that the opposition media do not work objectivily 
because they show reports with audio-visual and the government are not able to 
correct most of these news items which are shown across the opposition media. So I 
understand they want to reduce the role of the opposition media, as they want to 
reiterate that the current opposition parties are not a viable alternative government.   
This is the other negative aspect of the ruling political parties as they cannot make 
reforms and most of their members have lost their sense for money and privileges. 
Instead of behaving logically and reflecting our society, they try to manipulate people 
for the small family or group who monopolise power. The government is 
fundamentally corrupt and the media are not able to cover all aspects of this 
corruption. It is clear that the government has expired, but at the same time it is not 
allowing the rotation of power in a peaceful manner. Young people are aware of all the 
facts but there is not a real choice. We understand we need change but we do not 
know how to implement change. 
Focus Group second was young people in not in higher education and conducted 
in Cafe shop for discussing the GK TV in 15th April, 2013 
1. Bahasht, Female, Gorran movement (opposition party) 
GK TV focuses on the new public services provided by the government to show that it 
is perfect and efficient. However, there is more corruption on the ground which is not 
covered by GK TV.  GK does not address the real issues objectively. I don’t trust GK TV 
so I try watching other TV channels to understand what is going on. 
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2. Rawand, Male, Islamic Group (opposition) 
GK TV does not cover the issues impartially because it covers the positive aspects of 
the government only and remains silent on corruption cases. Also it tries to ignore the 
people’s issues through the coverage of foreign countries’ news.  GK TV is the tool 
used by the PUK as a political target for them, not to help people understand what is 
right and what the government should take into consideration in order to be useful for 
the people. 
3. Hawar, Male, independent 
Every person is sure that there is more corruption even among the political leaders, 
although this is not covered by GK TV or other media that are owned by the political 
parties in power. The media owned by the political parties in power are faltering in 
popularity, especially amongst young people because they do not give a true account 
of the government's performance. The Kurdish authorities do not want to provide any 
services to normal people; instead they give services only to those who have political 
affiliation to them.  The government started to improve the country’s infrastructure 
due to critical pressure from the opposition parties. I mean the government does not 
function properly even when reform is forced on them by the opposition parties. So 
how can I trust GK TV which is owned by corrupt political parties? At the same time I 
do not think the opposition media is perfect because it is working for a specific target 
which represents the political parties’ interests. I hope the independent media will 
grow so it can give us a real account of what is happening on the ground. We also need 
new political parties which can legislate for what is useful for Kurdish society not for 
their members only. I do not trust any media whether owned by the political parties in 
power or by the opposition parties. However, I watch them, and then I try to create 
new ideas because each media channel focuses on specific issues with a specific 
interpretation 
4. Soran, Male, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) (ruling party) 
GK TV shows some news on corruption however it does not cover the big cases 
because GK TV is owned by the PUK which is in power. I do not agree with some of my 
friends' arguments that GK TV does not cover national news. Instead, it focuses more 
on the coverage of external news because GK TV is satellite TV and it has viewers in 
another parts of Kurdistan, such as Turkey, Iran and Syria. TV news is controlled by 
politics in Kurdistan, and although there are independent newspapers and websites, 
TV is still the main effective tool. So, I would prefer to see the emergence of 
independent TV channels which would be the best means of showing us the facts of 
real life in Kurdistan.  GK TV has a right to focus on the news that is related to the 
advantageous projects introduced by the government, because the channel obtains its 
funds from the PUK. So, it is not a shame that GK TV shows the advantages of the 
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government. Besides, GK has a weekly discussion programme that invites two people 
from different backgrounds while KNN TV invites only those from the opposition 
whose opinions are always against the government. 
Focus Group third was students from media study conducted in Sulaymaniyah 
University for discussing the KNN TV in 14th   April, 2013 
1. Nian, Female, Islamic Group (opposition) 
KNN TV is one of the channels that has been an active participant for addressing 
corruption, however it shows that the Gorran Movement is the only alternative that 
has a suitable solution. So, that is not true because most of the political leaders of 
Gorran were in power before the cleavage from the PUK. Furthermore, recently 
corruption has emerged inside Gorran as well, whether amongst their own members 
or KNN staff members. 
2. Shaida, Female, Gorran movement (opposition party) 
KNN has changed the critical thinking of Kurdish society. Before the emergence of 
KNN TV the other opposition parties were weak and they did not dare to address 
corruption more openly.  KNN has opened horizons for debating several cases that 
contribute to helping people understand what their rights are and how to demand 
these rights. However, there is not full freedom in more places which could help the 
media to investigate several issues due to a lack of democracy as well as the right to 
access of information.  
The government is unable to improve the system definitely, as we cannot believe them 
because they have not given any good evidence. For example, the government has no 
plan for young people even those who are educated and have higher degrees and 
qualifications, although the budget is increasing more and more. I am not optimistic 
about my future life because jobs are more difficult to find as you need mediation and 
nepotism. Also some jobs are not available for females, particularly in the private 
sector. 
3. Sarwar, Male, Islamic Group (opposition) 
I think KNN TV has an important role in raising the level of awareness of the people. 
This channel has clarified some concepts in particular relating to corruption which 
were not familiar to a wide range of Kurdish society, such as clarifying the corruption 
of government by using data.  Moreover, KNN has helped people to understand their 
rights through explaining the budget of the government and government economic 
policy.  
The government has taken a wrong policy whether at the level of internal policy or 
that towards Baghdad due to the actions of President Massoud Barzani who has 
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tended to be over-authoritarian. Consequently, the wrong policy of exerting 
presidential authority in Kurdistan against Baghdad has been reflected on two levels. 
Firstly the division of the political parties' discourse, as many of them have a different 
vision towards Baghdad and Barzani does not share them. The second has led to 
creating crises with Baghdad. Anyway, I think we need to change this power structure 
as it has not been successful because the government has promised to reform several 
times and has demonstrated to us that it is unable to do so. 
4. Barham, Male, independent 
According to my point of view, KNN TV is focused only on corruption and it ignores 
the reforms that have been made by the government. So, this style of coverage by the 
channel makes me sceptical. We need to correct the vision that is conducted on the 
ground. For example, I try to watch the opposition and ruling party TV to understand 
the reality of the issues, as each one of them interprets issues consistent with its own 
agenda. However the ruling party TV claims that the government is taking the right 
way to bring about reform and that the government is perfect. 
The government makes improvements occasionally because it does not have a real 
strategic plan for reform.  I think both people and the authorities are remiss in 
apportioning blame for corruption.  
5. Alan, Male, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) (ruling party) 
I think that KNN does not cover the important issues on the ground and deals with 
events and cases according to its own interests. It works for the Gorran Movement, 
which is the main opposition entity, so KNN TV has a specific policy, for instance, it 
shows some reports only at certain times. So, this channel can be assumed to remain 
silent on some issues such as corruption, particularly when the Gorran Movement 
becomes too comfortable with the political parties in power. 
The problem of Kurdish media is its funding. Therefore; I think the Kurdish media 
cannot be characterised by professionalism, accordingly, working in the Kurdish 
media is like working in the other organs of the same political parties. Alongside this, 
KNN TV or the other media companies are owned by the governing parties so they 
have an absolute affiliation to the political parties who fund them. 
I think the case of reform in Kurdistan is related to the political system of Kurdistan 
established by all the political parties. In this case, if the opposition parties take 
power, the system will not become better. So, I don’t think the opposition parties are 
the best alternative 
6. Naza, Female, independent 
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Most people are aware of corruption through both the opposition and independent 
media because the media of the political parties in power shows only the advantages 
of the government. Also, the Kurdish authorities send the message to us that they are 
the best and there is no alternative. The two main political parties argue that the other 
parties have no right to take power because they created freedom for the Kurdish 
people. So the government are not in favour of any peaceful rotation of power. 
Furthermore, the political parties in power try to create a crisis in order to distract 
people from thinking about their rights. 
7. Shaho, Male, Islamic Group (opposition) 
I do not believe that the government has the ability to act against corruption and 
improve the government’s performance. Every day the independent Media and the 
opposition TVs show a huge amount of corruption in the public sector, although the 
government does not take any consideration of this. The current government has lost 
its reliability, as every person is sure this government is bad. Besides, the government 
is not considering the citizens' lack of trust due to the use of public funds to buy votes, 
and the increased salaries of those belonging to the ruling political parties. So, I do not 
think we have any real choice because the loyalty of a wide number of Kurdish people 
has already been bought, particularly the middle and elderly generations. 
Focus Group fourth was students from media study conducted in Sulaymaniyah 
University for discussing the KNN TV in 21th   April, 2013 
1. Aram, Male, independent 
KNN TV has played an active role in raising people's awareness, in particular relating 
to corruption and government policy. The coverage of KNN TV makes the government 
carry out some reforms. I think if there were no strong opposition parties in the 
political arena of Kurdistan, the government would not work as well.   
2. Gaylan, Male, independent 
The government has become corrupt, particularly after the split between the Gorran 
Movement and the PUK because the balance of power changed and the KDP started to 
control the government because the PUK became weak. Furthermore, the emergence 
of Gorran led to people discovering to what extent the ruling parties had become 
corrupt because previously there was no method of investigating government activity 
and the opposition parties were weak at that time due to the lack of freedom for 
journalists and the media. Therefore, I can say that corruption is much greater than is 
presented to the people and if we made a full investigation, more and more corruption 
could be uncovered.  So I want to say that KNN has a good role to play in enabling 
young people to understand political issues. 
3. Tahsen, Male, independent 
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I think before the emergence of Gorran and its KNN TV the political life of Kurdistan 
was closed and non-interactive because the opposition parties were weak, as at the 
same time the level of freedom did not encourage competition in any way. The 
government does not want to make reforms as more people are interested in the 
government from which they obtain their salary, especially those of middle age and 
above. So, any change to the current system in Kurdistan is not easy because 
fundamentally the wider part of Kurdish society supports the government. 
Furthermore, elections are controlled by the ruling political parties so there is a lack 
of integrity in the elections. The government is manipulating the people in several 
ways, such as creating the crisis against Baghdad and making false promises to the 
people. According to the President of Kurdistan as mentioned earlier, he promised to 
make reforms, but it is clear that there is nobody who can drive forward the reform 
process. 
4. Rovan, Male, Gorran movement (opposition party) 
I think there is no kind of reform in Kurdistan and the two biggest parties have 
monopolised public funds to enable them to stay in power. Although the budget 
increase more and more every year, the infrastructure of Kurdistan is still not 
established. 
5. Lana, Female, independent 
I think KNN TV shows an overestimated image of corruption because this TV has a 
specific agenda that concentrates on the negative part of the government. I think if the 
opposition parties took power they would behave in the same way as the current 
government. In particular, the Gorran movement as most of its members were 
members of the PUK prior to the split between them. It is 22 years since we separated 
from Baghdad and the Kurdish authorities have not provided us with good policy-
making even yet. So we do not know who are better political parties, those in power 
or the opposition parties. I mean there is no real choice because there is not a good 
alternative. Moreover, the two biggest parties do not allow any new political entity to 
gain power because they control everything, such as, the armed forces, security and 
even public funds. So we are sure the political parties will not accept any peaceful 
transfer of power and we cannot think that a revolution would be useful, as the Arab 
Spring did not produce any good or lasting solutions. 
6. Nvar, Female, independent 
KNN TV every day shows corruption in the government and this issue has become 
familiar. This media coverage does not affect the government’s policy. We have 
adapted to corruption as it has become the norm in the everyday lives of most people. 
The Gorran movement and its KNN TV are corrupt as well. So, I do not think that we 
have the chance to make any reforms. 
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7. Shanaz, Female, independent  
KNN TV has helped people to understand their rights but this does not mean that the 
Gorran movement is a good alternative to take power. We have to take consideration 
of the social and political components of Kurdistan that are divided into several areas 
of influence and each political party has a strong power base in some of them. The 
Gorran movement has more influence in Sulaymaniyah province where the other 
opposition parties consist of no more than 15%. I think any change to the current 
system is difficult, so I prefer to ask the government to make plans for reform. 
Focus Group Fifth was students from political science conducted in Human 
Development University for discussing the Awena in 20th  April, 2013 
1. Xhdr, Male, independent 
It is one of the media platforms that provide information to people about corruption 
in the government but it does not have more influence than the opposition's media 
because the opposition media has more correspondents and employees in the public 
sector that provide them with information about corruption. Besides this, the 
opposition TV has a bigger role in covering government corruption, for example KNN 
TV has revealed the extent of corruption in the public sector which it shows to 
viewers every day. I think the problem of corruption in Kurdistan is the system itself. 
Even if professional employees were openly assigned to the public sector, corruption 
would not be reduced. Because the public sector is controlled by the political parties 
in every place it becomes difficult to distinguish between the political parties and the 
government. So I cannot imagine that the Kurdistan government will make reform in 
any way. 
2. Rebaz, Male, independent 
There is no media channel which is able to show the real extent of corruption in 
Kurdistan because the system is corrupt absolutely. There is not full freedom for the 
media to investigate the public sector, especially sensitive documents and economic 
contracts. The government does not want to make reforms, for instance it argues that 
it is doing its best, while at the same time we see corruption every day in every place. 
The independent media and opposition media take the same stance and they are 
trying to uncover corruption. Furthermore, the independent media have the role to 
raise awareness of people of their rights, while at the same time helping the 
opposition parties to achieve support from people. So it can be seen that the 
independent media have a greater role in the reform process and the political process 
indirectly as well. Besides, the independent media have more influence because they 
do not have any aims to reach power, while some critics argue that the opposition 
media are making propaganda to assist the opposition parties to take power.   
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3. Rozan, Female, independent 
Awena and the independent media are the best and most reliable resources, as the 
independent media cover the political ground clearly, while the opposition media 
merely try to create a bad image of the government.  The opposition media should 
show the advantages and disadvantages of the government. The government is not 
capable of carrying out reform because it does not have any long term strategy, so 
every year the main issues facing people become worse. Although the budget has 
increased rapidly because of oil revenues, the average standard of living has 
decreased every year, particularly for young people because jobs and housing have 
become more difficult to find.    
4. Massud, Male, Democratic Party of Kurdistan (KDP) (ruling party) 
I think the Awena website addresses corruption cases objectively, as it has an active 
role to inform people about corruption. At the same time we should understand that 
the KRG is not like a developed country, so we should understand that we are in a 
transition stage and the situation is improving step by step. Kurdistan needs 
reconstruction, whilst the opposition and independent media claim that everything 
should become perfect. Moreover, the Awena website focuses on deficiencies and 
defects in the government, so consequently it gives people the wrong idea about the 
government’s performance and encourages pessimism. In the same way the ruling 
parties’ media channels portray the government doing everything perfectly, so we see 
the opposite view from both sides 
5. Kamaran, Male, Democratic Party of Kurdistan (KDP) (ruling party) 
 I have a different view from my friends I think Awena does not address corruption 
cases objectively as it is not accurate. Usually it shows a big headline without 
addressing the issue in-depth. This daily coverage by some media channels of 
corruption in the public sector has led to the normalisation of corruption as well. We 
need the solution to come from the government as I do not think that the opposition 
parties are a viable alternative to take power. So we should ask the government to 
make reforms in any way they can. 
6. Jutyar, Male, Gorran movement (opposition party) 
Awena shows the sensitive documents exposing corruption, however most of the time 
it does not reference its news sources as Awena argues that it is obtained from 
information leaked by government employees. So it is difficult to be trusted, while the 
media channels that belong to the Gorran movement present more sensitive news 
because they have power and the government is unable to punish them easily. In this 
case, both independent media, such as Awena and the opposition media, are the main 
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sources which tell us what the government is doing and in what ways the government 
is corrupt and why.  
I do not believe that the government wants to make reforms because every day we see 
the independent and opposition media uncovering  further corruption and the 
government does not listen because the political parties in power have their own 
economic interests as they are stealing  public funds through their big companies.   
The independent media channels have another important role which is giving space 
for some independent writers to assume the role of a pressure group as more young 
people are influenced by them. 
7. Revan, Female, independent 
There is corruption in every area of the public sector, and even the private sector is 
becoming corrupt because they are not controlled by any regulation. So the Awena 
Website is not capable of covering the real extent of corruption. Besides, Awena 
should cover some new services introduced by the government, in order not to appear 
biased to the opposition parties. 
8. Fahmey, Male, Gorran movement (opposition party) 
Awena is the first newspaper to criticise the government and contribute to raising 
political awareness of the Kurdish people. In addition it is one of the factors among 
the opposition parties which has led to the encouragement of some political leaders 
and groups who favour the reform process.  
The media of the political parties in power is not trusted by the people, and even some 
members of the political class prefer the independent media and opposition media 
because their employees work in these parties and can criticise their parties as well.         
The problem of the independent media is represented by some of the sensitive 
information from the government that is leaked by some employees in a confidential 
manner. Therefore, some people believe that some of these reports are not true.     
The majority of Kurdish people still belong to the political parties, particularly those 
who are middle-aged and older, so any change to the system becomes difficult. I think 
it will take several years because most of the younger generation would prefer to 
change the system through the change the power.  
Focus Group sixth was students from political science conducted in university of 
Sulaymaniyah for discussing the Sbeiy in 24th  April, 2013 
1. Rezaw, Female, (opposition) 
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The competition between the ruling political parties and those in opposition means 
that I don’t trust either of them. We understand the government is corrupt because 
this is covered by the media that do not have any political interest. Accordingly I 
prefer the independent media because it does not use propaganda for any particular 
political party to take power. 
The opposition parties have a specific aim which is to take power only and not to fight 
against corruption and make reforms. I am not happy with the government, even 
though there is no choice and no alternative party or parties are capable of removing 
the two main parties in power, particularly the KDP 
2. Shoxan, Female, Gorran movement (opposition party) 
The two main political parties in power have not carried out any real reform, even 
though they have introduced some projects and services in the public sector following 
pressure on them by the opposition parties. This also enabled them to tell people that 
they have started to make reforms. 
There is no guarantee that the government will continue these reforms, as at any time 
a crisis can happen because the government does not have any strategic plans. 
We need to change the system and devolve power because reform will not come from 
the two current political parties in power. Instead, they continue to monopolise power 
in several ways, such as distributing public funds and privileges to their members and 
to those who promise to give them their votes. Accordingly the two ruling political 
parties believe that they do not have any strong opposition rival as yet. Therefore the 
government thinks that reform is not necessary. 
3. Sheren, Female, independent 
The daily coverage of corruption by the Sbaiy Website makes me feel pessimistic 
about the government even though the government has some positive points. I would 
prefer Sbaiy to show the advantages and disadvantages of the government in order to 
appear more objective. Furthermore, I need to know what new projects are coming 
from the government, so in this case I tend to follow the media that belong to the 
political parties in power. 
So we need a professional media that covers both sides and makes us quite sure about 
what is happening on the ground. Due to the high levels of unemployment, most 
people give their votes to the political parties in power in order to obtain financial 
support or privileges, as most of these people are not capable of obtaining financial 
support in any other way. 
4. Xhagy, Female, independent 
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The independent media and that of the opposition parties uncover government 
corruption every day but the government does not listen. Corruption cases have 
become a normal thing because the majority of people have an interest in this 
situation. I think the people are divided into two groups. The first one supports the 
government because they receive funds and privileges as they are the majority. The 
second group does not favour the government because they do not receive any such 
funds and jobs. This second group can be subdivided into categories such as: young 
people, people adhering to the opposition parties and people who demand social 
justice and reform. 
Focus Group seventh was students from political science conducted in 
university of Sulaymaniyah for discussing the Xendan in 20th April, 2013 
1. Salar, Male, KurdishIslamic Union (opposition party) 
I believe the majority of Kurdish media channels are biased because they belong to the 
political parties and the media workers have a specific political and social background 
as well. Furthermore, I can say that the Kurdish media channels do not work 
objectively, particularly, the opposition media because they only show the 
disadvantages of government policy. 
I do not see that the government is capable of carrying out reform because more and 
more people are becoming upper class or lower class whereas the middle class are 
faltering every day. Besides, I believe there is no real choice because the opposition 
parties in the political arena do not offer a better alternative as well. 
2. Dana, Male, Kurdish Islamic Union (opposition party) 
There is no public broadcasting service in Kurdistan, even the media of each of the 
two main political parties in power focus on activities conducted by those in power in 
the same political party which funds the media at the same time. In another sense, the 
media of the PUK does not focus on sectors which are managed by those responsible 
within the KDP, although both PUK and KDP are in a coalition government.   
The media channels of the political parties in power try to focus people’s attention 
onto certain issues so that people do not think about the main issues. For instance, 
when people ask for reforms, the media of the two ruling political parties focus on the 
political crisis with Baghdad. The government has suspended some decisions 
regarding relations with Baghdad in order to use them when any internal crisis may 
occur. 
3. Mardan, Male, Gorran movement (opposition party) 
The budget of the government has increased dramatically because of our oil 
production after 2003 due to the economic sanctions being lifted. However, the 
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government does not have any suitable strategy for establishing infrastructure and 
controlling unemployment because of corruption. At the same time the media 
channels belonging to the two political parties in power try to obscure the facts from 
people's' eyes. 
I do not believe that the government is able to fight corruption and make reforms in 
any way, as the leaders of the two political parties have become a kind of Mafia 
because they are clearly stealing public funds. If he independent media and opposition 
media did not exist, nobody would know to what extent the government is corrupt. 
We cannot trust the government because it has already acknowledged corruption for 
several years and has not punished any one. Accordingly, how can we trust the 
government. 
4. Harem, Male, independent 
The people are quite sure that the government is corrupt, accordingly people do not 
trust the government and the media channels which support the government due to 
all the false promises made by the government over the last decade that they would 
introduce reforms. 
If we need reform this government should be taken over by the opposition parties, as 
all people understand that the government is not capable of fighting against 
corruption, but some people have an interest to maintain the current situation. In 
other words, the government supports some people by offering financial funds and 
privileges, so this group of people are helping the government by giving them votes 
and legitimacy. 
5. Hazar, Male, (opposition) 
The Xendan website and other media channels belonging to the political parties in 
power are a means of defending the government instead of being used to inform 
people of what is being conducted on the ground. 
We cannot trust the government because it has failed to make reforms as, day by the 
day the standard of living is worsening, although the budget of the government has 
been increasing more and more every year. We hope that the system will be changed 
as soon as possible. However, I do not think the system can be changed due to the fact 
that the two main parties control all the sensitive organs of authority.   
6. Shamal, Male, independent 
There is no real freedom in Kurdistan and the level of integrity of the government is 
not sufficient, as it does not encourage the independent and opposition media to 
investigate properly. Thus, we believe that corruption is actually much greater than 
has been shown. 
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7. Salam, Male, independent 
We need the independent media to actually reflect the facts to the people because the 
media channels belonging to the political parties, and even the opposition media, do 
not function objectively, particularly in periods of crisis, as each of these media 
channels has a specific agenda in order to help its given political party to take power.  
Consequently, some people do not trust the media because they think that political 
issues are interpreted differently through the media owned by the ruling political 
parties and by the opposition media. Instead people prefer to obtain the facts from the 
news and information given by people who have actually witnessed certain cases. For 
instance, people trust the news about corruption when the story is mentioned to them 
by employees in the public sector rather than believing stories presented by the 
media. 
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Appendix (2) The transcription of In- Depth Interviews with young people 
(2- 25 May 2013) 
1. Ekram Male, from village, student in Political Science at the University of 
Sulaymaniyah (Independent): 
How do you see the government’s performance?  
The opposition's media shows a huge amount of corruption in the public sector, but at 
the same time the media of the ruling parties argue that the government is perfect. So 
it is difficult to trust which one of them is telling the truth. As for an evaluation of the 
government’s performance, we rely on the service process in the public sector to 
judge how it is running. I see there are no sanctions in the public sector if employees 
do not treat people equally. So what is the role of the government and how can we 
trust it? 
2.  Zana Male, from city, student in Media Studies at the University of Sulaymaniyah 
(opposition): 
Is there a difference in attitude between young people and others towards the 
government’s performance? 
Most people of middle age and above do not have any sense of responsibility towards 
the young generation and they are just looking after their own interest because they 
support the government, although they are quite sure that the government does not 
treat the public equally. Accordingly, the government does not tend to make reforms 
because the largest sections of society are happy with the current situation. 
Why, as you said, are some categories happy with the government? 
Well, because they have self - interest with the government, such as jobs, pensions, 
getting a house or piece of land for establishing a house. What’s more, they have got 
all of these by mediation and favouritism rather than through open and fair 
competition. 
3. Heshw Female, from Sulaymaniyah, student in Media Studies at the University of 
Sulaymaniyah (ruling parties): 
What are your views on people’s voting at the next election? 
I will give my vote to one of the political parties in power, although I know this party 
has become corrupt due to the fact that some of my family were victimised by this 
party, but still we are getting pensions from the party as well as receiving some 
privileges. 
What about other people who do not have the opportunity to offer sacrifice for 
the Kurdish national movement? 
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 Well, at the same time I feel unhappy because all people have a right to get the 
privileges through good opportunities and the authorities should treat them equally. 
4.  Zala Female, from Sulaymaniyah city, student in Media Studies at the University of 
Sulaymaniyah (independent): 
What do you think about the government policy, particularly in relation to 
reform and corruption, as these concepts are becoming more common amongst 
media and political parties? 
I cannot imagine how the government can make reform because the KDP and PUK 
have held power since the revolution in 1991 and they have divided Kurdistan into 
two zones of influence. Ever since then there are many people who support these 
parties through the military, intelligence and security services. Alongside this, the two 
parties started appointing many people in to the public sectors and giving pensions to 
people in order to influence them in the elections. The big part of Kurdish society 
obtain such privileges from the two main parties, for instance there are 1.5 million 
employees in the public sector. Accordingly the largest part of society still supports 
the government because of their own vested interests. 
Who do you mean when you talk about the largest part of society who still 
supports the government? 
Well, most of them are middle aged and above, particularly those who live in rural 
areas and are not educated, as well as some young people who are affiliated to the 
political parties due to their salaries and jobs. 
5.  Shorsh Male, from town, student in Political Science in at University of 
Sulaymaniyah (independent): 
Why do the opposition and independent media focus on the reform of the 
political system, as the government has called for reforms against corruption? 
The two main parties do not make reforms because they want to stay in power in any 
way. So the devolution of power in a peaceful manner in any new democracy is 
difficult. I want the opposition parties to be stronger in order to observe the 
government and stand firmly against corruption. Accordingly, the reform of our 
system will need more time. At the same time there are many people who want the 
system to change more quickly as they are waiting for specific results from the 
opposition parties. Alongside this, I fear these people will lose their endurance to 
support the opposition parties. I am sure we will change the system given time. 
Why would you like the system to be changed? 
241 
Well, it is our right to seek a change in the system because we need to test the other 
political parties as the two main parties in power are absolutely corrupt. 
How can the system be changed? 
Well, we need all people to understand that the two political parties are not capable of 
making reform, so they need the people to change their political behaviour in order to 
choose opposition parties. 
6. Soma Female, from Sulaymaniyah city, student in Media Studies at the University of 
Sulaymaniyah (opposition parties) 
What do you think about government policy and the opposition media‘s 
arguments against the government? 
The government is weak if compared with the political parties' offices in all the main 
cities, as the KDP has the main power in its zone of influence and the PUK has the 
main power in its zone, whereas the central government is controlled by them.  What 
is clear is that the government is administered by the personal whims of government 
officials in the political parties instead of being run through regulation and the terms 
of the constitution. For instance, when you go to different institutions in different 
places of the public sector you receive different treatment and services because the 
process is related to the employee not to the system exactly.  Moreover, government 
resolutions are made by a few higher political leaders and decisions are based on their 
own personal mood as well. The parliament serves only to rubber stamp these 
resolutions. Also, the parliamentary members of the ruling parties are controlled by 
their political parties. 
So, what can be the solution for all the problems of the political system as you 
mentioned? 
Well, we need our system to become more democratic in order for all people and the 
political parties to have equal opportunity of obtaining financial funds. We also need 
transparency of government policy and fair elections. And then, the government will 
try to make reforms and the opposition parties will achieve a real chance to take 
power. Also the people will understand the facts and they will become free to choose 
which parties are most suitable for holding office. 
7. Rabar Male from, Sulaymaniyah city, student in Media Studies at the University of 
Sulaymaniyah (opposition parties) 
What do you think about the government performance, as you know we are 
near the next election? 
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The people are not happy with the government’s policy even some of those who have 
self-interests through their jobs, pensions and privileges because they think that the 
distribution of privileges is not divided equally among political members and those 
who have affiliation as well. As a consequence, I think all people who want reform but 
they are afraid of losing the current gains. 
Why do some people fear to lose the current gains and what do you mean by 
these gains?  
Well, due to the lack of equal opportunity for people to find jobs on the ground. If you 
support one of the ruling political parties you will be supported by the party through 
offering you a job in the public sector and in an organ of the party as well as being 
more likely to be nominated for one of these positions. This is because most positions 
in the public sector are distributed to those who have a good reference from the party 
rather than those with the necessary experience and qualifications. 
Why do young people make up the largest sector of the population who seek 
political reform? 
The young people are seeking reforms and achievement of their rights due to the fact 
that they have little or nothing to lose. There is high unemployment amongst them 
because the government has appointed older people to more jobs in the public sector 
in order to win the last election and achieve the people's support by apparently 
reducing the level of unemployment. 
8.  Zahra Female from Sulaymaniyah city, student in Media Studies at the University of 
Sulaymaniyah (ruling parties) 
What do you think about the government’s policy? 
Well, since the revolution in 1991 we hoped we would become more democratic but 
day by the day the ruling political parties are holding onto power. Particularly the KDP 
has controlled the Kurdistan Regional Government, in areas such as economic 
agreements and policy, foreign departments and higher posts of government. 
Consequently, the opposition parties cannot change the power structure even if they 
win the election. 
What about the PUK, which is the other political party in power and has 
influence on its zone (the Green Zone of political influence) as well? 
Well, that is right but the PUK is not really similar to the KDP, especially in relation to 
the issues of freedom. The Green Zone fundamentally allows more space for the 
people to express their ideas and the emergence of an independent media as well. 
Moreover, the PUK has lost its power since the split of Nawsherwan's group (Gorran 
movement) from the PUK and became the main opposition in Kurdistan. 
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Consequently, this zone has become much better than the Yellow Zone (the KDP's 
zone). 
What are the benefits of the Green Zone for the media and political process, as 
you said that it is much better than the Yellow Zone? 
Well, the problem is democracy and the political knowledge and attitudes of the 
people towards the political parties. I think more people still need to understand their 
responsibilities and their rights, but the majority of people are focusing on their self-
interest in the short term. Some opposition media organisations are working more 
professionally and they have similar messages to the opposition media, as both of 
them are trying to help people understand the government's policy. It is also 
important for people to use their role to participate in finding the solution by using 
their votes because the majority of people do not believe they have any role in 
elections. 
9. Barzan Male, from Erbil Capital city, graduated from the Salahaddin University 
Erbil- Capital city (opposition) 
What do you think about the government policy? 
The budget of the government has increased and some people became well off on the 
other hand unemployment has increased as well especially amongst young people 
coming out of university because there are not enough jobs in public sector and 
salaries in the private sector are no better as they do not include life insurance. So, I 
think life for normal people will become worse. 
What do you mean by “normal people” and why will life become worse as you 
said? 
Well, by normal people I mean those who have no mediation with political officials 
and they do not become employees in the public sector, especially young people.    
What is your suggestion for finding a solution and what should the government 
do to solve these issues? 
I think the government does not want to find a solution because it is focussing on its 
own members and those affiliated to its own political party. I mean the government 
does not feel any responsibility towards the public and does not treat people equally. 
Accordingly there is not any solution for normal people. That is the choice of the 
people as I cannot envisage how life can be changed. 
What about the role of the election and “normal people” as you mentioned who 
are not happy with this situation, and what is the role of the media in this issue?  
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The government does not take any consideration of the election because 
fundamentally it has control of everything, such as the majority of people by providing 
them with a job, salary, and pension. Furthermore, if the two parties lost in the 
election it is more likely that fighting would break out, especially the KDP. 
10. Kwvan Male, from Erbil Capital city not completed the higher education 
(independent) 
What do you think about the government policy? 
The government has unstable plans, for example we export the oil and the petrol is 
expensive in our country. I focus on my job I do not have any salary in the public 
sectors, so If I had a job in the public sector that would be best. 
Do you think the people have a right to ask the government to decrease the 
price of petrol and offer the state pension to people? 
Yes of course but the government does not listen to us. 
Do you mean the government has not got a good policy and what about the 
opposition parties? 
Yes, the government just focuses on its own power and helps those who support the 
party to stay in power. The opposition parties are also similar to those parties in 
power. The opposition parties show the government’s mistakes because they are not 
participating in power.  
11. Saber Male, employee in the public sector in Erbil (ruling parties) 
What do you think about the media, especially in relation to reform and 
corruption issues? 
Well, I think all the reports covered on opposition TV and some independent websites 
are true. But these channels have a specific target which is showing a negative image 
of the government to people and telling people that if we the opposition took power, 
we would all be better off. So, I think the government has some advantages and 
disadvantages as well, and then I do not think the opposition parties are a good 
alternative for taking power. 
You said the government has some disadvantages, how do you know about that 
and who is providing you with this knowledge? 
We hear about corruption from people who are working in the public sector and I can 
see something in our daily lives, also sometimes we hear it from the media. 
Do you think corruption is a normal issue in the government and who is 
responsible for making reform? 
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Well, I think nobody starts out corrupt, I just want to say that people become corrupt 
because they are looking for favouritisms when they apply for a jobs or even when 
they visit a public sector office to obtain a service. 
Do you mean if someone has mediation in the public sector he or she will 
receive service more quickly and secure a job as well?  
Yes, absolutely, as that is clear, who are you if you don’t know about that? Are you not 
from this country!? 
What is the role of the government in punishing employees in the public sector 
who do not treat people equally? 
Well, as I said people are corrupt and the government can manipulate people in our 
country because we do not have a state pension in our system.  So the majority of 
employees appointed to the public sector will also try to manipulate the situation and 
offer service and favours to their relatives and friends rather than to the general 
public.     
12. Dlawar Male from Erbil Capital city not completed the higher education (ruling 
parties) 
How do you see the government performance? 
The level of public life and public services has become much better than some years 
ago. I am quite optimistic about the future because we have a good security situation 
and the budget of the government is improving due to the income from the oil.  
What about the opposition and the independent media that show some 
corruption within the government as well as arguing that parts of society do not 
feel satisfied with the current government? 
Well, the opposition and the independent media focus on some disadvantages of the 
government only, I mean they do not show both sides because the opposition parties 
have specific framing for covering the news in order to affect people's attitudes. 
Furthermore, the opposition parties have a specific agenda that they hope will lead 
them to take power. 
Do you mean that you cannot trust the opposition and the independent media? 
Well, I trust some news covered by the opposition and independent media, otherwise 
it does not mean that the government is totally bad because there is not any 
government in the world which has not made any mistakes, even in the western 
countries.  
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13. Darwn Female, from Kifri town, student at educational department at the 
University of Garmian (opposition parties) and the interviews hold in Young club in 
Kifri town 
How do you see the government performance? 
Well, I would like to say in brief that the government is unstable and it  is 
administered purely by (destiny) and (fate) because there is not any guarantee of 
meeting the promises made by the government. 
Do you mean that you cannot trust the government? 
Yes, and absolutely, because the government is not based on any specific institutional 
administration, as it is run according to individuals’ whims. Moreover, the 
government does not have any clear strategy, particularly when the administration of 
the government is changed, as the new administration makes its own plan. So I can 
say the Kurdish government is undeveloped as yet. 
What is the reason behind the government being undeveloped as yet according 
to what you are saying? 
Well, there are many factors. Firstly, the historical conflict between the KDP and PUK 
led to division of the government into two governments, and although unification of 
the departments occurred in 2005, there are still two distinct areas of influence. 
Alongside this, each political party has its own military, security services, intelligence 
agency and a certain share of the Ministry of Finance. Secondly, each political party 
appoints a leader for all the public sector in its own separate area of influence. 
Moreover, the offices of the two main political parties have influence on the public 
sector in the cities, towns and even in the countryside. So, I can say we have a system 
of political parties which hold power and we live in such a traditional political system. 
14. Sayran Female, from Kifri town, student at educational department at the 
University of Garmian (opposition parties) and the interviews hold in Young club in 
Kifri town 
What do you think about the government’s performance? 
The government does not follow any coherent strategy and I have seen there are not 
suitable political parties to take power, because the problem is the system. So we need 
more time to pass this stage as both political parties and public need to improve 
because all individuals only consider their own self-interest.    
What is the role of people in the election? 
As I said, we need make reform in our system whereas the political parties and the 
majority of people are not ready to do that. I think the elections will change the cover 
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of the government rather than the foundations of the system due to the fact we have 
done some election and the basic political issues are still did not addressed.  
15. Hanan Female, from Kifri town, student at educational department at Salahaddin 
University in Erbil (ruling parties) and the interviews hold in Young club in Kifri town 
What do you think about the government’s performance? 
Well, it is not perfect like in western countries but they are widely accepted by people 
in Kurdistan because the level of public services in Kurdistan is much better than in 
other parts of Iraq. Alongside this, I see the current political parties in power are 
better than the opposition parties because the opposition parties do not have the 
experience in governance, particularly in the field of security. I mean the opposition 
parties are not a perfect alternative especially at this stage because there is no 
guarantee that the opposition parties would be any better. Therefore, it is not 
reasonable we should support the opposition parties only on an assumption that the 
opposition parties still haven’t held power and could be better if we chose them. 
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Appendix (3) Semi Structured Interviews with young people 
1. Sarkawt, young male from Sulaymaniyah: 
How do you see the election campaign and what will affect the political process 
after the election?  
Well, I think there will not be a big change in the political process due to the fact that 
the KDP has kept control of its area of influence that includes the capital city, at the 
same time the KDP has become the leading political party especially after the split of 
the Gorran group from the PUK.  The political system was split 50-50, as currently the 
KDP has more power because the PUK has lost more than half of its affiliated 
supporters because of the split. Following this, the KDP has changed some regulations 
and has held power since the last election. Arguably Kurdistan has become two 
regions: the first one is Dohuk and Erbil that is controlled by the KDP absolutely. The 
second one is Sulaymaniyah province that is administered by the PUK formally but the 
majority of people there support the opposition parties. Therefore, the political 
process has become worse because the main political parties in power have changed 
from the two main parties to one main party which is the KDP that tends to be more 
authoritarian and the small party which is the PUK.  Following this, the KDP has taken 
power individually and uses the PUK just for legitimacy. 
2. Azad, young male from Sulaymaniyah: 
How do you see the election campaign, especially most of the slogans that refer 
to making reforms, fighting corruption and delivering a more fair outcome; and 
what about the promises during the election campaign?  
Well, I think it is a shame for the political parties in power that say they will carry out 
reforms because what about 22 years ago when they had absolute power in Kurdistan, 
why did they not do it then? I am not like some people who cannot remember that 
political parties have promised things and have not done it. However, I am not 
optimistic that I have a right to choose because there is no real choice on the ground 
due to everything being controlled by the KDP. As I predict the KDP will win because it 
will use public funds to buy votes, therefore, the opposition parties will not be able to 
take power in this election.     
Do you mean that the opposition parties will not win the election and the 
current parties will take power again?  
Yes, of course, but it does not lead me to withdraw support from the opposition 
parties because we need to send a message to tell the government that this number of 
people do not want the current political parties to stay in power. As well as this, 
voting for the opposition parties can be helpful for people, especially in parliament 
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because the opposition members of parliament were the only ones defending projects 
and regulations that were useful for normal people    
3. Farman, young male from Sulaymaniyah: 
What do you think will happen after the election particularly in relation to 
public services, government performance and the reform process as we know in 
the election campaign stage? 
Well, this election will not change anything as the two political parties in power will 
form a coalition government and they will go on with their previous strategies as this 
policy is suitable for this stage. 
What do you mean it is suitable for this stage and do you think that the current 
strategy of government is perfect? 
Well, the two political parties have offered service to us since the Kurdish National 
Movement. So, how can we not support them at a time when the opposition parties 
are not offering a good alternative? We also have to take into consideration that the 
current parties will not accept losing power as they have some companies that have 
made a lot of economic agreements for the long term, so if they fail in the election 
everything will be revealed. Therefore, the two parties will do everything to protect 
their interests even starting a fire.    
4. Bestwn, young male from Sulaymaniyah: 
How do you see the election campaign and to what extent can the change of 
power take place through the elections in Kurdistan? 
Well, the two political parties in power do not want to lose control and they conducted 
the election to obtain legitimacy from the international community and to say to 
people that they are practising democracy. I mean they are not going to offer any 
devolution of power in a peaceful manner. So, the ruling parties have distorted the 
image of democracy. As well as this, they are holding an election to silence the 
electorate, especially when people are demanding their rights by telling the country 
that they have been returned with public support in the election. By this, I want to 
explain what kind of democracy we have. Democracy here gives legitimacy to corrupt 
political parties and manipulates the local population and the world community. 
Do you want to say that you do not trust the election? 
Yes absolutely, and I will cast my vote just to tell the current government we want to 
change. 
Why do you and other people do not prefer to change the government as you 
would like that? 
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We hope to change the system in any way and we cannot do that because the majority 
of people are still with the government for their own self-interest. Moreover, as I said 
the ruling parties still control everything.    
5. Dashet, young male from Sulaymaniyah: 
How do you see the election campaign and how will it affect the political future 
of Kurdistan? 
Well, the election should give an opportunity to both political parties and people to 
make a decision about the political process in order to be helpful for our society. 
Nevertheless, there is no choice for people and the opposition parties to make because 
the ruling parties control everything, such as the army, security and financial funds. 
Therefore, I cannot imagine that the two main political parties will accept a loss of 
power and become the opposition because they are planning to take power for their 
generation like in some Arab countries where power was taken and later lost in the 
Arab Spring. 
What about the opposition parties who have declared during the election 
campaign that they will change the system if they win? 
Well, they have to tell to people that in order to try and win the election and get more 
votes but I cannot believe that the ruling parties will allow any other political parties 
to take power in any way. 
What about the PUK which has lost some of its popularity due to the Gorran 
group splitting from them as some observers claim? 
Well, despite the PUK losing its popularity, it will control the authority in the area of 
its influence even if the Gorran group gets more votes. For instance, the KDP and PUK 
entered under one list in the last election and the PUK did not achieve more votes in 
its zone compared with the Gorran list. Otherwise, the KDP would have agreed to form 
a coalition government with the PUK on the basis of 50-50 members in parliament in 
order to allow each of them to retain control of their own zone of influence, although 
the KDP won more votes compared with the PUK. So, in this election the KDP and PUK 
will keep power, although each of them has entered separately in this election, as I 
think they will establish a coalition government together again. 
 6. Lawand, young male from Erbil: 
How do you see the election campaign and what will be changed after the 
election? 
Well, I expect that the KDP will attain more votes and the PUK will achieve fewer votes 
than in the last election so this will affect the balance between them. However, the 
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KDP will look to help the PUK because both of them have a similar interest if they 
remain in power. Furthermore, the two parties did not pay attention to corruption 
and they have a quite similar method of administration. I think this is the most likely 
scenario that will happen. Otherwise, there is another scenario if all the opposition 
parties attain more than 50 per cent of the votes, the KDP and PUK could be out of 
power or one of them at least. While it is difficult for this to happen at this stage, the 
opposition parties are gaining more and more support because the ruling parties are 
not making real reforms that are demanded by the people. 
What do you think will happen if the opposition parties attain more than 50 per 
cent of the votes as you said that is one scenario that may occur? 
Well, we hope this will happen as I mentioned before the two ruling parties or one of 
them could be out of power and the opposition parties would be able to participate in 
in the government by gaining more than 50 per cent of the votes which would mean a 
change in the political system that has been monopolised by the two parties since the 
Kurdish revolution. What is more, it could control corruption as all the hidden 
contracts and documents made by the current ruling parties would be revealed. 
Alongside this, we would be able to make developments in the political system and 
improve the democratic process that reflects on our standard of living. 
7. Hunar, young male from Erbil: 
How do you see the election campaign and how the political system be affected, 
particularly in relation to people’s standard of living? 
Well, I am not an employee in the public sector. So, I do not think the election will 
influence my life because I am not an employee who is waiting for an increase in my 
salary by the government. Furthermore, the price of everything tends to increase if 
people’s salaries are increased as well.  So, I do not have any interest in the 
government because I am responsible for meeting my own needs. 
Do you intend to vote in the election? 
I will go to cast my vote, although it will not change anything in my life. 
If you see that the election will not affect your life, why will you spend your time 
going to vote?   
Although the government has no influence on my life I see we have to go and vote 
because we have the one entity and need to respect it, and our previous generations 
struggled in order to allow us to live in freedom. So, participation in the election is a 
national duty and shows respect to the martyrs of the Kurdish National Movement. 
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Appendix (4) Focus Group Guide Questions 
A. Questions and themes that asked young people who watch GK TV 
- Did you think the GK TV addressed the necessary political issues? How and why? 
- What do you think of GK TV's coverage of political issues? 
- What did you think of GK TV's coverage of the corruption? 
- Do you think the GK TV addressed all kind of corruption on ground and their causes? 
- Do you see something that was not covered by GK TV about corruption? How? 
- What did you think of opposition TV's coverage of the corruption? 
- How did you feel toward the corruption?   Were you thinking you obtained enough 
information? What was lacking? 
- How the GK TV addressed the reform process and the government performance? 
- Do you think the opposition's TV reduces the possibility of the government to make 
reforms and the performance of government? 
- Do you think the GK TV addressed the reforms and the government performance 
objectively and how? Did you think the government able to make reform? 
- What did you think that government is active or opposition parties if who were on 
power? 
- Do you think they had similar/different thought with your thought? Why? And how? 
- What did you think of other young people who saw the political news on GK TV? 
- What is relationship between young people and their political background (political 
knowledge, political interest, political affiliation) with GK TV the coverage of political 
issues? 
- Which category of young people who trusted GK TV? Why? And  how? 
B. Questions and themes that asked young people who watch KNN TV 
- What do you think of KNN's coverage of political issues? 
- Do you think the KNN TV addressed the necessary political issues? How and why? 
- What do you think of KNN's coverage of the corruption? 
 -Do you think the KNN TV addressed all kind of corruption objectively on ground and 
their causes? 
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- What did you think the coverage of corruption across the ruling parties TV? 
- Do you think that the ruling TV or opposition TV are covered the corruption 
objectively and the causes of corruption 
- How KNN TV addressed the reform process and the government performance? 
- Did you think the KNN TV that addressed the reforms and the government 
performance objectively and how? Did you think the government able to make 
reform? 
- What do you think of other young people who watch the political news on KNN TV? 
- What is relationship between young people and their political background (political 
knowledge, political interest, political affiliation) with KNN TV the coverage of political 
issues? 
C. Questions and themes that asked young people who read political news 
across the Xendan website. 
- What do you think of Xendan's coverage of political issues? 
- Do you think the Xendan addressed the necessary political issues? How and why? 
- What did you think of Xendan's coverage of the corruption? 
- Do you think the Xendan that addressed all kind of corruption on ground and their 
causes? 
- Do you see something that was not covered by Xendan about corruption? How? 
- How do you feel toward the corruption? Were you thinking you obtain enough 
information? What was lacking? 
- What do you think of coverage of the corruption across the print media online of 
opposition and independent? 
- Which kind of print media online is covered the corruption and the causes of 
corruption objectively? such as, ruling parties, opposition parties and independent 
- How Xendan addressed the reform process and the government performance? 
- Do you think the Xendan addressed the reforms and the government performance 
objectively and how? Did you think the government able to make reform? 
- Do you think the print media online of opposition parties and independent have 
reduced the possibility of the government to make reforms and the performance of 
government? 
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- What did you think that government is active or opposition parties if who were on 
power? 
- What do you think of other young people who read the political news across the 
print media online of opposition parties and independent? 
- Did you think they had similar/different thought with your thought? Why? And how? 
- What is relationship between young people and their political background (political 
knowledge, political interest, political affiliation) with the coverage of political issues 
across the print media online of opposition parties and independent? 
- Which category of the young people who trusted the print media online of 
opposition parties and independent? Why? And how? 
D. Questions and themes that asked young people who read political news 
across the Sbeiy website. 
- What do you think of Sbeiy's coverage of political issues? 
- Do you think the Sbeiy addressed the necessary political issues? How and why? 
- What do you think of Sbeiy's coverage of the corruption? 
-Do you think the Sbeiy that addressed all kind of corruption on ground and their 
causes? 
- Do you see something that was not covered by Sbeiy about corruption? How? 
- How did you feel toward the corruption? Were you thinking you obtain enough 
information? What was lacking? 
- What do you think of coverage of the corruption across the print media online of 
ruling parties and independent? 
- Which kind of print media online is covered the corruption and the causes of 
corruption objectively? such as, ruling parties, opposition parties and independent 
- How Sbeiy addressed the reform process and the government performance? 
- Do you think the Sbeiy addressed the reforms and the government performance 
objectively and how? Did you think the government able to make reform? 
- Do you think the print media online of opposition parties and independent have 
reduced the possibility of the government to make reforms and the performance of 
government? 
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- What did you think that government is active or opposition parties if who were on 
power? 
- What did you think of other young people who read the political news across the 
print media online of opposition parties and independent? 
- Did you think they had similar/different thought with your thought? Why? And how? 
- What is relationship between young people and their political background (political 
knowledge, political interest, political affiliation) with the coverage of political issues 
across the print media online of opposition parties and independent? 
- Which category of the young people who trusted the print media online of ruling 
parties and independent? Why? And how? 
E. Questions and themes that asked young people who read political news 
across the Awena website 
- What do you think of coverage of political issues across  the Awena? 
- Do you think the Awena are addressed the necessary political issues? How and why? 
- What do you think of coverage of the corruption across Awena? 
- Do you think the Awena that addressed all kind of corruption on ground and their 
causes? 
- Do you see something that was not covered by Awena about corruption? How? 
- How did you feel toward the corruption? Were you thinking you obtain enough 
information? What was lacking? 
- What do you think of coverage of the corruption across the print media online of 
ruling parties and opposition parties? 
- Which kind of print media online is covered the corruption and the causes of 
corruption objectively? such as, ruling parties, opposition parties and independent 
- How Awena addressed the reform process and the government performance? 
- Do you think the Awena addressed the reforms and the government performance 
objectively and how? Did you think the government able to make reform? 
- Do you think the print media online of opposition parties and independent have 
reduced the possibility of the government to make reforms and the performance of 
government? 
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- What did you think that government is active or opposition parties if who were on 
power? 
What do you think of other young people who read the political news across the print 
media online of ruling parties and opposition parties? 
- Do you think they had similar/different thought with your thought? Why? And how? 
- What is relationship between young people and their political background (political 
knowledge, political interest, political affiliation) with the coverage of political issues 
across the print media online of ruling parties and opposition parties? 
- Which category of the young people who trusted the print media online of ruling 
parties and opposition parties? Why? And how? 
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Appendix (5)Content Analysis Coding Sheet 
Quantitative Descriptive Analysis Coding of News content Analysis 
Media Duration of Selecting the Sample for the News 
Content Analysis 
Internal Issues Disputed 
Areas 
Other 
News 
Values 
GK TV 
11 
April 
12 
April 
13 
April 
14 
April 
15 
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16 
April 
17 
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p
tio
n
 
R
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rm
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o
v
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m
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t 
P
erfo
rm
an
ce
 
C
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s' T
ru
st 
  
Positive Negative Neutral 
KNN TV 
Xendan 
Website 
Sbeiy 
Website 
Awena 
Website 
Qualitative Framing Analysis Coding of News content Analysis 
Media Duration of Selecting the Sample for the News 
Content Analysis 
Internal Issues The Four Frames 
Components 
The Other Frames 
GK TV 
11 
April 
12 
April 
13 
April 
14 
April 
15 
April 
16 
April 
17 
April 
C
o
rru
p
tio
n 
R
efo
rm 
G
o
v
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m
en
t P
erfo
rm
an
ce 
C
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s' T
ru
st 
P
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b
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efin
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n
 
C
au
sal In
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n
 
M
o
ral E
v
alu
atio
n
 
T
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en
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m
m
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d
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n
 
m
agn
ified
 fram
e
 
co
n
seq
u
en
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fram
e 
refram
in
g
 
sim
p
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 fram
e 
lo
calisin
g fram
e
 
in
tern
al secu
rity
 fram
e
 
KNN TV 
Xendan 
Website 
Sbeiy 
Website 
n
egativ
e 
p
o
sitiv
e Awena 
Website 
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Appendix (6) In- depth Interviews Guide Questions with Media Workers 
of (GK TV, KNN TV,  Xendan Website, Sbeiy Website and Awena Website) 
themes and aspects Questions 
the history of the media - when did they start 
- brief history 
Staff  -number of journalists 
- number of reporters 
- number of freelance reporters and journalists 
- number of news editors 
- number of news proof-readers 
- number of technical staff 
Sources of funding - funding from International Organisations 
- funding from Non-Governmental Organisations 
- funding from advertising 
- is there any government funding 
- is there any charity funds 
 - funding from political parties 
Salary - minimum and maximum salary of the staff if available 
- minimum and maximum for freelance reporters if available 
Editorial policy - how you are addressing the political issues 
- how you are addressing corruption, reform and government 
performance 
- how you are addressing the citizens' trust in the government 
 
Freedom to access the 
information to the 
journalists 
- how do you obtain the information on the government's department and 
the political issues 
- how does the government provide the information particularly about 
the corruption and shortcomings of the government 
- do government departments provide you information easily and equally 
why 
- what are the most important obstacles to obtain information 
- why some information are provided to the media in secret 
 
- why do some Kurdish media able to achieve the information in secret 
- what is the disadvantages publishing and broadcasting of the 
confidential information across the Kurdish media 
- what are the main forms of the obstacles facing the Kurdish media 
- how do solve the problem of freedom to access the information 
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Appendix (7) In-depth Interview with Media Worker 
Positions of 
media 
professionals 
Date of in-
depth 
interview 
Place and the method of the and- 
depth interview 
News Chief  
Editor of Xendan 
22/4/2013 Face to face interviewing in his office  
Managing News 
Editor of KNN TV 
22/4/2013 Face to face interviewing in his office  
The Head of 
Public Relations 
of GK TV 
14/4/2013 Face to face interviewing in his office 
News Chief 
Editor of Awena 
website 
19/2/2013 By Skype 
News Chief 
Editor of Sbeiy 
1/5/2013 Face to face interviewing in his office 
Former News 
Editor 
In GK TV 
14/4/2013 
Face to face interviewing in his office 
in Cafe  
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Appendix (8) Letter of Consent of the Young People of the Focus Groups 
and Conducting Interviews 
LETTER OF CONSENT 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
I fully understand that this focus group will take place to collect data which will be 
used to compile a thesis for a Doctorate (PhD) in the United Kingdom. The subject of 
this research is political communication and the media in Kurdistan. 
I fully understand my capacity as a volunteer in this research which I am entering into 
without any pressure.  
I understand that I have a right to stop the interview process at any time by telling the 
researcher that this is my wish. 
I have read this letter and I freely consent to participate in this study. 
I hereby freely agree to sign and provide pseudonym to indicate my consent. 
Signed in the city of______________________, Kurdistan, Iraq, on the _____day of_______ 
(month) in the year_____________ 
Signature :___________________________ 
Name :___________________________ 
 
